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Between Good and Evil 
The Singularity University, founded in 2008 by Peter Diamandis and Ray Kurzweil, 
exemplifies the optimistic stance regarding the usefulness of modern technologies for 
the improvement of our society. Its avowed mission is to "apply exponentially growing 
technologies, such as biotechnology, artificial intelligence and neuroscience, to address 
humanity’s grand challenges".1 Indeed, the name of the unaccredited university located 
in Silicon Valley explicitly points to the evolutionary transhuman theories supported by 
its founders. Singularity is in fact the term used by Kurzweil in his publications to 
describe the predicted moment, within a near future, when the computing power of 
machines will parallel the human mind, with supposed consequences such as the 
possibility to download the integrity of the human brain and its conscious state in a 
machine.2 If the Singularity University does not openly pursue the goal of merging or 
replacing human beings with machines, it does offer research programmes in artificial 
intelligence, robotics and biotechnologies. The philosophical ideas promoted by Ray 
Kurzweil and his followers might be discarded as extravagant and improbable by 
many,3 yet these critiques did not prevent the Singularity University from forming 
partnerships with powerful institutions and corporations, such as Google Inc. and the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The involvement of Google as 
corporate founder of the Singularity University and its recent acquisition of the artificial 
intelligence company DeepMind Technologies,4 has raised some criticism and 
speculation among the press. One of the most important online platforms on art and 
digital technologies, the mailing list Nettime, discussed the issue among its members. In 
                                                            
1 Singularity University, "Company Overview", accessed June 4, 2014, http://singularityu.org/media-
room/#. 
2  Ray Kurzweil, The singularity is near: when humans transcend biology (New York: Viking, 2005). 
3 The ideas and predictions of Ray Kurzweil have been criticized, among others, by philosophers, 
computer scientists and critical thinkers such as John Searle, Daniel Dennett and Rodney Brooks. See: 
Ray Kurzweil, Jay Wesley Richards and George F. Gilder, Are we spiritual machines? Ray Kurzweil 
vs. the critics of strong AI (Seattle, WA: Discovery Institute Press, 2002). 
4 Samuel Gibbs, "Google buys UK artificial intelligence startup Deepmind for £400m", The Guardian, 





May 2014, the critical theorist and media art specialist Geert Lovink wrote a post titled 
"Tensions within the bay area elites", to which several prominent art critics such as 
Florian Cramer and Brian Holmes responded, addressing and discussing a possible 
hidden agenda within Google and its supposed implications with the Singularity 
University and transhuman ideology.5 It is not the first time that the ethical orientation 
of Google - which has embraced the expression "don't be evil" as its corporate motto – 
has been called into question. As early as 2007, the Italian hacker collective Ippolito 
published a book condemning the profit-oriented economical strategies and the 
underlying privacy-invading mechanics of the famous search engine, pointing out the 
dangerous hegemonic potentials of the corporation.6 
 
The discussion that occurred in the Nettime mailing list is just one example of vibrant 
debates, within the artistic field, concerning the correlation between scientific research, 
the implementation of modern technologies and their consequences on society. The 
2012 edition of the Transmediale Festival, to mention another example, hosted an 
exhibition presenting the works of artists that privileged a disruptive attitude toward 
computers. The exhibition, curated by Jacob Lillemose, was tellingly entitled Uneasy 
Energies in Technological Times. Amid works from artists such as Eva & Franco 
Mattes, Heath Bunting and Jon Satrom, a fork bomb was depicted on the wall of the 
exhibition space.7 A fork bomb is a line of code written in a programming language that 
has the potential to compromise an operating system, forcing it to run in an endless loop 
of self-replicating command lines. Often, hackers rival in creating shorter but more 
efficient fork bombs as a way of manifesting their computer skills. In its simplicity, but 
also in its disruptive and devastating power, the simple code was regarded by the 
curator of the exhibition as a suitable artwork. 
 
The previous examples are symptomatic of a diffused tendency in the arts today, which 
seem to privilege works of digital art that manifest a critical stance towards the 
                                                            
5 Geert Lovink, " Tensions within the bay area elites" Nettime Mailing List, May 11, 2014, accessed 
June 4, 2014, http://nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-1405/threads.html. 
6 Ippolita, Luci e ombre di google: futuro e passato dell'industria dei metadati (Milano: Feltrinelli, 
2007). 






technology used by the artists. If the techno-euphoria is alive and well in the Bay Area, 
within the new media art field the stance towards new technologies (and in particular 
towards artificial intelligence and its iconic device, the computing machine) seem to be 
tainted by a critical position. Certainly, the artistic production cannot be reduced to a 
single approach. Even within a narrow field such as the new media art one, there are 
artists, curators and historians that engage in a discourse in which works of computer art 
opt to focus on the generative properties of the machine and favour an approach that is 
compliant with computer technologies and the related scientific research. Nevertheless, 
the subversive approach seems to have gained momentum in recent years within the 
new media art field, which is made up of a peculiar cluster of actors, events and 
institutions that focus on the use of new technologies within contemporary artistic 
production. The word 'new' is often discarded and many refer to the field as simply 
'media art' while some critics and historians have argued that the expression 'digital art' 
is preferable. Although there is no consensus regarding the exact designation of the 
technologies belonging to new media art, the works included in this kind of production 
are for the most part associated with the use of computers, digital tools and information 
technologies. Furthermore, a large number of authoritative voices among this specific 
field affirm that new media art is separated from what they consider the traditional art 
circuit. 
Subversive Drives: Questions and Origins 
Computer-generated art has been traditionally associated with artificial intelligence 
research, because of its peculiar procedural approach and also because this scientific 
research was predominantly discussed during the pioneering years of the use of 
computers in art. Artificial intelligence and the computing machine were generally 
regarded as the appropriate instruments to explore and understand peculiar human 
abilities such as intelligence, reasoning and consciousness. The ambitious goals of 
artificial intelligence are not new: the synthetic reproduction of life has haunted the 
imagination of many artists, writers, composers and scientists through the centuries. 





modern automata, from medieval paintings to contemporary movies. Computer-
generated art seems to fit particularly well within this tradition, benefitting from the 
development of cybernetics, the retailing of personal computers and the development of 
new theories in artificial intelligence, robotics and artificial life. 
 
It is during the second half of the twentieth century that computer-generated art is 
recognized as an artistic practice. Margaret A. Boden and Ernest A. Edmonds report 
that the first use of the term ‘generative’ in an artistic context was linked to computer 
graphic and computer art, represented by pioneers such as Michael Noll, Frieder Nake 
and Georg Nees, with a first occurrence in 1965 during the exhibition Georg Nees: 
Generative Computergrafik at the Technische Hochschule Stuttgart.8 The German 
philosopher Max Bense was possibly among the first contributors to take computer-
generated art into consideration and propose a methodology to analyse this production 
within his structuralist aesthetic.9 Important exhibitions like Cybernetic Serendipity, 
curated by Jasia Reichardt at the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London in 1968, and 
Software, curated by Jack Burnham at the Jewish Museum in New York in 1970, finally 
presented works of computer-generated art to a larger audience. During the following 
decades, the number of artists working with new technologies to produce generative art 
and the number of institutions, festivals, conferences and journals presenting and 
discussing their works continued to grow.10 Artists did not only create works, they 
participated in the discussions regarding the technologies they were using, together with 
researchers, historians and philosophers. These discussions ranged from aesthetic 
questions to scientific ones, and further encompassed cultural, political and ethical 
issues, from the most optimistic positions to the most sceptical and critical ones in 
respect to the evolution and implementation of modern technologies within society. 
 
If the aspiration to emulate life was conducted by artists and researchers with a shared 
excitement during the initial years of computer-generated art and until the mid-eighties, 
                                                            
8 For a brief history of generative art, see: Margaret A. Boden and Ernest A. Edmonds, "What is 
Generative Art?" in Digital Creativity, Volume 20, Numbers 1-2, March 2009. 
9 Max Bense, Aesthetica: Einführung in Die Neue Aesthetik (Baden-Baden: Agis-Verlag, 1965). 
10 Some significant examples are the Leonardo journal (founded in 1968 in Paris) the Ars Electronica 
festival, (founded in 1979 in Linz), the Transmediale festival (founded in 1988 in Berlin) and ISEA 





artists evolving in this field started to develop a more critical and distanced approach. 
Sometimes, they expressly used the modern tools of technologies, such as computing 
machines, robotics and biotechnologies, to create works questioning the ethical, moral 
and social values of precisely the technologies they were employing. Artists Joan 
Heemskerk and Dirk Paesmans (Jodi), Paul Vanouse, Natalie Jeremijenko, Oron Catts 
and Ionat Zurr of The Tissue Culture & Art Project created some exemplary works in 
this regard. Parallel to the discussion offered by the artists and their works, the question 
concerning the utility and dangers to society presented by the development of new 
technologies was vividly discussed by researchers, philosophers and literary theorists.11 
Conferences and panels held at international venues like Transmediale, Ars Electronica 
and ISEA, offered a common ground for artists, historians and researchers from a 
variety of fields to share and discuss their ideas. 
 
This study examines some historic examples of computer-generated art to provide an 
understanding of this production and to offer a possible framework for discussing it 
today. For what reasons do artists that currently use computing machines, together with 
the actors involved in the presentation of computer art, seem to favour a subversive and 
disruptive approach to computer technology and research? Can we identify some key 
moments that have contributed to shaping computer-generated art in this manner? What 
are the conventional approaches to discussing computer art? Are they still pertinent 
today? Additionally, the question of the alleged separation of new media art - to which 
computer art is associated - from the traditional art circuit will also be considered. The 
goal is to provide a better understanding of the complex relations and the supposed 
separation of the two fields, by means of a detailed analysis of key moments related to 
this assumed divide. Through the examination of selected works, texts and exhibitions, 
this research intends to provide an understanding of the subversive drives in the present 
artistic production related to computer-generated art. Furthermore, it will contribute to a 
better understanding of the complex relations between art and technology on the one 
hand, and between new media art and contemporary art on the other. Thereby, it aims to 
resolve a number of questions associated with this type of artistic production that is 
today a source of ongoing debate. 
                                                            






In order to answer the previous questions, it is necessary, as a first step, to consider 
computer-generated art as an artistic practice in its context. I will examine the role 
played by artists, curators and institutions as cultural actors in the field of new media 
art, and more specifically generative art. Consequently, I am adopting a sociological 
methodology. In this sense, I am referring to the analysis made by Pierre Bourdieu 
regarding the constitution of the field of cultural production, outlining the important 
methodological concepts for a sociology of art. As Bourdieu emphasized, artistic 
production is not independent from external factors, quite the contrary: "it becomes 
clear that the ‘subject’ of the production of the art-work – of its value but also of its 
meaning – is not the producer who actually creates the object in its materiality, but 
rather the entire set of agents engaged in the field."12 A field which, as Bourdieu 
explicitly states, is the result of the combined efforts of artists, critics, collectors, 
curators, and so forth. As a result, the perception and the study of a work of art require 
the examination of the field in which the work has been produced. This approach allows 
me to position the work considered in a broader social, cultural and economical context. 
Yet, as Bourdieu himself admits, "it is difficult to conceive of the vast amount of 
information which is linked to membership of a field."13 It is impossible to account for 
all the slight influences, relations, gossip and exchanges that contribute to the 
constitution and the evolution of a specific cultural field, because they are not registered 
and documented. As a consequence, I have decided to mainly work with specific and 
selected case studies. Indeed, case studies are more appropriate tools when dealing with 
qualitative questions and more effective if the field of a research exists in the present 
moment and is still evolving, which is the case with computer-generated art and new 
media art. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, I have decided to focus on three specific cases: the works 
of pioneering artists Edward Ihnatowicz and Harold Cohen; the writings of researchers 
                                                            
12 Pierre Bourdieu, "The Historical Genesis of a Pure Aesthetic" in The Field of Cultural Production: 
Essays on Art and Literature (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 261. 
13 Pierre Bourdieu, "The Field of Cultural Production, or: The Economic World Reversed" in The Field 





and artists questioning the validity of the artificial intelligence research, in particular 
during the eighties and the nineties; and the presentation of computer art at the 
documenta X exhibition in 1997. The diversity of case studies considered reflects the 
complexity of the subject and the reality of the cultural field of new media art. They 
also provide an overview of the evolution of this kind of artistic production through the 
years. The sources taken into account have been determined by each specific case: 
analysis of the artworks and related documents, interviews with artists and curators, 
analysis of texts and documents in the archives of institutions and museums. To further 
complement my research, I have also been actively visiting and participating in 
exhibitions and symposiums related to new media art, which provided an invaluable 
insight into the field and the ongoing debates. 
 
Furthermore, I also refer to the idea of Performative Kunstgeschichte, which considers 
the work of an art historian as being not only analytical but also performative. This 
approach does not try to hide or disregard the subjectivity of the historian within the 
cultural field, but rather to assume it as a contributing and enriching element of the 
research. In Philip Ursprung's words: "als eine Praxis, welche die Bedingungen und 
Motive der Autoren ins Spiel bringt und der es weniger darum geht, Bedeutung zu 
fixieren, als darum, sie offen zu halten."14 The researcher is thus – to associate this 
approach with the reflections put forward by Bourdieu - part of the cultural field that he 
investigates. The Performative Kunstgeschichte approach considers, furthermore, that 
the acknowledgement and awareness concerning the subjectivity of the researcher 
should not lead to a futile attempt to limit or hide his personal position within the field, 
but rather to expose and to consciously bring the information that such a position offers 
into the research. My activity as curator and art critic, and the experience that I have 
collected during my participation in the field of contemporary art and, in particular, new 
media art, has led me to conclude that the artistic production of computer-generated art 
should today be re-examined. 
 
In the introduction to the first edition of the Variantology collection, cultural and media 
theorist Siegfried Zielinski claimed that it is necessary to have knowledge of the 
                                                            
14 Philip Ursprung, "Performative Kunstgeschichte" in Kunstgeschichte und Gegenwartskunst: vom 





transdisciplinary field of research associated with a specific production, in this case he 
is noticeably considering the variety of media art and their related scientific fields.15 For 
this reason, and because Zielinski’s assertion seems to be shared by the majority of 
media art critics, I deemed it important to analyse the fundamental ideas developed by 
researchers in the field of cybernetics, robotics and artificial life when approaching 
computer-generated art. I will therefore sometimes refer to their basic concepts and 
ideas. As a guideline to conducting research, Siegfried Zielinski also emphasised the 
necessity of a purpose. As he affirms, "research that is not also driven by wishes and 
hopes, belongs to the Hades of academe; it is anaemic and lifeless."16 Hopefully, the 
questions addressed will offer a different and original understanding of computer-
generated art today and suggest alternative views concerning its discussion and 
evolution, in comparison to the current and dominant ones regarding this specific type 
of artistic production. 
Chapters and Case Studies 
The first chapter addresses the historical and theoretical background of computer-
generated art and its development within the new media art field. The historical 
precedents of current generative art production are briefly presented through a concise 
history of works created from antiquity to modern times. Subsequently, the definition of 
generative art is considered through the examination of some of the most frequently 
recurring ones, provided by prominent artists and historians. The question of 
emergence, appearing as central in several definitions of generative art, will also be 
discussed. Theories about emergence therefore constitute the theoretical framework in 
which works of generative art are more likely to be discussed. The visions and ideas of 
the most important art critics and historians active in the new media art field and in 
particular those approaching computer-generated art, contribute to the constitution of a 
specific narrative in which this type of artistic production is generally analysed and 
                                                            
15 Siegfried Zielinski, Silvia Wagnermaier and Gloria Custance, Variantology: On Deep Time Relations 
of Arts, Sciences, and Technologies (Köln: W. König, 2005). 
16 Siegfried Zielinski and Silvia Wagnermaier, "Depth of Subject and Diversity of Method - An 
Introduction to Variantology" in Variantology: On Deep Time Relations of Arts, Sciences, and 





understood. However, the new media art field is regarded as being separate from the 
traditional art circuit, something that is referred to as the digital divide.17 Therefore, the 
most recurring arguments of critics and historians who support the existence of the 
divide are analysed at the conclusion of the chapter. Ultimately, the purpose of the first 
chapter is to attempt to constitute a possible framework in order to understand 
computer-generated art as an artistic production that belongs not only to the specific 
field of new media art but also to a larger discussion that concerns the relationship 
between the arts, technology and society. 
 
Chapters two, three and four present the analysis of the specific case studies. The three 
case studies have been chosen by a set of criteria determined by the subject of the 
research and its questions. The first case study focuses on two artworks, the second on a 
theoretical debate and the third on an exhibition and its curatorial choices. The works 
discussed had to meet the current and broad definition of computer-generated art, while 
they also had to be sufficiently well known and discussed within the new media art field 
on an international scale. Since this research intends to provide an understanding of 
computer-generated art and the subversive tendencies of this form of artistic production 
today, the consideration of three cases belonging to three different historical moments 
further provide a variety of sources from which to infer some conclusions. In particular, 
the analysis of the artist's writings and the analysis of the context of presentation of the 
works have been taken into account.  
 
In the second chapter, a selection of artworks created in the early seventies will 
illustrate the production of what are commonly considered the pioneering artists in the 
field of computer-generated and computer–controlled art. The work Senster, by Edward 
Ihnatowicz, and Aaron, by Harold Cohen, are examined in detail. These works were 
widely discussed at their time and are still referred to as pioneering in recent 
publications.18 The chapter considers not only the specificity of these works, their 
context of presentation and their reception, but most importantly, the artistic goals of 
                                                            
17  The digital divide discussed here must not be confused with that which concerns the disparity of 
access to the Internet between rich and poor countries. 
18 See, for example: Paul Brown, "From Systems Art to Artificial Life: Early Generative Art at the Slade 
School of Fine Art", in White Heat Cold Logic: British Computer Art 1960-1980 (Cambridge, Mass: 





their authors and their position regarding the scientific research associated with their 
work. 
 
The third chapter examines the assimilation, within generative art, of the criticism 
addressed against computers and the artificial intelligence research prompted by the 
humanities and by part of the scientific community. The question concerning the impact 
of computing machines on our society, discussed by sociologists, philosophers and 
researchers, nurtured the debate within the new media art field. What is more, the 
opposition of bottom-up approaches to top-down approaches, within scientific research, 
has been especially vivid in this regard. The positions of artists that have been actively 
discussing these topics, mirrored in the writings of philosophers and critical thinkers, 
will provide an understanding of some important debates surrounding computer-
generated art during the eighties and the nineties. The Leonardo journal founded in 
1968 in Paris and the festival Ars Electronica in Linz, founded in 1979, are also 
considered for their role in the evolution and the shaping of the discussion associated 
with this specific artistic production. 
 
The fourth chapter examines one particular event, namely the constitution of a computer 
and media art showcase within the documenta X exhibition in 1997, exemplifying the 
artistic production of computer art at a time when more artists seem to have lost faith in 
computer technologies. This case study portrays an interesting example of participation 
by artists making use of computers in an important international contemporary art event. 
It also coincides with the constitution and recognition of new media art as a distinct 
field of artistic production. Additionally, the analysis of the participation of the artistic 
collective JODI within the tenth documenta exhibition provides an example of 
computer-generated art that differs greatly from the pioneering works discussed in the 
second chapter. 
 
In the concluding chapter, possible explanations about the reasons behind the current 
subversive tendencies in computer-generated art are deduced from the analysis of the 
cases discussed in chapters two, three and four. I will discuss the current perspective on 





findings. Subsequently, I will discuss the alleged separation between new media art and 
the traditional art circuit and I will attempt to offer an unconventional perspective on 
this particular question. Computer-generated art exemplifies the problematic and often 
ambiguous relationship between the new media art field and the traditional art circuit, 
on the one hand, and the dialogue between the arts, modern technologies and society, on 
the other. This research will hopefully offer alternative perceptions and open up new 
debates regarding this kind of artistic production, in addition to providing a better 
understanding of the works examined and their context of presentation and discussion. 
What is more, this study illustrates a thrilling history of opposing visions and opinions 
on how to contribute to the enlightenment of society through art and technology, and on 










1.1 Computer-Generated Art and Its Multiples 
Computer-generated art is frequently associated with a restricted group of works 
produced using computing devices and sophisticated algorithms, written in 
programming languages such as processing and vvvv that have been specifically 
conceived for graphic and artistic creation. The algorithms in question are habitually 
referred to as evolutionary or generative algorithms.19 The great majority of these 
works, which are presented through video screenings, interactive installations and in 
printed or sculpted form, are abstract in nature. Artists Karl Sims, Christa Sommerer 
and Laurent Mignonneau, Kenneth Rinaldo and, more recently, Aaron Koblin or Casey 
Reas are commonly associated with this type of artistic production and are credited with 
having brought it to international recognition.  
 
Computer-generated art is a specific example of generative art: the two terms are 
sometimes used interchangeably, although generative art doesn't necessarily require the 
use of computing machines per se. In fact, generative art - considered in its literal and 
broader definition - is a very old and varied artistic production, preceding the invention 
of a programmable electronic machine. Artists and theoreticians working with 
generative procedures acknowledge the long established heritage of this practice in art. 
Philip Galanter, artist, curator and researcher, teaching graduate studies in generative art 
and physical computing at Texas A&M University, affirmed: "Generative art didn't start 
with computers, and I don't think it will end there either."20 In the following section, I 
will briefly consider the history and the variety of this artistic production in order to 
better understand its heritage and its recent development. 
                                                            
19 For a description of the programming languages used to create generative art, see, for exemple: Casey 
Reas and Chandler McWilliams, Form+code in design, art, and architecture (New York: Princeton 
Architectural Press, 2010); Matt Pearson, Generative Art: A Practical Guide Using Processing 
(Shelter Island, NY: Manning, 2011). 






1.2 An Open History of Generative Art 
While several narratives related to generative art could be written, according to the 
perspective one wishes to highlight, the story of generative art is traditionally regarded 
as exemplary of the prolific intersections between art, science and technology. A good 
number of current works in generative art use computing machines and programming 
languages. For this reason, it has been customary to inscribe this type of artistic 
production within the history of mechanical sculptures and automata.  
 
Automata have been produced in different countries and civilisations since antiquity. In 
their extensive publication edited in 1949, Alfred Chapuis and Edmond Droz analysed 
in depth the history of automata.21 According to the two historians, Heron of Alexandria 
is among the most significant forerunner of cybernetics principles and automata, in 
antiquity.22 His experiments with air, steam and water pressure enabled him to produce 
spectacular animated devices and surprisingly life-like sculptures for theatres and 
temples. In Arabia, during the Middle Ages, Haroun-al-Rachid, also known as Al-
Jazari, pursued the research in mechanical engineering and developed water powered 
clocks and automata.23 In Europe, mechanical clocks appeared during the fourteenth 
century and were often flanked with automated bronze figures counting the full hours, 
the Jaquemarts. The art of animating clocks with automated figures spread across the 
continent throughout the centuries. A significant example is Strasbourg cathedral’s 
astronomical clock, which was constructed between 1838 and 1848 by Jean-Baptiste 
Schwilgué, who replaced the ancient clock with a more complex and accurate 
mechanism and a variety of new figures and calendars.24  
 
But automata were not only associated with clocks. During the seventeenth century, the 
Italian family De Francini, from Florence, were invited to decorate the grottos of the 
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Château Saint-Germaine-en-Laye, in France, which they adorned with water powered 
fountains and automata.25  
 
The golden age of automata, with an increased production and complexity of automated 
animals, writing and drawing children, talking maidens and chess players, flourished 
during the baroque epoch. The digesting duck created by Jacques de Vaucanson, 
supposedly not only imitating the natural movements of a duck but its digestive system 
as well, is probably the most famous and somehow mythical example. Jacques de 
Vaucanson, who created two other spectacular automata and dreamed of reproducing an 
artificial man displaying the entire circulatory system, was also responsible for the 
modernization and mechanization of tailoring manufacture.26  
 
In Switzerland, Pierre Jaquet-Droz, his son Henri-Louis and their collaborator Jean-
Frederic Leschot, created a large number of extremely complex automata that are still 
admired today. One of their most sophisticated creations, The Writer, is composed of 
more then six thousand pieces.27  
 
The French philosopher René Descartes is also credited with having built an automata 
so true to reality that when discovered by the captain of the boat in which it was being 
shipped, it was thrown into sea because of the fear it raised. The story is probably a 
legend, but it is commonly recounted to portray the growing interest in the artificial 
imitation of life and the speculation concerning a mechanical approach to life and nature 
in modern times. An example is the controversial essay by Julien Offray de La Mettrie, 
L’Homme Machine. Not surprisingly, the author mentions the automata created by 
Vaucanson to document his description of the human being as a complex machine.  
 
Vaucanson, who needed more skill for making his flute player than for making 
his duck, would have needed still more to make a talking man, a mechanism no 
longer to be regarded as impossible, especially in the hands of another 
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The history of automata is not limited to Europe: in Japan, mechanical puppets capable 
of serving tea, the Karakuri Ningyo, were being created since the seventeenth century 
and are part of a longer tradition of handcraft production of anthropomorphic puppets 
used for ritual and ceremonies.29 
 
The automata are also the ancestors of modern computing machines, a heritage that 
finds a first illustrious inventor in Joseph-Marie Jacquard, who further developed the 
mechanism invented by Jacques de Vaucanson, by creating what is considered to be the 
first programmable machine with punched cards, the Métier Jacquard. In turn, the 
Métier Jacquard served as inspiration to Charles Babbage who conceived the analytical 
engine, which could have been the first mechanical general-purpose computer, had 
Babbage received enough support and funding to complete it.30  
 
In the concluding chapter of their extensive investigation on automata, Alfred Chapuis 
and Edmond Droz briefly consider this kind of production in the twentieth century. 
They also mention the ongoing research of cyberneticists Norbert Wiener, Warren 
Sturgis McCulloch, and William Ross Ashby - who provide a mechanist model of the 
functioning of the brain - suggesting that their research might open new developments 
in the building of future automata. Chapuis and Droz further consider the hypothesis 
that automata could one day imitate nature to the point that they ought to be considered 
as living creatures. They nevertheless sustain that automata will always be subjugated to 
the intelligence of men and that "no element of this intelligence can apparently be 
conveyed to a machine."31 However, the authors conclude that the work of automata 
developed through the centuries should be admired for its contribution to the present 
development of technology and the industry. 
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In the twentieth century, the production of automata was associated with the invention 
of electricity and the possibilities of telecommunication. French researcher Jean-Claude 
Heudin includes the production of utilitarian robots in his long history of ‘artificial 
creatures’, stressing that the highest achievements in robotics were dictated by 
utilitarian and economic imperatives.32 In 1927 Engineer Roy James Wensley created 
the Televox robot for the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, a robot 
capable of executing simple tasks and that could be remotely controlled by telephone.33 
Televox belongs to a long series of robots whose purpose is to present and celebrate the 
technological achievements of the corporation financing them. Half a century later, in 
1986 the Honda Motor Company developed Asimo, who was advertised as the world’s 
most advanced humanoid robot, embodying the continuing fascination for the 
automation of movement. Similar to the automata made by the Jaquet-Droz, which were 
an elaborate means of advertising their clocks and pendulums, Asimo fits the Honda 
Corporation’s mobility campaign perfectly, although the creators insists that "the main 
concept behind Honda’s robot R&D was to create a more viable mobility that allows 
robots to help and live in harmony with people."34  
 
Other machines were created in the laboratories and associated with research in 
cybernetics, such as the Machina Speculatrix by William Grey Walter, first created in 
1948, and Shakey, developed during the sixties by the Stanford Institute of Research. 
Ordinary robotic machines, such as mechanical arms have also been used in industrial 
production since the first acquisition of the Unimate 001 by General Motors in 1962. At 
the end of his historical survey, Heudin analyses several recurring arguments opposing 
the development of research in robotics and the quest for the creation of artificial life. 
He dismisses these arguments as being "the translation of a more general technophobia 
or of a timeless conservatism."35 According to the French researcher, the ongoing 
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implementation of robots in our society is the prelude of an inevitable evolution in 
which men and machines will peacefully coexist and collaborate. 
 
The fascination for automata and the possibility to imitate life-like behaviours through 
mechanical objects is thus an obsession that runs through the centuries and not only in 
western culture. Today, a large variety of robots exist: spectacular objects of 
entertainment and advertising such as Asimo are probably the closest product to the 
general representation of what a robot should be and look like. But the example of 
Honda's Asimo is also interesting for the way it highlights the relationship between the 
production of modern automata for commercial purposes and the cultural field of new 
media art. Indeed, Asimo was among the stars of the Ars Electronica festival in 2010, 
which dedicated a series of public presentations supplemented by screenings and panels 
relating the achievements of Honda's research in robotic mobility. 
 
If the history of automata leads to the recent developments in cybernetics and robotics, 
while allowing artists to experiment with these technologies, the history of generative 
art is not restricted to the production of mechanical sculptures and devices. Generative 
practices are not only found in works of visual arts, they are found in a variety of 
different artistic productions that range from architecture to music to literature.  
 
In the eighteenth-century, composer and music theorist Johann Philipp Kirnberger 
experimented with the possibilities of using mathematical and casual rules to generate 
music,36 leading to the practice of the Musikalisches Würfelspiel, a system to compose 
minuets and polonaises with the use of a dice. The Musical Dice game has fascinated 
many composers since the end of the eighteenth century, but the experiments to 
compose with casual and accidental elements is not limited to the use of dice: the 
famous sonatas and interludes for prepared pianos created by John Cage are a renowned 
example in contemporary music.37 Eventually, music composition integrated the use of 
computing machines and a growing number of music theorists and composers further 
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developed experiments with the use of computational and generative practices.38 The 
Illiac Suite, created in 1955-56 by Lejaren Hiller and Leonard Isaacson, is considered 
the first composition in this regard by Gerhard Nierhaus, computer music professor at 
the University of Music and Performing Arts Graz.39 In his wide-ranging examination 
of algorithmic composition, Nierhaus describes a great variety of applications of 
algorithmic procedures in music, dividing the different sections of his research into 
scientific disciplines such as chaos theory, cellular automata and artificial intelligence. 
For example, David Cope, with his Experiment in Musical Intelligence, programmed a 
computer to imitate works of illustrious composer and autonomously generate new 
works.40 Andrew Horner and David Goldberg applied the principles of genetic 
algorithms to create musical scores. Peter M. Todd experimented with artificial neural 
networks41 while Peter Beyls was among the first to compose music by using cellular 
automata.42 Joseph Nechvatal, finally, composed his viral symphOny (2006) with the 
use and the application of generative algorithms and computer viruses.43 Nierhaus 
sustained that "virtually all procedures used for tasks of algorithmic composition have 
their origins in extra-musical fields, and often become highly popular outside the purely 
academic study of these disciplines."44 
 
In literature, examples of compositions that are linked to generative principles are found 
in the cut-up technique, consisting of cutting pre-written texts from books and 
newspapers and reassembling the single words and sentences in an accidental way. The 
dadaist Tristan Tzara introduced this technique in his "dada manifesto on feeble love 
and bitter love."45 Later, beat generation writers William Burroughs and Brion Gysin 
made large use of the cut-up technique, in particular in their collaborative work The 
Third Mind.46 In addition, Burroughs and Gysin developed the permutation poems, 
using computers to generate all the possible results offered by the multiple distributions 
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of the words within a sentence. Together with Antony Balch, Burroughs also produced a 
short film using the same principle: The Cut-Ups (1966). In her extensive analysis of 
the history and aesthetic of the cut-up technique in literature, Sigrid Fahrer emphasised 
the defiant and destructive qualities of this practice and considered it a paradigm of 
postmodernism: 
 
In its destructive potential, which although tamed is nonetheless persistent, the 
Cut-up generates Entropy in the information theory sense. (…) In this reflection 
of ambiguity and indifference, the Cut-up appears as a postmodern paradigm.47 
 
Fahrer’s observations regarding the cut-up technique in literature seem to challenge the 
common perspective that considers generative approaches, applied in artistic 
production, in light of a long established constructive relationship between art and 
technology. 
 
Generative practices are found in architecture, as well. From the legendary origins of 
the Corinthian capital to modern organic architecture, nature has always played an 
inspiring role. During the second half of the twentieth-century, the evolutionary forms 
of nature appealed to architects, who were interested in using the computing power of 
machines to analyse and reproduce these forms through specific algorithms. Nicholas 
Negroponte, co-founder of the MIT Media Lab, was an enthusiastic forerunner in the 
use of computers within the field of design and architecture. Most of his works reflect 
on the opportunities to apply artificial intelligence to architecture, and on the potential 
to foster a dialogue between the architect and the machine, as in his project URBAN5. 
Negroponte was persuaded that machine intelligence is necessary in the implementation 
of computer-aided design, because: 
 
An environmental humanism might only be attainable in cooperation with 
machines that have been thought to be inhuman devices but in fact are devices 
that can respond intelligently to the tiny, individual, constantly changing bits of 
information that reflect the identity of each urbanite as well as the coherence of 
the city.48  
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Negroponte regarded the implementation of machine intelligence in architecture as a 
way to foster a humanistic approach. In his view, machines must be capable of learning 
and evolving in order to effectively contribute to architecture, instead of simply 
performing automatized tasks. In a similar way, architect and researcher John Frazer, 
professor at the Architectural Association in London, applied the principles of cellular 
automaton and evolutionary algorithms in the creation of architectural tools and 
prototypes over the course of many decades of research, from his first experiments with 
the Reptile structural system in 1968 to the more elaborate project Universal Interactor 
in 1991. According to Frazer, evolutionary architecture "will conserve information 
while using the processes of autopoiesis, autocatalysis and emergent behaviour to 
generate new forms and structures."49 The vocabulary employed by Frazer to describe 
his work largely employs the scientific jargon associated with artificial intelligence, 
robotics and artificial life. More recently, a variety of architects have been 
experimenting with a large array of generative tools such as evolutionary algorithms 
and swarm intelligence to create new forms and develop new architectural techniques of 
construction. Examples are R&Sie (n)+D, Morphosis, Kokkugia, Gramazio & Kohler 
(ETH).50 In particular, Gramazio & Kohler developed an approach, which they termed 
‘Digital Materiality’ that uses computer and robot-arms to create a synthesis between 
the material and the digital world. They carried out a series of experiments in the 
construction of walls and modules, by adding or subtracting materials. In one particular 
example, The Resolution Wall (2007), they made use of generative algorithms aiming to 
optimize both the fabrication time and the solidity of the structure, letting the computer 
evolve and learn from previous constructions in order to create new and unpredictable 
patterns of bricks.51 
 
In Italy, the application of generative principles in architecture have been developed 
since the eighties by architect and professor Celestino Soddu, who created a software 
based on evolutionary algorithms that produces architectural models of edifices and 
cities. Together with Enrica Colabella, Celestino Soddu founded the Generative Art 
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Conference in 1998, with the purpose of creating a platform for generative art and all its 
varied productions, not only inviting architects but also artists, musicians and historians 
to present and discuss their works and research. The Generative Art Conference is still 
held today, each year in a different location in Italy, and is one of the few international 
events dedicated exclusively to generative art. Celestino Soddu presented the vision and 
goals behind the organization of the international conference with the following terms:  
 
Generative Art is a way to think and to design. Following this approach we can 
find, united by the same enthusiasm, architects and mathematicians, poets and 
musicians, physicists and semioticians, philosophers and painters, engineers 
and designers.52 
 
Quite significantly, Soddu stresses the interdisciplinary potential of generative art 
allowing for collaboration among researchers and artists from a variety of fields.  
 
The role played by computers in the development of generative art in music and 
architecture has been significant. However, computing machines and robots were not 
the only possible way of creating generative works of art, some notable examples can be 
found in painting and sculpture. The frottages by Max Ernst, the Métamatics machines 
generating abstract works by Jean Tinguely, the Condensation Cube by Hans Haacke 
(1963–65), the expanded polyurethane sculptures by César and Damien Hirst’s Making 
Beautiful Drawings (1993) could all be included in a large history of generative art. 
Indeed, all these works present a technique or a system that generate unpredictable 
results, as a consequence of the peculiar procedure set in motion by the artist. 
Generative processes are still used today in artistic production and are found in works 
that encompasses a variety of techniques including internet-based practices, interactive 
works and even biotechnologies. 
 
To further extend the frontiers of generative art, one should mention some experiments 
developed by researchers outside the arts. Their influence on artistic production and 
their conceptual and aesthetic qualities have had such an impact in the new media art 
field that they have been presented widely in art festivals, museums and publications. 
With time, these projects have been regarded as works of art in their own right. A 
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notable example is the Tierra project, started in 1989 by ecologist and researcher 
Thomas Ray, a computer simulation based on artificial life principles.53 Another 
example is the work Evolved Virtual Creatures (1994) by computer graphic scientist 
Karl Sims, a research project on the application of genetic algorithms in the evolution 
and interaction of virtual creatures.54 Although these works were mainly research 
projects to simulate evolutionary properties in artificial creatures, they became iconic 
examples within artistic production and were repeatedly presented in artistic venues and 
publications.  
 
This brief historical overview reveals that generative approaches in art are an old 
practice that still exists and continues to evolve today. Furthermore, it shows that 
generative art has very often been regarded as an artistic production that exemplifies the 
intersection between art, science and technology. During the second half of the twenty 
century, generative approaches in art have been largely associated with research in 
artificial intelligence and robotics, while the artists who exploited computers to produce 
works of art have been exploring the generative possibilities offered by computing 
machines. The relationship between computers and generative approaches has been so 
strong, that generative art has been used as a general term to simply describe the use of 
computers in art in the emerging years.55 Nevertheless, the definition of the distinctive 
attributes characteristic of a work of generative art is an ongoing debate.  
1.3 Recurring Definitions and the Concept of Emergence 
While art historians and critics have mostly examined the position of computer-
generated art within the dialogue between the arts and science, many artists, architects 
and musicians actively involved in this field have proposed and discussed a variety of 
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definitions of generative art. The most frequently argued definition today is probably 
the one offered by Philip Galanter, artist and professor at Texas A&M University. 
 
Generative art refers to any art practice where the artist uses a system, such as a 
set of natural language rules, a computer program, a machine, or other 
procedural invention, which is set into motion with some degree of autonomy 
contributing to or resulting in a completed work of art.56 
 
The definition proposed by Galanter has been cited in many publications and papers on 
generative art. It has the advantage of clearly defining the requirements of a work to be 
generative while, at the same time, being quite broad in scope. According to this 
definition, a work of generative art can be made of any material and can represent 
anything, as far as it has been produced using a system that functions in a procedural 
way with some degree of autonomy. If the definition doesn’t specify the necessary 
characteristics of the resulting work of art, it prescribes some necessary qualities to the 
system, which must be of a procedural sort and work with a degree of autonomy. 
Gallanter is not restrictive about the nature of the system itself, any system that the artist 
builds or chooses to work with could be used to create generative art: from computing 
machines, to a set of rules of natural language. A large production of works is inscribed 
in this definition, from the most recent works of digital art to the previously mentioned 
work by Jean Tinguely and Hans Haacke, for example. 
 
Artist, art critic and curator Thomas Petersen, founder and co-editor of the online 
magazine on net and computer art artificial.dk offers a similar definition: 
 
The defining trait of generative art is rather that the artist establishes a system, 
which can generate a number of possible forms rather than one single finished 
form.57 
 
The definition stresses again the procedural method and the use of a system in order to 
generate forms. On the other hand, Petersen explicitly mentions the fact that the system 
can produce more than one form, which is something worth mentioning, considered that 
many artists commonly use a single system to produce a large number of artworks. 
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Curiously, this definition suggests the exclusion of systems that are built to generate one 
single result, albeit a generative one. Such works are possible and exist: the 
Condensation Cube by Haacke, for example, once sealed and installed in the museum 
space will generate one single work, although an evolving one. For this reason, it is, in 
my opinion, clear that Petersen is mostly thinking about computer-based generative art 
for his definition. 
 
Marius Watz, artist and curator of Generator.X - a platform created in Oslo in 2005 with 
exhibitions, concerts and symposiums focusing exclusively on generative art - proposed 
an analogue definition, which clearly emphasizes the use of modern and digital 
technologies: 
 
Generative art is an art practice where the artist creates a system, typically a 
piece of software, which is either used to create a work of art or constitutes a 
work of art in itself. Generative art describes a method or strategy, rather than a 
specific style or medium of work. The form of Generative Art that most people 
are aware of is software-based visual abstract art, with artists like C.E.B. Reas, 
Lia, Jared Tarbell etc. being the most visible exponents. This work is abstract, 
visually complex and non-representational. Typically, it will be purely digitally 
generated, with no "natural" origin.58 
 
Although Watz does not exclude other possibilities and alternative ‘systems’ from his 
definition, he puts emphasis on the fact that generative art is today associated with 
software-based art. The artist also stresses that generative works are mostly abstract and 
visually complex. His definition has therefore the merit of offering a qualitative 
description of works of generative art. Another point worth mentioning is that Watz 
regards both the output produced by the system and the system itself, as part of the 
work. 
 
Although most of the definitions and criteria for examining generative art are put 
forward by artists involved in this kind of artistic production, the issue has also been 
explored by some important media art critics. Invited to open the first conference of 
Generator.X, Susanne Jaschko, art historian and former co-director of Transmediale, 
acknowledged the recent application of the concept of generative art to a stricter 
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context, namely the use of computing machines, evolutionary algorithms and digital 
programs to produce works of abstract art. Susanne Jaschko proposed an interesting 
analysis of this artistic production and provided an alternative definition. 
 
However, because this conference intentionally presents a more focused 
understanding of generative art, and one that I would like to pursue and enlarge 
upon, I come up with another, stricter, definition which we can discuss further 
later on, as this won’t be the only definition of generative art that will be 
presented in this conference. In this definition, generative art refers to an art 
practice where the artist creates a process by the means of a computer program 
executed by the machine itself. The so-created process is characterized by some 
degree of autonomy and selforganization and can result in various 
manifestations capable of providing an aesthetic experience.59 
 
In her talk, Jaschko acknowledges the limitation of using the expression generative art 
to such a strict spectrum of production and mentions the broader definition proposed by 
Galanter. Yet, she engages in some aesthetic considerations within this stricter 
perspective. Jaschko distinguishes between the code written to generate the work and 
the graphical output of the work, affirming in turn that both can be considered as part of 
the work of art. On the one hand, she considers that the code could be appreciated for its 
elegance: "In generative art, the medium and material is the code, which is supposed to 
be designed elegantly."60 On the other hand, she stresses that the spectator can rarely 
appreciate the code and its elegance, either because it won’t be presented to the public 
or because the spectator doesn’t have the capability to decipher and read it. The output 
of the work, be it a video screening or a digital print, is what most viewers will 
experience of the work. From this premise, Jaschko questions whether this aspect of the 
work is purely retinal, that is to say, whether it appeals exclusively to the senses instead 
of stimulating the intellect. She acknowledges that generative art is double in nature and 
necessitates appreciation not only of the visual output, but also of the underlying code 
generating the work of art and thereby concludes that the main output of a generative 
work is indeed retinal. The definition put forward by Jaschko - although limited in this 
context to the kind of generative art mainly concerned with software-based works - is 
extremely interesting, because it identifies the dual nature of a generative work of art, 
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where both the system and the output are part of a single work, but where each of them 
need to be appreciated with a very distinct act of perception and aesthetic judgment. If 
the code needs to be appreciated for its conceptual elegance, the output needs to be 
appreciated for its formal properties. Jaschko inscribes the works of generative art in the 
"long history of art that is dedicated to sensory perception and that will always exist as a 
parallel to conceptual art."61 Regarding the restricted field of generative art taken into 
account in her survey, Jaschko adds: "unfortunately, the emphasis on sensory perception 
continues to keep it out of the core of the media art discourse. Its closeness to design is 
as suspicious as its widespread neglect of media critique or self-reference that is so 
popular within media art."62 These considerations are extremely important: they not 
only offer criteria for the evaluation of generative art but they also offer some 
reflections concerning the status and the perspectives of this production within the new 
media art field. 
 
The provocative argument put forward by Jaschko primarily addresses artistic 
productions that strongly focuses on generative approaches. She affirms that works of 
generative art might be as complex and elaborated as the codes that underlie the works, 
but their results, the visual outputs, are less interesting or indeed altogether 
uninteresting from a conceptual point of view. However, in her analysis there is also an 
underlying critique addressing the media art field itself. Following Jaschko's reasoning, 
the current media art community seems to favour 'media critique' and 'self-reference', to 
use her words, instead of works that focus on generative procedures, elaborated codes 
and 'retinal' outputs.  
 
If Jaschko is right, we might infer that there is significant pressure on artistic production 
to discard generative approaches in the traditional sense, that is to say, approaches that 
focus on procedural systems and formal results. In this respect, British artist Matt 
Pearson offers some reflections that seem to manifest the will to bridge the gap between 
the retinal and the conceptual qualities. In his practical guide to generative art, he 
contemplates the definition proposed by Galanter and, even though he does not refute it, 
he expresses his dissatisfaction with it: 
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Although this is accurate and descriptive—and a long sentence with all the right 
words—a single phrase like this isn’t enough. I don’t think it quite captures the 
essence of generative art (GenArt), which is much more nebulous. In my mind, 
GenArt is just another by-product of the eternal titanic battle between the forces 
of chaos and order trying to work out their natural harmony, as expressed in a 
ballet of light and pixels.63 
 
Pearson seems more interested in grasping the hidden forces behind generative art and 
offers a less technical definition, considering more the aesthetic and philosophical 
aspects behind generative art. In turn, he proposes another possible definition: 
 
Generative art is neither programming nor art, in their conventional sense. It’s 
both and neither of these things. Programming is an interface between man and 
machine; it’s a clean, logical discipline, with clearly defined aims. Art is an 
emotional subject, highly subjective and defying definition. Generative art is 
the meeting place between the two; it’s the discipline of taking strict, cold, 
logical processes and subverting them into creating illogical, unpredictable, and 
expressive results.64  
 
This definition is particularly interesting because it associates the specific artistic 
qualities of generative art with the subversion of the mechanical and rational properties 
of the system used. In this case, Pearson considers generative art associated with the 
production made using computing machines, although he later concedes that generative 
art could be produced with any kind of autonomous system such as a mechanical one, a 
game of chance, a natural phenomenon, or even a subconscious human behaviour. It is 
also worth noting that the author considers generative art as the meeting point between 
art and programming, confirming a general vision that regards computer-generated art 
as a discipline that bridges the arts and the sciences. While he stresses the importance of 
an intuitive comprehension of generative art, Pearson nonetheless adds some more 
objective properties. Among the list of properties offered by Pearson, one is worth 
mentioning in particular: generative art is "an exercise in extracting unpredictable 
results from perfectly deterministic processes."65 This is, in fact, a distinctive 
characteristic of emerging systems and it is not a coincidence that Pearson, in his book, 
dedicates a chapter to the question of emergence as well. 
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Emergence is a concept that many other artists and critics dealing with generative art 
have recognised and acknowledged its playing an important role in their research. Artist 
and theoretician Mitchell Whitelaw, for instance, considered emergence as crucial to 
these groups of works: "emergence is central to artificial life. It is the concept that 
explains the crucial leap it makes between non-life and life."66 Furthermore, Whitelaw 
suggests that emergence is what drives an artist to create works of artificial-life and 
even what makes these works worthy of being considered within an artistic approach. 
This is possibly the strongest thesis in his research: 
 
I will argue that emergence is not merely central to the mechanics of a-life 
practice but represents its primary interest and its dominant drive, that 
emergence is to a significant extent the reward that draws artists to use a-life.67 
 
The concept of emergence appears in almost every essay discussing works of generative 
art. It recurs in several definitions of generative art and it is regarded by many as the 
ultimate goal and driving force for artists engaging in this kind of production. Because 
artists and historians deem the concept of emergence as being critical to understanding 
and evaluating works of generative art, it is therefore important to examine this concept 
in detail. Emergence is an essential concept in many scientific and humanistic 
disciplines as it is, for instance, in cognitive sciences, in the philosophy of mind and in 
biology. It is defined in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy with the following 
description: "A property of a complex system is said to be ‘emergent’ just in case, 
although it arises out of the properties and relations characterising its simpler 
constituents, it is neither predictable form, nor reducible to, these lower-level 
characteristics."68 
 
The concept can be traced back to Aristotle. In his considerations of the relationship 
between form and matter in the book H of Metaphysics, the Greek philosopher observes 
that in some specific cases "the whole is something over and above its parts, and not 
just the sum of them all."69 This very simple definition might be regarded as the most 
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general description of the basic property of emergence. The description offered by 
Aristotle is nonetheless very general and the concept evolved over the course of the last 
century with contributions from both philosophers and researchers. In an article relating 
to the history and key concepts of emergence, philosopher Jaegwon Kim traces the 
origins of modern emergentism back to John Stuart Mill.70 While observing the results 
of the chemical combination of two substances producing a third substance with 
different properties - different from the two substances but also from the combination of 
the two - the British philosopher and economist concludes that this phenomenon applies 
to other complex agents in nature: 
 
If this be true of chemical combinations it is still more true of those far more 
complex combinations of elements which constitute organised bodies and in 
which those extraordinary new uniformities arise which are called the laws of 
life. All organised bodies are composed of parts similar to those composing 
inorganic nature and which have even themselves existed in an inorganic state, 
but the phenomena of life which result from the juxtaposition of those parts in a 
certain manner bear no analogy to any of the effects which would be produced 
by the action of the component substances considered as mere physical 
agents.71 
 
Not only does Mill apply the phenomenon of emergence to more complex organisms, 
he also considers life as an emerging property that cannot be explained by mechanical 
laws alone. It is George Henry Lewes, however, who is usually acknowledged with 
having clearly defined and used the term emergence: "the emergent is unlike its 
components insofar as these are incommensurable, and it cannot be reduced to their sum 
or their difference."72 Jaegwon Kim argues that emergence became a popular concept 
applied to many disciplines, from biology to neurophysiology, as a result of the ideas of 
philosophers John S. Mill, G. Henry Lewes, followed by the so-called British 
emergentists Samuel Alexander and Conwy Lloyd Morgan. However, he believes that 
the British philosophers from the beginning of the twentieth century were compromised 
by the concept of vitalism.73 In particular, if applied to the explication of life, as Conwy 
Lloyd Morgan admits, "it is pretty sure to be said that to speak of an emergent quality of 
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life savours of vitalism."74 According to Kim, the association of the concept of 
emergence to vitalism is the reason why philosophers of the twenty-century quickly 
discarded it. It is only in recent times that emergence was again considered in a new 
light by younger philosophers, especially in the effort to explain problems related to the 
body-mind separation within a physicalist approach. In his attempt to classify and 
illustrate the variety of approaches on emergence, Robert Van Gulick distinguishes 
between metaphysical relations and epistemic relations. Within the first group, he 
further distinguishes emerging properties from emergent causal powers and suggests 
that there is a variety of degrees of radicalism from the weakest kind of emergence to 
the most radical one where, supposedly, "the whole has features that are both 1. 
different in kind from those had by its parts, and 2. of a kind whose nature and existence 
is not necessitated by the features of its parts, their mode of combination and the law-
like regularities governing the features of its parts."75 Van Gulick seems sceptical about 
the existence of such radical kinds of emerging properties and causal powers, believing 
that it would challenge some fundamental physicalist assumptions. This disbelief, 
however, does not belong to the research in artificial intelligence, as the ambition to 
create life-like behaviours from an artificial system seems to rely precisely on the 
possibility of this radical kind of emergence. 
 
Indeed, the concept of emergence has been influential within the scientific research that 
evolved from cybernetics. The faith in the possibility of strong emergence has been a 
compelling drive for artificial intelligence research and emerging behaviours have been 
predicted from the start. Herbert Simon expected that "machines will be capable, within 
twenty years, of doing any work that a man can do" and Marvin Minsky agreed, stating 
that "within a generation ... few compartments of intellect will remain outside the 
machine’s realm - the problem of creating 'artificial intelligence' will substantially be 
solved."76 These bold predictions implicitly assumed the emergence of behaviours 
commonly associated to human beings within an artificial system, such as intelligence, 
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semantic understanding and even conscious thinking. Partly responsible for the 
proliferation of such speculations was the article written by mathematician Alan Turing 
describing a possible test, today known as the ‘Turing test’, to resolve whether or not a 
machine could be considered intelligent.77 The article generated a vast literature not 
only in computer science but in philosophy as well,78 and provided a concrete goal for 
many researchers in the field. 
 
Although the concept of emergence has not always been explicitly employed by AI 
researchers, it was nevertheless embedded in their visions and predictions. It is in more 
recent fields of embodied robotics and artificial life, that the concept of emergence 
became particularly important. Rodney Brooks, developer of the ‘subsumption 
architecture model’, a biologically inspired approach in robotics, considers that 
intelligent capabilities "arise from the interaction of perception and action, and that 
getting these right was the key to more general intelligence."79 American computer 
scientist Christopher Langton, who organized the first International Conference on the 
Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in 
1987, while introducing the expression ‘artificial life’, clearly affirms the significance 
of the concept of emergence: "Artificial Life starts at the bottom, viewing an organism 
as a large population of simple machines, and works upwards synthetically from there 
(...). The 'key' concept in AL is emergent behaviour."80 
 
The new-born field of artificial life, which would have an even greater influence on 
artistic production than artificial intelligence, was largely relying on the research by 
Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. In their theory of 
autopoiesis, the nervous system is presented as a result of an emerging process: 
 
The nervous system emerges in the phylogenetic history of living beings like a 
network of special cells (neurons), which is embedded in the organism in such a 
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way that it couples points in the sensory surfaces with points in the motor 
surfaces.81 
 
If the concept of emergence has been analytically discussed by philosophers and applied 
by researchers of different fields to explain and justify their research, it is today a 
concept that still fascinates as much as it generates opposing positions. Science historian 
George Dyson illustrates quite vividly the problematic ambiguity related to the concept 
of emergence at the end of the twenty-century: 
 
The emergence of life and intelligence from less-alive and less-intelligent 
components has happened at least once. Emergent behavior is that which 
cannot be predicted through analysis at any level simpler than that of the 
system as a whole. Explanations of emergence, like simplifications of 
complexity, are inherently illusory and can only be achieved by sleight of hand. 
This does not mean that emergence is not real. Emergent behavior, by 
definition, is what's left after everything else has been explained.82 
 
Confused and varied as it might be, the concept of emergence had a strong impact on 
artistic production, as already acknowledged by Mitchell Whitelaw. Several artists 
creating generative works of art were confronted with the concept of emergence and 
even contributed to it with their own ideas and observations. Among them, Australian 
artist Simon Penny, mostly known for his interactive robotic artworks, largely 
contributed to the theoretical discussion about emerging properties and the opposition 
between top-down and bottom-up approaches. In a recent article, revisiting the rise of 
artificial life practices in new media art in the late eighties, he recalls a general 
intellectual inclination toward the concept of emergence among artists at that time: 
 
A general desire was to capture, harness or simulate the generative and 
‘emergent’ qualities of ‘nature’— of evolution, co-evolution and adaptation. 
‘Emergence’ was a keyword in the discourse.83 
 
Jane Prophet, the artist who created the interactive works TechnoSphere (1995) and 
Swarm (1997), explicitly affirmed her debt to artificial life research. In an article co-
written with computer scientist Mark d’Inverno, she offers a personal view on the 
concept of emergence: 
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There has been a great deal of debate about what constitutes emergent systems, 
but they are typically described as having some kind of order, structure or 
intelligence that is not pre-determined. In our view emergence is related to 
scale and observation, and the conflict which arises between our different 
understandings at the micro- and macrolevels.84  
 
Although it is more a comment then a definition of emergence, the artist concedes that 
the attribution of an emerging behaviour is, in reality, to a certain extent dependent to 
the subject observing the events. Later in the article, Jane Prophet admits that her means 
to create emerging systems in her work follows a bottom-up approach, which has been 
decisive to the research in both embodied robotics and artificial life. 
 
The concept of emergence plays a central role in the works of many other important 
figures of new media art engaging in generative processes. Louis-Philippe Demers and 
Bill Vorn, collaborating together to create impressive robotic installations, affirm: "the 
perceived emergent behaviours of these machines produce a multiplicity of meanings 
based on single dynamic pattern of events."85 Christa Sommerer and Laurent 
Mignonneau, famous for their applications of evolutionary algorithms in the creation of 
artificial life art installations, believe that "when a set of evolving autonomous particles 
or agents interact, the resulting global system displays emergent collective properties, 
evolution and critical behaviour having universal characteristics."86 Furthermore, the 
concept of emergence is fundamental to the work of Roy Ascott, who experimented 
with the possibilities opened by the application of telematics in art. Ascott’s visionary 
ideas, sometimes tinted with esoteric elements, envision the emergence of a global 
culture and the appearance of a collective intellect. 
 
When sensibilities from diverse cultures from all parts of the globe interweave, 
collaborate, conjoin, and become restructured, new cultural forms emerge, new 
potentials for meaning and experience are brought forth.87 
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Roy Ascott is interested in the networking of humans through the development of new 
technologies; he promoted a society based on ‘connectivity’, a concept that often recurs 
in his writings, which is at the base of his vision of emergence, encompassing not only 
the behaviour of a single man or a single machine, but society as a whole. The work and 
the writings of the British artist reflect the ambitious goal to merge art and modern 
technologies in order to move society forward.  
 
And so, artists engaging in generative practices have investigated the philosophical 
concepts associated with artificial intelligence, artificial life and robotics, in order to 
deepen their artistic research, as exemplified by their speculation on and their 
application of the concept of emergence. The concept of emergence, important in many 
scientific disciplines, seems to have provided a suitable bridge to finally connect the arts 
and the sciences. It also allowed for the constitution of a specific production within the 
arts that critics, curators and historians could approach under one narrative. This 
production, associated with the application in an artistic context of approaches related to 
artificial intelligence, artificial life, robotics and sometimes biotechnologies to create 
emerging behaviours, belongs to the specific field of new media art. 
1.4 A Common Narrative: Bridging the Arts and the Sciences 
Generative art is characterized by a variety of media, approaches and techniques:  the 
multiplicity of definitions and the diversity of ideas concerning its key aspects, such as 
the concept of emergence, reflect the variety of works that have been created under the 
term generative art. The manufacture and retail of personal computers, video cameras 
and other digital devices, made this technology available and affordable for artists who 
wanted to experiment with them, facilitating the establishment of a unique artistic field 
at the threshold of art and technology. The term ‘new media art’ used to designate this 
field, is a recent one: many current art historians and critics concerned with this type of 
artistic production recognise its application, though they admit its ambiguity. The term 
‘new’ within the label ‘new media art’ is probably the most problematic element. For 
                                                                                                                                                                              





Christiane Paul, a leading curator and historian in the field of digital art, "what is in fact 
new is that digital technology has now reached such a stage of development that it 
offers entirely new possibilities for the creation and experience of art."88 With time, new 
media art has developed its own cluster of festivals, exhibitions, museums, publications 
and PhD programmes,89 together with the emergence of notable artists, critics and 
curators. Nevertheless, many professionals working in this field regret the limited 
exchanges and interactions between new media art and the traditional art world. To take 
the example of generative art, there is no subject entry for this production in important 
art dictionaries and encyclopaedias like The Dictionary of Art90 and the Lexikon der 
Kunst.91 Generative art is equally absent from the Oxford Art Online database.92 Indeed, 
generative art is almost exclusively discussed in publications specifically dedicated to 
new media and digital art. 
 
Inscribing a variety of works into one narrative is a delicate task, not deprived of 
problems. Works such as the Senster, a cybernetic sculpture by Edward Ihnatowicz, A-
Volve, an interactive software-based installation by Christa Sommerer and Laurent 
Mignonnau, and MEART, a project created with the use of biotechnologies by the 
SymbioticA laboratory, differ regarding the techniques employed, but they also share 
some fundamental similarities, such as the attempt to investigate emerging properties. 
Delineating narratives within the history of art is a common and recurring effort among 
art historians; on the other hand, some artists have been reluctant to accept their 
inscription in such narratives. Harold Cohen, for example, even if universally described 
as a pioneer in the field of computer art, always refused to be labelled as a computer 
artist and explicitly distanced himself from the work of his colleagues associated with 
the same kind of production.93 Oron Catts, artistic director and co-founder of the 
SymbioticA laboratory at the University of Western Australia, similarly addresses the 
question of outlining narratives within art history: while he recognizes the relationship 
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between bio-art and artificial life, he refuses to associate his research with the work 
carried out by former artificial life artists.94 Nevertheless, several historians addressing 
new media art seem inclined to situate the work of artists investigating generative 
approaches that they associate with the research in artificial intelligence, artificial life 
and biotechnologies within one narrative. 
 
In his encompassing publication Information Art - today a point of reference concerning 
the intersection of art, science and technology - artist and Professor Stephen Wilson 
presents a large variety of artists and works associated with scientific research. The 
chapters are divided according to the different disciplines: biology, physics, 
mathematics, kinetics, telecommunication and digital information. Computer-based 
generative art is in particular analysed in the fourth chapter, presenting works of 
algorithmic art, genetic art and artificial life, although works of robotics and artificial 
intelligence are analysed in other chapters as well. In his introduction, Wilson mentions 
the separation of the two cultures stated by Charles Percy Snow and affirms that his 
book "seeks to revisit the relationship of art to scientific and technological research (…) 
and the prospects for future mutual influence."95 According to Wilson, artists can 
contribute to research because of their alternative ways of approaching problems and 
because they "can function as an independent zone of research."96 But in order to do so, 
artists "must become curious about scientific and technological research and acquire the 
skills and knowledge that will allow them to significantly participate in these worlds."97 
 
Christiane Paul takes a similar stance. In the chapter addressing themes in digital art - 
such as artificial intelligence, artificial life and telerobotics - the media art historian and 
curator affirms that many artists working with these technologies have been influenced 
by the ideas of researchers such as Norbert Wiener and Richard Dawkins. She also 
considers that the artistic projects in artificial life can contribute to a better 
understanding of the nature of life and intelligence. 
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All the previously mentioned artificial-life projects point to the possibility that 
computers may not only help us to understand the structures of ideas, the nature 
of intellectual processes, but they may very well change these very processes 
and the way we think.98 
 
By discussing some examples of artificial life, Christiane Paul suggests that the artistic 
productions involved with the use of computers not only provide a link between the arts 
and the sciences, but through research they also contribute to the body of knowledge 
within this field. 
 
The Italian art historian Gianna Maria Gatti identifies the roots of artificial life at the 
end of the sixties, within the research on neural networks and artificial intelligence. 
 
Artists operating in the sphere of Artificial Life also make reference to neural 
networks. (...) The fact that these nets are inspired directly by the brain - by a 
part of the body of the living organism - makes them count among the models 
of Artificial Life. Their origin, however, can be traced to Artificial Intelligence 
research.99 
 
Eventually, Gianna Maria Gatti incorporates the recent artistic production by means of 
biotechnologies in the tradition of artificial life, thus providing an encompassing 
narrative that spans from the earlier artistic research in artificial intelligence to the 
recent works of bio-art. Gatti regards the artistic production made with electronic and 
digital technologies - to which she includes computer art, virtual realities, telerobotics 
and net.art – as a means to "undertake a closer dialogue with the sciences and therefore 
confront oneself with more specific expertise, with other methodologies: an 
interexchange that makes itself reciprocal."100 According to Gatti, the marriage of art 
and science is the most efficient way to contribute to knowledge and the progress of 
mankind. The communication between men and machines can, in her opinion, further 
contribute to this progress.   
 
Artificial life is the focus of the research by art historian and artist Mitchell Whitelaw, 
who provided a comprehensive compilation and cataloguing of different works of this 
kind. Whitelaw traces the origins of these works in cybernetics and artificial intelligence 
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research, mentioning artists such as James Seawright, Thomas Shannon, and Edward 
Ihnatowicz as their predecessors. Whitelaw also uses the general terms of new media art 
within which he inscribes this artistic production. He describes the significance of new 
media as follow: 
 
New media art provides a venue for the transformation and translation of the 
technical and conceptual artifacts of artificial life into cultural objects – 
conglomerates of rhetoric, metaphor, and aesthetics. (…) The interface of 
artificial life and cultural practice is particularly significant for all these 
reasons: it opens a space for creative experimentation and debate around the 
increasing technologization of living matter as well as broader issues of life and 
autonomy, agency and evolution, genetics, code and matter.101 
 
Along with Christiane Paul and Stephen Wilson, Whitelaw considers new media art – 
and artificial life in particular - important because of the opportunity it offers to discuss, 
from a cultural perspective, the growing importance and the application of new 
technologies in our society and in our lives. 
 
Oliver Grau inscribes the artistic research related to virtual reality within a tradition of 
artistic production that originated with the phantasmagoria spectacles. 
 
Considered in this light, a number of contemporary artists can be found 
working today in the tradition of the phantasmagoria, a hybrid between art, 
science, and the magic.102 
 
While he mostly describes the development of virtual reality, Grau ends his historical 
overview with a section dedicated to artificial life, mentioning the works of artists 
Christa Sommerer and Laurent Mignonneau, Thomas Ray, Karl Sims and Berndt 
Lintermann. He inscribes the works of these artists within the narrative that he has 
drawn from the phantasmagoria spectacles of the late eighteenth century onward. In his 
opinion, the peculiarity of artificial life is to create an interactive image space powered 
by a genetic algorithm in order to generate the illusion of a biologically populated 
space. Through the concept of phantasmagoria, Oliver Grau provides thus a link that 
encompasses artificial intelligence, artificial life and virtual reality into a possible 
narrative. 
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Edward Shanken, a prominent new media art critic and historian, acknowledges a long 
tradition of artistic production dedicated to the imitation of life-like behaviours, linking 
automata and cybernetics to recent experiments in artificial life art.103 In his publication 
for the prestigious Phaidon edition, the popular collection Themes and Movement, the 
author groups under the chapter "Bodies, Surrogates, Emergent Systems" artists such as 
Edward Ihnatowicz, Karl Sims and Eduardo Kac, thus classifying them under what he 
considers a ‘thematic stream’ of works related to a variety of scientific concepts and 
disciplines. 
 
Complementing art research on robotics and artificial intelligence, artists have 
embraced the relatively new field of artificial life. (...) Building on similar and 
related ideas, art research with theoretical foundations in cybernetics, 
autopoiesis, emergent behaviour and artificial life was vitalized in 1990s, when 
it became possible to run simulations of evolutionary systems, such as Tom 
Ray’s Tierra program, on a personal computer.104 
 
Shanken concludes his short survey of the artistic creations that attempts to imitate life 
by affirming that "electronic media have begun to cross the threshold between silicon-
based systems and biological systems, instigating public dialogue about the social 
implications of biotechnology."105 According to the American historian, biotechnologies 
are a further and complementary step within the new media art tradition of discussing 
and reproducing life-like behaviours. 
 
Similarly, German art historian Ingeborg Reichle discovers in the earlier artistic 
experiments with artificial life, robotics and artificial intelligence the origins of recent 
applications of biotechnologies in art. Reichle considers the highly controversial access 
of techno sciences to ‘genetic makeup’ and affirms that the "multifaceted relations 
between art and science range from critical interrogation of ethically highly 
controversial technologies of the life sciences, to the artistic endeavour to acquire the 
science laboratory for the production of art."106 What is more, for Reichle "the use of 
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laboratory methods has opened up new means of expression for art, and at the same 
time has transformed our ideas of laboratories as places dedicated only to the production 
of knowledge."107 Reichle pinpoints thus as ‘multifaceted’ the approach to scientific 
research permitted to artists: on the one hand, the access for artists to laboratories and 
tools associated to life science allows for new creative experiments, while on the other it 
also provides some first-hand knowledge for a critical positioning of these technologies 
within the artistic discourse. 
 
To provide a narrative is to provide a framework to consider works, texts and events in 
a particular light. Art historians seem to have favoured the constitution of narratives, 
creating bridges between artists, works and events, and eventually providing personal 
and innovative visions of the history of a particular movement or genre. But creating 
narratives is also a problematic exercise: it is not surprising that many artists and 
historians, as already mentioned, strongly criticize this approach, correctly pointing out 
that the constitution of a narrative is always the result of a subjective lecture of the 
events examined. While it is essential to keep in mind that every narrative is inevitably 
subjective, to consider a selection of works within one possible narrative is, 
nevertheless, an approach that allows for hypothesis and considerations on a broader 
spectrum and thereby offers a wider understanding of a specific artistic production. 
 
The previous examples - describing the ways prominent art critics and historians have 
decided to group the works of artists that engage with artificial intelligence, artificial 
life and even biotechnologies together - further illustrate that among some of the most 
influential actors in the field of media art, some bridges and similarities between artistic 
positions have been recognized. There are indeed many analogies between the works 
that will be discussed in the following chapters: all rely on the use of computing 
machines and the possibilities of imitating or reproducing behaviours commonly 
associated with living beings. Furthermore, all are characterized by systems that have 
some degree of autonomy and that produce results that are to some extent unpredictable, 
be it in terms of movement, form or behaviour. This last characteristic is particularly 
significant for generative art and is commonly associated to the concept of emergence, 
                                                            





previously discussed. What is more, the majority of critics and historians have conceded 
that generative art offers the opportunity to create a link between the arts and the 
sciences. On the one hand, they affirm that this kind of artistic production allows for 
contributions to scientific research, by developing similar or alternative models of 
understanding life. On the other, they consider that the artists involved in the use of 
technologies associated with artificial intelligence, artificial life and life science, are in a 
favourable position to discuss, question and comment on scientific research. In 
conclusion, it seems that the majority of critics, curators and historians discussing new 
media art - and in particular the works associated with the narrative of generative art – 
deemed this artistic production significant because of the possibility it provides to 
discuss the sciences and technology outside of their respective fields or, to use a 
recurring metaphor, to bridge the gap between the humanities and the sciences. 
1.5 The Digital Divide 
Many influential art historians and critics were keen to write a narrative that links works 
of computer and generative art to research in artificial intelligence, artificial life and 
biotechnologies. This specific cluster of works that share the use of computer and 
generative principles to create emerging behaviours are part of the media art field. It is 
in the exhibitions, festivals, institutions and publications dedicated to new media art that 
one is likely to find references and discussions about generative art. But what are the 
relations of this specific form of artistic production to the field of contemporary art? 
This question has occupied art historians and critics involved with new media art since 
the consolidation of this particular field in the nineties and is still highly debated today. 
 
Indeed, there seems to be a general consensus that new media art is separated from the 
contemporary art field. A recent article published by Claire Bishop on Artforum, 
bearing the suggestive title "Digital Divide", explicitly discusses this position. While 
emphasising the lack of interest for new and digital media in the traditional circuit of 
contemporary art, the author supports the thesis that a divide between media art and the 





sphere of ‘new media’ art, but this is a specialized field of its own: It rarely overlaps 
with the mainstream art world."108 In turn, Edward Shanken affirms that "rarely does the 
mainstream art world converge with the new media artworld. As a result, their 
discourses have become increasingly divergent."109 In a publication examining new 
media art, the Italian art critic Domenico Quaranta asserts that new media art constitutes 
an autonomous and independent field, with respect to the contemporary art world. 
 
All that we weren’t able to explain so far can be explained with a simple 
theorem: the expression ‘New Media Art’ denotes a ‘world of art’ that is 
completely autonomous and independent from the contemporary art world and 
from any other ‘world of art’.110 
 
These few examples illustrate how some of the most important critics and curators 
engaged in media art today seem to agree that there is a separation between the field in 
which they work and the traditional contemporary art field. However, they don't simply 
acknowledge this divide, they also offer arguments in order to explain it. What are the 
arguments that are commonly put forward, in this sense? Among the arguments, a 
recurring explanation that is almost unanimously endorsed is the lack of market for new 
media art, what I propose to define as the ‘economic argument’. The fact that there are 
very few dedicated galleries creating a market for works of new media art is considered 
a significant factor in its difficulty with gaining access to the traditional art world. In 
addition, because of their digital or technological nature, media artworks are particularly 
difficult to sell as a commodity, in particular to art collectors interested in the 
speculative value of an artwork. Therefore, media art is largely cut off from the 
commercial circuit of art, which allegedly plays an essential role in the traditional 
contemporary art field. In the article that clearly affirmed the divide separating digital, 
media art from the traditional field of art, Claire Bishop proposed the following 
economic argument: "Yet the hybridized solutions that visual art is currently pursuing - 
analog in appearance, digital in structure - seem always biased toward the former, so 
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favoured by the market."111 Bishop supports her argument by stressing that visual art 
and its market are inherently attached to intellectual property and physicality. Digital 
art, in her opinion, challenges this basis and could, eventually, overthrow the practices 
of art collection relying on physical and identifiable objects. The economic argument 
has been mentioned many times before to justify the separation of digital based works 
from the traditional art field. In 1998, as net-art practices were starting to gain 
international attention, Isabelle Graw published an article in Texte zur Kunst, an edition 
dedicated to media art, in which she stressed the difficulty faced by net-art when trying 
to enter the traditional market of contemporary art: "Another favourite topic is the 
difficult merchantability of netart. The dominance of the financial imperatives is again 
the reason why this artistic scene is largely self-organized."112 Hence, Isabelle Graw not 
only affirmed the difficulty of artists working with new medias to sell their works, but 
she also attributed the dominance of the market in the traditional contemporary art field 
as the reason why media artists are obliged to create their own field. Some years later, 
in 2005, as the excitement for net-art at the turn of the century started to fade, a 
prominent media art critic, Geert Lovink, suggested that the lack of market for media art 
is a reflection of a general lack of interest from critics, historians and the public in the 
specific field of media art: "In the case of new media arts there was - and still is - no 
market, no galleries, few curators and critics, and no audience."113 During a conference 
at Ars Electronica in 2007, the art historian Verena Kuni, who has been critically 
involved in mapping and analysing net-art at the turn of the century, further developed 
the question of the link between economic necessities and web-based art to explain their 
difficulties in entering the traditional circuit. 
 
A further fundamental problem is that the political and economic strategies of 
museums cannot, or can only in part, be applied to Web-based art. Institutions 
like the Walker discovered that Web-based art did not help boost local pull, and 
hence visitor numbers, utilizable for procuring subsidies. Private collectors and 
galleries, whose importance for museum politics is continually on the increase 
not just in the Anglo-American world, quickly realized that the classical 
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principle of up-valuing through placement in museums and/or museum 
exhibitions has little relevance for Web- based art.114 
 
In her article, Verena Kuni principally focuses on presenting the difficulties that she 
faced while engaging in digital culture from a historical perspective. Among the reasons 
cited, the economic difficulties of the digitally based artistic production played a role. 
But the art historian adds an important element to the economic argument that presents 
the difficulties faced by artists that wish to sell their works. In addition, Kuni stresses 
the complex relationship between private galleries and collectors, on the one hand, and 
the public institutions such as museums and contemporary art spaces (supposedly 
independent from the market) and their need for public funding on the other. If the 
private galleries and collectors rely on the visibility of works in public spaces to 
enhance their value, the public institutions rely on the number of visitors to obtain 
subsidies. The art historian concludes that in this entangled, strategic game, web-based 
artworks have been eventually left aside. The argument by Verena Kuni brings thus a 
wider and more complex perspective to the economic argument supporting the digital 
divide. 
 
The economic argument is also put forward by Domenico Quaranta, who affirms that 
"unfortunately, among the various typologies of connoisseurs that New Media Art has, 
art collectors have always been a rare commodity."115 That is to say, collectors are not 
interested in investing in works of new media art. The Italian media art critic, although 
concordant with the economic argument, points out that some examples of galleries and 
fairs associated with media art have nevertheless been created. In his opinion, therefore, 
the economic argument alone cannot justify the digital divide. 
 
Edward Shanken also supports the economic argument and recognizes the intricate and 
influential game of interconnections that bind private and public institutions to the art 
market.  
 
It is no surprise that the flow of capital in the art market exerts tremendous 
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influence on MCA discourses, through systemic interconnections between 
artists, galleries, journals, collectors, museums, biennials and art fairs, critics, 
and art schools.116  
 
Not only does Shanken stress the influence of the market on the traditional mainstream 
contemporary art field, (MCA in his text) he also considers this influence as an 
important reason for the exclusion of media art from the traditional field: "the 
contemporary art market remains tightly tethered to more or less collectible objects, and 
the vast majority of works acquired are painted canvases."117 
 
If the economic argument is the most recurring argument in explaining the digital 
divide, another argument that is often proposed concerns the lack of competences to 
approach media art among the important actors within the traditional contemporary art 
field, what I propose to define as the ‘competence argument’. The argument can be 
summarized as follows: because a critical discourse on new media art necessitates a 
particular knowledge of its history and its techniques, the art historians and critics that 
are trained within the traditional contemporary art field lack the capacities to approach 
new media art works, hence they tend to ignore this specific artistic production in their 
curatorial or critical approaches. This argument is strongly supported by Simon Penny, 
an artist who produced notable works that exploited principles of embodied robotics and 
who is also very active from a theoretical perspective in discussing this kind of artistic 
production. In 2005, he published an article in which he asserted the necessity for art 
historians and curators to acquire specific competences in order to approach media art. 
 
Inasmuch as the work discussed in this paper is quintessentially 
interdisciplinary, it follows that in order to discuss this work in a satisfactory 
way, historians and scholars must have a similar breadth of training and 
experience as the practitioners they study. The kind of art criticism typified by 
the connoisseurship model is inappropriate and inadequate here. It is not 
sufficient to address such works by passive assessment of them as static 
aesthetic artifacts, as has been the case with more conventional treatments of 
‘new media art’.118 
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In this passage, Penny clearly affirms the inadequacy of traditional historical and 
aesthetic approaches while implicitly suggesting a lack of specific competences in the 
traditional art world. He calls for the constitution of an appropriate aesthetics that would 
provide art historians and critics with the suitable tools to understand new media art. On 
the other hand, and this is the singularity of his argument compared to the one offered 
by other media art critics, he also suggests that media art should be separated from the 
traditional art world.  
 
Such works seldom fit in the conventional cultural milieu of the 
museum/gallery/private collection, but are often immersed in a radically new 
kind of dispersed digital simultaneity – the net. (...) As such, as I have argued in 
the past such work demand the development of a new branch of aesthetics: 
what I have called the aesthetics of behaviour.119 
 
This rather unique call for a separation of fields is pertinent to his argument, since a 
separation of fields would, in Penny's opinion, guarantee an appropriate degree of 
competence of the actors involved. 
 
The separation of new media art from the traditional art world is discussed in an 
influential publication printed in 2006, At the Edge of Art, by Joline Blais and Jon 
Ippolito. The title itself tackles the idea of a distance between the artistic approaches 
discussed in the book and the traditional concept of art. The competence argument 
surfaces in this book, as well. Regarding the separation of the fields, the authors point to 
the actors of the traditional art world who, in their opinion, are responsible for not 
including the new practices in their accounts: "what's holding the art world back is a 
philosophical laziness: a disinterest in or - worse - a refusal to rethink their definitions 
of the art they spend so much of their time trying to scare up."120 
 
Edward Shanken, again, supports an analogous argument focusing on the lack of 
competences among the majority of art historians and critics. He also adds some further 
considerations. 
 
But the use of these terms in MCA literature typically lacks a deep 
understanding of the scientific and technological mechanisms of new media, 
the critical discourses that theorize their implications, and the interdisciplinary 
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artistic practices that are co-extensive with them. Similarly, mainstream 
discourses typically dismiss NMA on the basis of its technological form or 
immateriality, without fully appreciating its theoretical richness, or the 
conceptual parallels it shares with MCA.121 
 
The American art historian, on the one hand, highlights the lack of competences within 
the mainstream contemporary art (MCA) preventing the appreciation of the 
technological and scientific background of new media art (NMA). On the other, he 
suggests that mainstream art critics commonly fail to appreciate the deeper and richer 
conceptual qualities of many new media art works, a reason, in his opinion, why they 
are rarely interested in these works. If Shanken agrees with other media art critics that a 
lack of competences is detrimental to fully appreciating the new media art works, on the 
other he invites traditional art critics to nevertheless appreciate the conceptual qualities 
of these works. His position, therefore, is less radical than the one proposed by Simon 
Penny and suggests that the divide could ultimately be bridged, despite the deficiency of 
specific competences. 
 
The lack of commercial interest in new media art works and the lack of competences in 
the traditional art field to approach media art, are without doubt the most recurring 
arguments used to justify the digital divide. In addition to these two main arguments, a 
few other arguments have been proposed. The German art historian Verena Kuni 
explained the difficulty of approaching digital and media art from a historical 
perspective. As she points out, the difficulty is mostly due to the rapid evolution of the 
technologies and the practical difficulty of viewing, documenting and archiving works 
created in the past with what are now out-dated technologies, which are difficult and 
expensive to conserve and restore.  
 
However, there is a particular reason why, especially in the case of Web art, 
serious scholarly research is considerably hampered or impaired—a reason that 
might also conceivably make becoming a "Net art historian" impossible, and 
not just for me. This reason is the rapid decay of an art form that in several 
respects—software, hardware, and the contextual system in which it is 
embedded and with which it often works—is an art of unstable media.122 
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The difficulty in conserving media art works is the topic of an ongoing discussion. The 
arguments that Verena Kuni puts forward in her article, not only point out the difficulty 
of conservation, but also the consequences of such difficulties for art historians and 
their careers. Because of the ephemeral character of media art works and the lack of 
dedicated archival institutions, many art historians are discouraged from specialising in 
new media and digital art works. In this respect, the title of the article - "Why I did not 
become a digital art historian" - written by one of the most respected specialists of 
digital art and internet art in the German speaking world, is quite surprising but 
nonetheless understandable. 
 
Another argument, concerning the interactive quality of many media and digital art 
works, is put forward by curator and historian Christiane Paul. In her opinion, the 
interactive quality of these works is the reason why, astonishingly, they are ultimately 
less accessible to the public. 
 
One of the greatest challenges of curating and presenting new media art to a 
traditional art audience is to balance the demands of the art and of visitors. 
Non-interactive and reactive pieces tend to be more "successful" in engaging a 
museum audience, but easy accessibility does not equal good art.123 
 
One might be tempted to consider interactivity as an element that facilitates the dialogue 
between the audience and the work. It is not the opinion of Christiane Paul, who 
stresses that the traditional museum audience is rather accustomed to a passive 
relationship with artworks and is likely discouraged from engaging in works that 
demand a higher level of interaction. In her opinion, curators and directors of many 
museums consider it a challenge to present works that demand interactivity, such as 
media and digital artworks. Because traditional art works tend to be more successful in 
appealing to a more traditional audience, and because of the imperative of institutions to 
record a higher number of visitors, Christiane Paul concludes that compared to more 
traditional works new media and digital art is disadvantaged when it comes to the 
possibility of being presented in prestigious institutions. 
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A last argument that is worth considering is proposed, again, by Edward Shanken, who 
offers a complex and manifold explanation of the digital divide. The American art 
historian is also among those who strongly support the reunification of these two fields, 
condemning the separation of new media and digital art from the traditional field, 
considering it detrimental for the former. If most of the arguments previously discussed 
tend to put the blame on the traditional art field, Edward Shanken offers a last argument 
that partly blames the new media artists and curators. 
 
Some blame must be placed on the artists themselves, many of whom lack 
traditional art training and have cultivated little sensitivity to and experience 
with the materials and techniques of MCA installation and exhibition practices. 
Critics and historians have not focused enough attention on theorizing across 
borders. Curators are also culpable. NMA curators must master the conventions 
of MCA if they are to succeed in exhibiting NMA in that context and must be 
able to make connections between works made in both fields. By the same 
token, MCA curators who are unfamiliar with NMA and the technical and 
spatial considerations that it demands are ill-prepared to create compelling 
exhibitions. They must also familiarize themselves with the field and be able to 
recognize and draw conceptual parallels between works that use conventional 
and new media.124 
 
In this argument, Edward Shanken affirms that many artists and curators working 
within the new media art field ignore the dynamics and the strategies, as well as the 
language of the traditional art world. This is the reverse of the competence argument, 
addressed instead this time to the media art field. Because of their lack of competences 
in the usages and norms that regulate the traditional art world, new media artists and 
curators are unable to professionally and successfully position themselves in the 
traditional field. In his opinion, it is not only the duty of the actors of the traditional art 
world to be more attentive about digital and media art production, but it is also the 
responsibility of new media artists and critics to be able to understand and enter the 
traditional field of art. 
 
To summarise, two main arguments appeared in the writings of art historians and critics 
engaged with new media and digital arts who recognised the separation of this field 
from the traditional field of contemporary art. The most discussed argument is the lack 
of commercial interest in media artworks, due to their particular digital or technological 
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nature, the second is the lack of interest and competence among the majority of actors 
working in the traditional art field towards new media art. Along with these two 
arguments, other reasons have been offered such as the ephemeral nature of 
technologies and the resulting difficulty in archiving and documenting them (Kuni), the 
complexity of the interactive character of media art, discouraging the traditional 
museum audience (Paul) and the lack of competence among new media artists and 
curators to position themselves in the traditional art world (Shanken). It is interesting to 
note that most of these arguments tend to attribute the fault of the digital divide to the 
contemporary art world, with the exception of one argument by Edward Shanken. 
Another important point to consider is that, with very few exceptions, the arguments 
previously discussed implicitly suggest that the digital divide is unfortunate and 
detrimental to the new media and digital artistic production. Although this statement is 
not explicitly expressed, the idea that media and digital art suffers from the exclusion 
from the traditional field of art is constantly elicited in the considerations concerning the 
exclusion from the market and from the most prestigious exhibitions and events 
associated with the traditional art field. Is the digital divide a reality? Are the arguments 
offered by the critics providing an exhaustive explanation of the claimed digital divide? 
Is it really the case that this separation is detrimental to the media and digital arts? 
These questions will be reconsidered in the concluding chapter, after the analysis of 
some specific cases of computer-generated art works and their context of presentation. 
 
For now, it can be concluded that there is not one, but many histories of generative art. 
If many art historians, critics and artists have been inscribing the activities of artists and 
their works into a possible narrative, and providing a variety of definitions, it is because 
there are several common factors in the works of generative art. The concept of 
emergence is probably the most distinctive and recurring element within this type of 
artistic production. Because the concept of emergence is a peculiar concept discussed in 
the sciences, in particular in the fields of artificial intelligence, artificial life and robotic 
research, artists engaging in generative art have often been compelled to contribute or at 
least confront some of the philosophical and scientific aspects of emergence. In this 
sense, computer-generated art has often been regarded as a production that bridges the 





toward computer-generated art still suitable today? Has the concept of emergence 
always been the focus of the artists? Have they changed their position, particularly with 
regard to the scientific research with which their work has been associated? Computer-
generated art is a paradigmatic example through which one can investigate the dialogue 
between artistic production and the scientific research, as has been outlined here. Of 
particular interest is the position of the artists with regard to the impact of the 
computing machine within society. Computer-generated art is, furthermore, a suitable 
lens through which to consider the problematic relationship between the fields of new 






2.1 The Pioneering Period of Computer Art 1968-1983 
At the end of the sixties, computing machines were becoming popular not only within 
scientific research but also in the art world. The foundation of the Computer Arts 
Society in London in 1968, the exhibitions Cybernetic Serendipity at the Institute of 
Contemporary Arts in London in 1968 and Software at the Jewish Museum in New 
York in 1970, all attest to the growing interest in the use of computers in an artistic 
context. Catherine Mason describes the sixties and seventies as the pioneering period of 
British computer art, largely characterized, in her opinion, by the discussion of 
cybernetic theories, the significant role played by Academia and the lack of mainstream 
institutional support.125 
 
Among the cohort of artists using computers to produce works of art (for the most part 
exploiting their graphical applications) some tried to experiment more specifically with 
the opportunities to program the machine. Edward Ihnatowicz and Harold Cohen are 
two examples of such an approach and are today often cited in publications retracing the 
history not only of computer art, but also of digital and media art in general. For 
example, Paul Brown mentions both artists as early examples of generative art,126 while 
Eduardo Kac recognises in Edward Inhatowicz, together with Nam June Paik and Tom 
Shannon, an important pioneer in robotic art.127 Nonetheless, if Harold Cohen and 
Edward Ihnatowicz raised curiosity among art critics interested in computer art at their 
time, many historians affirm today that the significance of their work has been largely 
neglected by traditional critique. Paul Brown, in his extensive article about early 
computer art recognises their importance, but remarks that "many of the early pioneers 
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of the computational arts (including Cohen and Ihnatowicz) were never adequately 
recognized by the mainstream art world when it became increasingly dominated by the 
post-modern aesthetic paradigm during the 1980s."128 Together with several other 
media art critics today, Brown affirms that artists working with new technologies such 
as computing machines and robotics were never really credited by the most important 
museums, art centres and commercial galleries. His remark is an implicit recognition of 
the digital divide. 
 
Because many historians involved in the field of digital and media art today regard 
Harold Cohen and Edward Ihnatowicz as seminal reference points for early computer 
art, an analysis of their works can provide a better understanding of positions toward the 
computing machine and its associated scientific research during the pioneering years of 
this kind of artistic production. They both have created works in which the machine 
plays an essential part and supplemented their artistic research with publications that 
provided extremely interesting ideas, perspectives and reflections not only on their 
artistic vision and activities, but also concerning epistemological questions. 
 
In this chapter, I analyse the work Senster, created by Edward Ihnatowicz and presented 
at the Evoluon exhibition centre from 1970 to 1974, and the lifelong project AARON by 
Harold Cohen, in particular the early production from 1971 to 1983. These works are 
described in their specific context, including the presentation to the public, their 
reception and the larger cultural context in which the works where produced. More 
significantly, I have focused on the intention of the artists by analysing their written 
articles and interviews. What drove Ihnatowicz and Cohen to turn to computing 
machines to develop their work and research? What was their perspective towards the 
advancements of the scientific research with which they have been associated? How has 
their work been received by critics and journalists? As two influential figures within the 
emergence and subsequent historical narrative that frames computer art, Ihnatowicz and 
Cohen present a suitable case study from which to draw some key considerations about 
the early visions, goals and expectations of an artistic production that is still evolving 
today. 
                                                            






2.2. Harold Cohen 
2.2.1 From Painting to Programming 
Before using computing machines and writing codes to generate drawings, Harold 
Cohen was leading a successful career as a British artist, renowned for his abstract 
paintings and invited to exhibit in prestigious institutions such as the Tate Gallery in 
London, the Jewish Museum in New York and the Musée d'Art Contemporain in 
Montreal. He also represented England at the 33rd Venice Biennale in 1966, together 
with his brother Bernard Cohen and artists Anthony Caro, Robyn Denny and Richard 
Smith. Two years later, in 1968, he was invited as a visiting lecturer to the Visual Arts 
Department at the University of California San Diego, where he was introduced to Jeff 
Raskin, a student in computer engineering who introduced him to computer language 
and programming. Cohen put aside his activity as a traditional painter and concentrated 
on programming, learning basic languages like Ditiran and Fortran. Subsequently, he 
created a specific computer program capable of independently producing drawings, a 
program that would become the cornerstone of his future artistic career. This story is 
well known and is related in many articles and publications on the artist, emphasising 
the difficult but audacious decision of an emerging, successful painter to give up a 
promising career in order to dedicate himself to computing machines and 
programming.129 Cohen provides some reflections, pointed with sharp criticism, on the 
traditional activity of painting and its strong association with the art market, in a text 
published on the occasion of the documenta 6 exhibition in 1977. He affirms that his 
motivation to abandon painting was also due to the dissatisfaction with the activity 
itself: 
 
What appeared clear to me, indeed, was that painting had left my intellectual 
appetite unfulfilled; a need for clarity and precision remained unsatisfied.130 
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It is not the purpose of this research to recount the life of Harold Cohen. Nevertheless, 
the fact that this particular moment in his career is often acknowledged by historians 
and by the artist himself,131 highlights how the use of computers in an artistic context 
was perceived as a difficult, audacious and even alienating choice for an artist. To 
engage with computers was regarded as unconventional, in particular for an artist 
associated with the traditional activity of painting. The manufacturing of the digital 
divide seems to have been prepared before the recognition of the new media art field 
itself. 
 
Cohen’s experiments with machines resulted in the creation of AARON, a work that can 
today be considered his most famous and ambitious; a work that he has since continued 
to develop, modify and improve. However, the question of how to define it as an 
artwork might pose some problems. AARON is a computer program, a series of codes 
written by the artist to produce a large quantity of drawings through an assemblage of 
hardware: computers, terminals, printing turtles and plotters. The hardware changed 
over the decades and the program evolved. Not only did Harold Cohen create a program 
to challenge the activity of image making, he also wrote many articles in which he 
described his artistic research, the capacities of AARON and his speculations on topics 
associated with computing machines and artificial intelligence.  
 
Is it really the case that the artist abandoned painting for programming? What were the 
preoccupations that guided his artistic research with machines? Through the analysis of 
Cohen's work, in particular during its first years of development, from 1971 to 1983, I 
will attempt to answer these questions. This period of time corresponds to the first 
decade of the program, from its first official presentation during a computer conference 
organized by the Data General Corporation132 to the publication of The First Artificial 
Intelligence Coloring Book edited by Cohen, his wife Becky Cohen and Penny Nii.133 
This time period comprises three important solo exhibitions, as well: one at the 
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Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam in 1977, one at the San Francisco Museum of Modern 
Art in 1979 and one at the Tate Gallery in London in 1983, in addition to the invitation 
to participate in the drawing section of the documenta 6 in 1977. 
2.2.2 Early Computer Drawings 
During the years that followed his visit and residency in San Diego, Cohen produced 
works that relied on the use of computers, together with more traditional hand-made 
drawings. The Victoria and Albert Museum in London host in their archives one of the 
most extensive collections of printed works by Harold Cohen accessible to the public, in 
particular the program’s early productions. It is interesting to consider some of the hand 
drawings, within the collection, made by the artist during the same years in which he 
started experimenting with computers. The pencil drawing Untitled E.335-2009, 1971, 
and the screen print Untitled E.318-2009, 1971 (Figure 1), represent the development of 
his previous artistic approach, characterized by abstract compositions. These works 
depict organised shapes on the surface, delicately drawn by hand, mostly with long, 
single traits. They are also organised and connected together, as if to depict structures 
that could be found in the natural world. The shapes - often circular, irregular and 
almost organic - are representative of a characteristic hand-made drawing and are easily 
recognised as being made by a human author. If we compare these works with the first 
documented work within the collection generated with a computer by the artist, the 
similarities with the hand-made drawings are striking. Untitled E.316-2009, 1971, and 
Untitled E.321-2009, 1972, consists of computer-generated drawings with words 
encircled by irregular traits or fields. Harold Cohen seems to have continued his formal 
research developed in his drawings and paintings with the use of the computer. But the 
work within the collection that mostly presents an autonomous functioning of the 
program and constitutes the starting point to the subsequent development, is Untitled 
E.325-2009, 1971 (Figure 2), which consists of a computer generated drawing depicting 
a cluster of lines, some of which are connected to one another. In this work, exclusively 
created by the machine, the artist approached the fundamental problem of organizing 





appears that the lines are composed of several dots produced by a plotter. The forms 
created by the computer in this drawing present many analogies to the precedent hand-
made drawings of the artist. A more elaborate composition, formed by a series of 
increasingly complex structures, appears in Untitled E.341-2009, 1972 (Figure 3), in 
which the lines are organized in distinct groups, similar to grapevines, folding on each 
other to depict something that looks very similar to a solid shape. 
 
The work Untitled E.342-2009, 1974 (Figure 4), describes a considerable progression in 
the computer program’s ability to generate a greater variety of forms. The lines are not 
simply connected to each other in some nodal points: they are organised together to 
produce closed, circular figures. Not only does the program produce irregular, organic-
like forms, it also distributes them in relation to one another, creating more elaborate 
structures. For example, the association of a circle with a smaller one generates an 
image that could represent a very simple organic, three-dimensional shape, such as a 
cell or a rock. The work Untitled E.326-2009, 1974, is very similar, although in this 
specific case, the artist has coloured by hand the computer-generated drawing. Instead 
of transforming the abstract organic-like shapes into recognisable forms, the artist has 
simply highlighted the forms produced by the computer program, filling the spaces with 
different colours. It is clear that the colouring activity of the artist is not intended to 
modify the work of the computer, nor is the work of the computer a simple background 
upon which the artist freely creates a new painting. The purpose of the colouring is 
really to emphasise the forms generated by the program, something that Cohen did 
manually until he managed to write a program capable of autonomously handling 
colours. 
 
A particularly interesting series of prints, in the V&A collection, is the Amsterdam 
Suite, created in 1977 for the artist’s personal exhibition at the Stedelijk Museum 
(Figures 5-8). It is a series of lithographs in an edition of 75, produced from a computer-
generated drawing. The series comprises six different prints, plus a version of the first 
print with colouring added by the artist. The Amsterdam Suite presents a further 
development of computer-generated images, with a wider variety of shapes, figures and 





zigzag, a group of crossed lines, a reticule - but some other elements seem to suggest 
allusions to physical objects: for example a flower, a rock, a bird, a tree, an eye, or the 
horizon line. The series demonstrates that the program is capable of generating a variety 
of patterns that could be organised in more complex compositions. 
 
The early drawings produced by Cohen with his computer program are clearly a further 
development of his previous research, as a painter. With the computing machine, the 
artist investigates the production of forms, the organisation of space and the basic 
elements that constitute the representation of images of greater complexity. On the other 
hand, these early drawings are the premises for the further development of the works 
produced by AARON. If we consider the later works in the V&A collection, such as 
Untitled E.343-2009, 1985 (Figure 9), and the more elaborate one Untitled E.337:1-
2009, 1987 (Figure 10), in which the program attempts to reproduce recognisable 
figures, humanoid or animal-like, in a realistic landscape made of rocks and trees, the 
building-blocks that were previously developed by the program are still recognisable. 
Quite significantly, the signature of AARON appears next to the signature of the artist, 
in some of these works, a signature that is clearly generated by the program, while the 
signature of the artist is hand-written. It is important to stress that, prior to these 
figurative works, Harold Cohen did not instruct the machine to create recognisable 
figures, that is to say: he did not supply the computer with pre-determined forms. The 
artist made clear that the machine did not have any information about the world 
whatsoever. If figures and shapes are recognisable to the viewers in the early drawings, 
this was not the purpose of the artist. However, the fact that figures and shapes might be 
recognised in a drawing generated by a machine that does not have any empiric 
knowledge of the objects it creates, is considered by the artist as an interesting way to 
investigate the possibility of creating an image that can carry a symbolic representation. 
These ideas are developed in his essay, "What is an image?", published in 1979.134 
 
The analysis of these early drawings suggests that with a computer program, Harold 
Cohen tried to create works that are similar, from a formal point of view, to drawings 
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made by human beings, reproducing organic-like shapes. This is a different approach 
which, compared to the one generally associated with early computer graphics and art, 
often exploits the intrinsic aesthetic of the machine to generate drawings that present 
rigorous geometric patterns. Furthermore, this aspect suggests that Cohen is really 
trying to investigate, through his program, the functioning of the human activity of 
drawing, a research that could be considered as an epistemologically driven one. 
 
On several occasions, Cohen expressed that he does not consider his program as being 
creative, although he does not regard it as being a tool, either.135 It is therefore 
interesting to examine the definitions of AARON proposed by the artist. Simply put, 
AARON is a computer program hosted in a computing machine that generates drawings 
through a printing device. Many definitions can be found in the artist's essays. 
 
AARON is a knowledge-based program, in which knowledge of image making 
is represented in rule form. (... ) It is a complete and functionally independent 
entity, capable of generating autonomously an endless succession of different 
drawings.136 
 
AARON was not GIVEN all these rules and instructions. AARON WAS the 
rules and instructions. Adding new rules to the program was not changing what 
AARON HAD, it was changing what AARON WAS, its very structure.137 
 
A knowledge-based program, a set of rules and instructions, an independent entity, 
these are some of the possible ways that the artist has described and defined his work. 
Cohen affirmed that, although some of AARON’s knowledge could be considered 
declarative and that it doesn’t behave randomly, it is also not producing paintings that 
are pre-programmed as such by the author of the code. At first look, there is no actual 
reason not to consider AARON to be really creative, if by creativity one simply defines 
the activity of producing a drawing or a painting. Nonetheless, as the artist affirms, the 
word ‘creative’ tends to be employed to describe a more noble activity, one that only 
human beings are entitled to engage in. Such is the case when the word is used to 
describe, for example, a talented and inventive person. Because of the lack of objective 
criteria that allows for the attribution of this particular use of the word ‘creative’ to a 
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person, and even more to a program or a machine, Harold Cohen judged it inadequate to 
use the term when referring to his own work, although he concedes that it does, to some 
extent, display creative features. In a later article, he admitted his difficulty in dealing 
with the term ‘creativity’ and affirmed that he eventually preferred to avoid it.138 
 
Considering the particular nature of AARON, the artist made clear that he did not intend 
it to be used as a tool, at least not in the sense of an instrument to be employed by the 
user. AARON, in fact, permits no interactivity. This is possibly the most important 
reason as to why Cohen has always distanced himself from the cluster of artists 
associated to computer art, a label that was often attributed, during the seventies, to 
artists and graphic designers using computers as a creative tool to produce works and 
images. For Cohen, computer programming was not an instrument to facilitate and 
automatize the production of paintings. Rather, for Cohen programming was intended to 
be a work in its own right. 
 
The decision to work with a machine inevitably raised several questions: not least, the 
commonly debated question of originality and authenticity. Who is the author of the 
paintings generated by AARON, the computer or the man behind the program? Is the 
program itself a work of art or are only its drawings and paintings? Is AARON to be 
considered a unique work in progress, together with all its productions of drawings and 
paintings, or is every single version of AARON a distinct work of art? The artist donated 
several paintings produced by AARON, together with photographs taken of the machine 
and, quite significantly, some original pieces of hardware, such as cables, turtles, 
plotters and other physical devices to the Computer History Museum, in Mountain 
View, California. All of these elements are catalogued by the museum with a number, a 
description and a picture and have been stored and labelled for historical and 
conservational needs. About 20 physical objects are registered in the archive. Here are 
some examples of the descriptions that are listed in the website collection of the 
museum: ‘AARON Paint System assorted ribbon cables, physical object’,  ‘AARON 
Paint System vessel, physical object’, ‘AARON Paint System regulator, physical object’, 
                                                            






‘AARON Paint System power chord, physical object’.139 The descriptions and references 
employed by the museum are effective in providing a useful system of archiving within 
the context of the collection, but they certainly wouldn’t be effective in giving a more 
comprehensible definition of AARON as a work of art. After all, the work has been 
constantly updated and embodied in varied and different machines through the years. It 
also went through different stages and has been constantly modified. In several articles, 
Cohen explicitly stated that AARON is the program, not the hardware hosting it. During 
the solo exhibition at the Tate Gallery, for example, the artist presented the work in the 
exhibition space as a functioning installation, displaying the computing machines, the 
terminal and the turtle drawing the shapes on the paper laid on the ground. The images 
of the installation are found in the catalogue, which also presents the description and the 
diagram of the whole system. Nevertheless, Cohen was ultimately dissatisfied with this 
mode of presentation, as he admits in the text of the catalogue, and he felt obliged to 
remove the turtle from the exhibition space because the public was more interested in its 
movement, rather than appreciating the drawings.140 
 
If it is clear that AARON is the computer program, and not the machine, it is however 
more difficult to present and record the work as such in a museum space. What is more, 
the fact that AARON produces physical drawings that are suitable to be exhibited, 
collected and archived, presents an ideal opportunity for institutions interested in 
acquiring the work of the artist for their collections. If the Computer History Museum, 
in Mountain View, California, decided to archive the physical elements and hardware, 
something that is pertinent to the nature of the museum which focuses on computer 
history, the Victoria and Albert Museum’s decision to acquire only those AARON 
drawing that were printed on paper is understandable. However, of the three important 
museums that hosted a solo exhibition of Cohen during the considered time frame - the 
Stedelijk Museum, the Tate Gallery and the San Francisco Museum - only the Tate 
Gallery and the Stedelijk Museum display works from Harold Cohen in their collection. 
The Stedelijk Museum holds only one work from 1978, while the Tate collection holds 
a list of fifty-three Cohen works. Fifty of these pre-date works made by the artist before 
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the creation of his computer program. Two works are early computer generated works 
by Harold Cohen made in 1971 and 1972, and only one is a work created by the 
program AARON. This unique work by AARON in the collection of the Tate Gallery is a 
donation to Michel Compton, who was responsible for the artist’s exhibition in 1983. 
His name is mentioned on the work with a dedication note.141 
 
The analysis of the early production of AARON reveals that Cohen was interested 
mostly in the question of the genesis of forms. The comparison of his hand drawings of 
the late sixties and early seventies to the first computer drawings, shows that Cohen is 
interested in developing his aesthetic and epistemological research, more precisely on 
the syntax of image making, research that he started with his artistic career as a painter. 
The use of computing machines and programming was indeed coupled with further 
investigations on creativity, symbolic representation and the difference between 
machines and human beings. What exactly were the artist’s preoccupations and, more 
particularly, how did the artist position himself within the context of the use of 
computers in an artistic field? The following chapter analyses the articles in which 
Cohen seeks to understand his personal perspective regarding these questions. 
                                                            










Figure 1   Screenprint, edition 15/20, E.318-2009, by Harold Cohen, 1971. 










Figure 2   Drawing, computer-generated, on paper, E.325-2009, by Harold Cohen, 1971.  










Figure 3   Drawing, computer-generated, on paper, E.341-2009, by Harold Cohen, 1972. 











Figure 4   Drawing, computer-generated, E.342-2009, by Harold Cohen, 1974. 










Figure 5   Lithograph, 'Amsterdam Suite F', edition 75/75, by Harold Cohen, 1977.  











Figure 6   Lithograph, 'Amsterdam Suite C', edition 75/75, by Harold Cohen, 1977.  










Figure 7   'Amsterdam Suite C', edition 75/75, by Harold Cohen, 1977. Detail.  










Figure 8   'Amsterdam Suite C', edition 75/75, by Harold Cohen, 1977. Detail.  










Figure 9   Drawing, computer-generated, E.343-2009, by Harold Cohen, 1985. 










Figure 10   Drawing, computer-generated (with drawing on the reverse), E.337:1-2009, by Harold Cohen, 









2.2.3 Creativity, Intelligence and Computer Science 
The use of a computing machine marked a turning point in Cohen’s research, although 
he did not use the computer as a graphical tool, nor did he intend to challenge the 
concept of art and originality. As exemplified by his works produced in the seventies, 
Cohen researched the act of drawing in greater detail and therefore further developed 
his previous artistic explorations. His use of programming languages was a means by 
which to enquire the question of creativity through a machine. In the Tate catalogue 
published on the occasion of his exhibition in 1983, the artist expresses his motivations: 
 
I have always had a profound preoccupation with how things work, however, 
and since the most remarkable 'thing' I know about is the human mind, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that I saw the program's decision-making abilities as an 
analogue for human intellectual activity. That I found fascinating, and I still do. 
I discovered eventually that I was not alone in my attitude, though my co-
believers were not in the art world. Under the guidance of Professor Ed 
Feigenbaum, of Stanford University, I learned how the Artificial Intelligence 
community went about its business and started again, with more knowledge and 
more direction than I had had at the beginning, to write programs which would, 
in some important respects, do what human artists do when they make 
images.142 
 
This passage informs us that Cohen was moved by the urge to understand the 
functioning of the human mind. Additionally, the artist draws a clear parallel with the 
artificial intelligence research and highlights how the encounter with Professor Edward 
Feigenbaum facilitated his understanding of programming. He also communicates his 
purpose: to make programs that simulate the behaviours of humans as they engage in 
creative activities such as drawing. This passage alone would suggest that the artist was 
quite in concordance with artificial intelligence research, something that he would 
disregard in later articles.  
 
Over a ten year period from 1973 to 1983, Harold Cohen published six papers which are 
of relevance to this thesis. In these articles, he explains and describes the functioning of 
the program and his work. He also elaborates on ideas concerning creative behaviours 
                                                            





and the similarities and differences between a hand-made drawing and a computer-
generated one. In addition, he tackles questions related to consciousness, intentionality 
and artificial intelligence. Through the analysis of these articles, it is possible to 
understand Cohen's ideas and concerns as he developed AARON during the early years.  
 
The similarities and differences between human beings and machines are already 
approached in "Parallel to Perception", published in 1973, in which Cohen considers 
more specifically the question of feedback and non-deterministic behaviours in a 
machine. In the introductory paragraphs, he clearly expresses his ambitious goal: 
 
If the whole system can autonomously generate art — autonomously, that is, in 
the obviously qualified sense used above — then we will know something more 
about ways in which art may be made, and conceivably something about the 
way in which human beings make it.143 
 
Here again, the artist stresses how his intention is to understand the human activity of 
drawing through experimentation with a machine. In the paper, the question of whether 
a machine is capable of non-deterministic behaviour appears as a central one. Cohen 
admits that such question is difficult to solve and that any answer would in turn be 
dependant on the very idea of human behaviour and machine behaviour. 
 
But we should examine the implications behind this answer with some care, 
since it appears to involve the question of whether a machine might be capable 
of non-deterministic behaviour. I have some doubt whether any definitive 
answer can be given to this question: whatever more rigorous definitions of the 
term 'nondeterministic' might be available in other disciplines, it seems to me 
that here it relates to what we think human behaviour is like at least as much as 
it does to what we think machine behaviour is like.144 
 
Eventually, Cohen resolves to consider that humans and machines don’t work within 
the same environment, thus any attempt to compare and evaluate the two on the same 
basis is, in Cohen’s opinion, erroneous and misleading. According to the artist, a 
machine must be understood in its own language and terms. On the other hand, in 
Cohen's opinion, the programmer cannot but relate to his human knowledge and 
experience while programming a machine, most particularly when attempting to 
accomplish an activity that has been considered only possible for intelligent beings, 
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such as drawing and painting. This seems to be particularly true, according to the artist, 
when dealing with questions of images and colours. Nevertheless, the artist does not 
believe that a machine need to be embodied in a physical environment in order to deal 
with image-making and being able to produce objects in the physical world, objects that 
can challenge our ideas about art and creativity. For this reason, he concludes that the 
conception of a machine imitating a creative activity such as drawing does not 
necessitate the reproduction of peculiar human abilities such as perception. 
 
Cohen’s considerations are further developed in a successive paper, "On purpose", 
published in 1974. In this article, the artist carefully and precisely explains the 
functioning of a computing machine. Because the computer is a general-purpose 
symbol-manipulating machine, as the artist concedes, it is capable of "dealing with any 
problem which can be given a symbolic representation".145 He starts with the hypothesis 
that "machine behavior shares some very fundamental characteristics with what we 
normally regard as art-making behaviour."146 A difference between a human being and 
a machine proposed by Cohen is that the machine cannot draw at random, contrary to 
popular belief. Human sometimes rely on random acts to take decisions, such as 
throwing a dice on a table or a sponge on a canvas to create unpredictable patterns, 
while a machine will always follow an order. Omit this difference and what interests the 
artist the most are the similarities: a fundamental similarity between the functioning of a 
machine and the one of a human being is, according to his opinion, the ability to 
compare things, and to proceed by inferring from the results of the comparison. This 
process corresponds to a decision-making one. Consequently, Cohen suggests that 
machines have the potential to couple this decision-making process with the ability to 
weight the results and modify the parameters that allow the program to make the 
decisions. To illustrate this capacity of the machine, the artist mentions the early 
research in artificial intelligence, in particular he cites the checkers program developed 
by Arthur Samuel which beat a state champion human player in 1962 as an example of 
a program capable of adapting to the analysis of the outcomes.147 
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In "The material of symbols", an article published at the University of California in San 
Diego in 1976, the artist deepens his analysis regarding the difference between a human 
and a machine in the context of image-making. He further investigates concepts of 
creativity, protocol and feedback. Here again, the artist clearly affirms his purpose: 
 
The point of the strategy — the building of a computer program — was not to 
see whether the presence of these behavioral primitives would add a sense of 
authenticity to the output. It was to see whether the program could generate 
image-rich material in a controlled context where it would be clear that the 
effect was not the result of something else.148 
 
What is particularly interesting in this article is that, to support his observations, Cohen 
examines and describes the behaviours of real human beings when they draw. He starts 
to examine the sketches of his two daughters, in particular when questioned to draw on 
a piece of paper to which he previously added some random dots. He repeats the same 
exercise with his art students, some of them being older and having many years of 
experience. He also analyses the reasoning of his daughters and his students to try to 
understand if they followed any rules when deciding whether to connect the dots on the 
paper, or not.  Cohen concluded that all the people involved in the experiment were 
acting in accordance with a limited set of recurring rules. According to the artist, these 
rules could be summarised with the following observations: 
 
1. see if you can see an image in the dots, and if so draw a line around it: 2. if 
you can't see an image, draw closed figures anyway: and, 3. if you can't do 1 or 
2, fake it. "Faking it", on questioning, turned out to mean using open structures 
like short straight lines, zigzags, and so on, as space filling.149 
 
Through these examples, the artist wishes to demystify the idea that image making, as a 
particular example of art making, involves a peculiar artistic inspiration. The recurring 
idea of the artistic genius, the inspiration of the muse, are strong metaphors that 
impregnate both artistic production and its reception, according to Cohen, who 
nevertheless does not negate a priori the possibility of such occurrences. However, he 
asserts that the activity of making art, and quite particularly the one involved with 
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drawing, relies for the most part on processes that do not necessitate these metaphors to 
be explained. 
 
What seemed certain to me, and still does, is that freehand drawing involves an 
elaborate feedback mechanism, a continuous matching of current state against 
desired end state and a continuous correction of deviation, essentially like the 
mechanisms we use to thread a needle, or drink a glass of water, or drive a 
car.150 
 
It is interesting to observe how the artist refers to the concept of feedback as an 
explanation of the necessary process in the activity of drawing. Feedback is a central 
concept in cybernetics, fundamental to the research of Norbert Wiener, whose work has 
greatly influenced research in computer science and robotics. The artist uses this 
concept to partly explain the functioning of drawing, as many other human activities, 
and thus to bridge the distance between men and machines. The intent to demystify and 
to better understand the activity of producing works of art is again stated as a motivation 
of his own work and research with computer-generated images in an article published 
for the University of California at San Diego, "What is an image?": 
 
The motivation for this work has been the desire to understand more about the 
nature of art-making processes than the making of art itself allows.151 
 
The article develops a precise description of the functioning of his computer program. 
As the artist explains, AARON is based on a hierarchical system organised by a group of 
protocols that mostly relies on the 'if-then' series of command, a rather basic feature of 
programming languages for decision-making. In this article, Cohen admits that his 
knowledge of the activity of drawing relies on a long artistic career, something that has 
certainly influenced his approach to experimenting with computers. The artist stresses 
once more that the machine was never instructed to reproduce a particular drawing, nor 
was it fed with a specific drawing made by the artist as a starting point. The program 
does not rely on any kind of input or data to produce drawings: the creation of the 
drawing by the machine is the result of a process of choices, in which the 'if-then' 
command plays an important part. This is particularly true for the first years of 
production; later versions of AARON possess a knowledge base to create more complex 
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and articulated figures such as animals and people. During its first decade of existence, 
AARON produced his drawings through a series of rules structured to generate points, 
lines and figures and by organizing these elements in the available space, coupled with a 
monitoring process. In writing the program with such a hierarchical structure, Harold 
Cohen was trying to individuate a set of fundamental cognitive processes that are 
essential to creating images, as well as to understanding them: 
 
In short, my tentative hypothesis in starting work on AARON was that all 
image-making and all image-reading is mediated by cognitive processes of a 
rather low-level kind, presumably processes by means of which we are able to 
cope also with the real world.152 
 
To reproduce these cognitive processes in a machine, he chose to focus on three specific 
ones to start with: the capacity to distinguish between figures and ground, between open 
and closed forms, and between interiors and exteriors. Although Cohen made it clear 
that he regarded the functioning of a machine as different form the functioning of the 
human mind, he proposed to consider the mind as "devoted primarily to establishing 
symbolic relationships."153 In the conclusion of the article, the artist mentions that his 
ideas concerning the nature of visual representation are different from those proposed 
by the artificial intelligence and cognitive science community. Nevertheless, he 
concedes that some parallel can be drawn. 
 
Cohen’s analysis of creative behaviour, supplemented by his considerations concerning 
the approach of artificial intelligence research on this subject, are presented in a longer 
article written during the artist's residency at the Rand Corporation in 1981. In this 
paper, the artist describes the results of the development of a newer program, ANIMS, 
written with the purpose of investigating the representation of figurative forms such as 
animals. The program is provided with knowledge of animals from a structural point of 
view: for example, it has a set of instructions concerning the articulation of limbs. 
Cohen, describes the new program as being the successor of his previous one, AARON, 
and briefly provides an evaluation of the results achieved with the older program: 
 
It has shown itself capable of generating extremely diverse, even bizarre, 
output; yet it is not capable of the purposeful self-modification that 
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characterizes creativity. It has become apparent that the programming structures 
it employs will not lead to that end.154 
 
In this article, published after ten years of works, the artist draws the first conclusions 
concerning the results of his research. He admits, for the first time, not to be completely 
satisfied with his program, in particular because it cannot modify itself autonomously. 
This assertion suggests that the artist is aiming at devising a truly creative machine. In 
the conclusion of the article, Cohen elaborates on some suggestions for the conception 
of a program that could reproduce a more efficient creative behaviour. He names the 
hypothetical program AARON 2, and he describes the features that the program would 
have to fulfil in order to be considered creative. The features are the following: the 
program should generate an unpredictable output, and exhibit an adaptive behaviour; it 
should "generate representational objects which are compellingly 'visual'" and "produce 
persuasive evidence of the possibility of addressing computer programs to a range of 
tasks which, like creativity itself, now appears to be fundamentally beyond their 
scope."155 These particular features are the result of considerations developed 
throughout the paper, concerning creativity, representation, image making, but also 
cognitive functions, consciousness and reflections on the results of artificial intelligence 
research. Cohen concludes that if one thinks that creativity only belongs to humans, one 
will never concede that AARON 2 will ever be creative. However, at the time of the 
publishing, the artist does not seem to exclude the possibility that creativity could in the 
future be attributed to machines in general and to his program in particular. 
 
Speculations about the possible development of AARON 2 are again examined in the 
article "How to make a drawing". Here the artist appears confident that the future 
program will probably achieve a higher degree of creativity:  
 
In a short time its drawings will be unpredictable, not in the simple sense that 
Aaron1 's drawings were unpredictable, but in the more profound sense that 
they were produced by a program which had changed since it was written.156 
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This passage could be regarded as Cohen's personal definition of emerging behaviour, 
quite a demanding definition and a rather optimistic prediction for a computer program. 
In this article, the artist manifests similar optimism regarding the evolution of 
computers within society: 
 
We are living on the crest of a cultural shock-wave of unprecedented 
proportions, which thrusts a new kind of entity into our world: something less 
than human, perhaps, but potentially capable of many of the higher intellectual 
functions — it is too early still to guess HOW many — we have supposed to be 
uniquely human. We are in the process of coming to terms with the fact that 
‘intelligence’ no longer means, uniquely, ‘human intelligence’.157 
 
In 1983, Cohen seems very confident about the future evolution of his program. Over 
the course of the succeeding decades, his position towards computer and artificial 
intelligence will nevertheless reconsider these optimistic predictions. 
2.2.4 On Artificial Intelligence and the Evolution of AARON 
During the first decade of its existence, between 1973 and 1983, AARON produced 
black and white drawings, which would sometimes be coloured and signed by the artist 
himself. In this early phase, the artist was mainly addressing problems such as the 
ability of the machine to differentiate between figure and background, between open 
and closed forms and between inner and outer surfaces. At the beginning of the eighties, 
Cohen reprogrammed AARON, unhappy with its previous results, and decided to deeply 
focus on the process of generating figurative forms. He thus felt it was important that 
AARON had a memory to store all his drawings and all the rules, a model that was 
inspired by the functioning of human intelligence, on the one hand, and the activity of 
painting on the other, in particular as observed in children. The artist was convinced, at 
that time, that since human intelligence was the only model available to us, it was not 
unreasonable to use it as a source of inspiration while programming a machine to do an 
activity such as drawing, widely considered as an activity that necessitates a degree of 
intelligence. Programming a machine with a knowledge-base, a memory, the possibility 
to influence new productions from stored information, and eventually creating a 
                                                            





machine that would record its own information, were some of the artist’s objectives 
during this period of time, as attested by his own early articles. Indeed, it could be said 
that when it came to the challenge of creating a truly independent machine, which 
would be able to modify itself and to produce unpredictable drawings, Cohen set high 
expectations for himself. These goals - and the approaches to reach them – were, to a 
certain extent, influenced by conventional artificial intelligence research.  
 
In an interview with Curtis Roads for the Computer Music Journal, Cohen clearly 
associates his vision of his program as a production system, to the artificial intelligence 
approach, in particular concerning the concept of knowledge: 
 
One of the ongoing problems in AI is now the representation of knowledge. 
Production systems are a way of representing knowledge. There isn't a 
fundamental difference between saying I know something and saying I know 
the rules for doing something. What the production system represents is the 
rules for image-making.158 
 
It is interesting to note that the Encyclopaedia of Artificial Intelligence, edited in two 
volumes in 1987, hosts a short article of two columns indexed 'Art, AI in', that is to say, 
artificial intelligence in art.159 This article on artificial intelligence in art is exclusively 
dedicated to AARON, which is described as a ‘knowledge based […] family of 
programs’ that is ‘distinguished for its autonomous creative behaviour’. It is remarkable 
that an exhaustive encyclopaedia in two volumes totalling 1'219 pages host only one 
example of an artwork produced using artificial intelligence. Indeed, it is worth noting 
that this single entry was in fact penned by Cohen himself whose contribution was the 
result of an invitation. 
 
In this respect, it is also interesting to consider the book published by Cohen, together 
with his wife Becky Cohen and Penny Nii, entitled The First Artificial Intelligence 
Coloring Book: Art and Computers. The computer scientist Edward A. Feigenbaum, 
professor at Stanford University, was solicited to write an introduction on the work of 
the artist for the publication. In it, Feigenbaum recalls the invitation he made to Harold 
Cohen to spend a sabbatical year at the Stanford Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, 
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having previously discovered the artist's work. Of Cohen, the computer scientist affirms 
that he "sought to use the concepts and methods of artificial intelligence research to 
shed light on the ways artists make their images. (...) Cohen is dedicated to 
demystifying art and bringing it back into the hands of ordinary people."160 Not only 
does Edward A. Feigenbaum acknowledge the application of concepts and methods of 
artificial intelligence research in the work of Cohen, he also affirms that the artist uses 
these tools to '[demystify] art' and to make it accessible to 'ordinary people'. 
Demagogical as it might appear, this statement reveals how the computer is perceived, 
or promoted, as a democratic tool, in opposition to the world of fine art, which implies a 
certain elitism. 
 
Journalist Pamela McCorduck, who has documented the life of Cohen and extensively 
analysed his work, described AARON as a ‘semi-intelligent program’, an ‘artificial 
intelligence system’ and even a ‘contingent system’.161 She pointed out that in 
developing his own experiments in order to test the application of computing machines 
to art and his own ideas on cognitive behaviours, Cohen did so independently from 
scientific research in the AI field. In addition, she reported that it is in particular the ‘if-
then-(else)’ program command that inspired him to write the application to create 
drawings, while he was learning to program. McCorduck concedes that her book is the 
result of a long encounter and discussion with Cohen. Although she is responsible for 
the interpretation of his work, the fact that she mentions an association with artificial 
intelligence research, but also an independence from it, is certainly the result of a 
dialogue between the author and the artist. 
 
On some occasions, Cohen admitted his inclination towards artificial intelligence 
research himself and, more particularly, his preference for symbolic representation 
when it comes to using machines as a mean to further progress in epistemological 
knowledge. During a talk held at the Tate Modern in 2004, a member of the audience 
asked him to comment on the artistic production that had emerged from recent 
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developments in artificial life, a development that discarded symbolic representation. 
Harold Cohen replied that: 
 
There is an awfully big difference between being able to respond physically to 
environmental stimuli and being capable of symbolic thought and we see no 
indication yet at all that the artificial life people are within a million miles of 
developing the original model into symbolic thinking. (...) You don't make art 
unless you have a history.162 
 
This statement is essential to understanding Cohen’s approach, not only in regard to his 
opinions toward scientific research, but also concerning his preoccupations with 
developing a computer program in an artistic context. Cohen explicitly refuses to 
concede that the bottom-up approach, promoted by artificial life research, supplemented 
and disavowed the traditional one held by artificial intelligence researchers. He also 
suggests that art-making is possible if there is a background allowing for the 
comprehension and the organisation of such an activity, as well as a reason to do so, 
something that cannot be achieved, in his opinion, through generative algorithms alone. 
And this is also the reason why he kept rewriting his program, trying new directions to 
further investigate the nature of image-making and attempting new solutions in dealing 
with forms and colours. 
 
During the eighties and nineties, a decade after AARON was first created, the printed 
works present a clear evolution towards figurative and realistic shapes. Furthermore, the 
forms started to be coherently organised in interiors or in landscapes displaying organic 
elements. At first, the artist personally applied colours by hand to the printed works, he 
later decided that AARON should be able to deal with colours independently. It is only 
at the beginning of the nineties, that he expressly confronted the difficulty of instructing 
AARON to autonomously deal with colours. Cohen used many programming languages 
through the years, such as "Fortran, Basic, SAIL, Algol and C", and he has been "using 
Lisp exclusively for the past twenty-five years,"163 a language that precisely helped him 
to find a solution to integrate colours into his program. Invented by John McCarthy in 
1958, Lisp was commonly considered the favoured language by artificial intelligence 
researchers. 
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At the turn of the millennium, AARON started producing abstract works displaying a 
large array of colours. However, the problem of colouring brought the artist to 
reconsider his formal position regarding intelligence and the way to program a creative 
machine. While his initial approach matched, to some extent, the principles of AI 
research based on symbol manipulation and top-down modelling of human intelligence, 
the solution to the problem of colouring was possible, for the artist, only by diverging 
from these models and abandoning the idea of an organized knowledge base. In a 
personal email, Cohen admitted that his early thoughts, illustrated in the article "What is 
an image?" were "very much under the influence of orthodox AI."164 Conversely, the 
current version of AARON, as described by the artist, "to the degree that it acts with 
neither intelligence nor purpose, it resembles a natural system more than an intelligent 
system."165 With the ambition to achieve greater autonomy for AARON, the artist finally 
adopted the model of an artificial machine whose functioning relies more on 
independent local rules instead of on a coherent and organized system. 
 
In a sense, Harold Cohen didn’t entirely give up painting when he turned to computers 
and programming: painting, drawing and creativity in general were precisely the subject 
of his investigations while he conceived and constantly reprogrammed AARON. More 
than a device to produce commercially valuable and attractive artworks in an efficient 
and automated fashion, more than a tool, as he so often felt compelled to affirm, his 
endeavour was to constantly rework and evolve his program in order to better 
understand the act of image making, and eventually achieve the possibility of producing 
a truly creative machine that could display a particular kind of emerging behaviour. 
 
Concerning the association of his work to computer art, on the one hand, and to 
artificial intelligence, on the other, Cohen explicitly expressed his objections in a paper 
published in 1986, "Off the Shelf". 
 
I've noticed that the computer art telephone callers are starting to profess a deep 
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involvement with Artificial Intelligence: I surely cannot deny my fellowship 
with that, can I? Oh, but I can! I know where I stand with respect to Artificial 
Intelligence. I also know the difference between a name that differentiates and a 
label that prevents differentiation.166 
 
In an email exchange, I had the opportunity to question him on his position regarding 
artificial intelligence, as well as the debate opposing top-down versus bottom-up 
approaches. He clearly took his distance from both approaches: 
 
I've argued in one of my papers - on colour - that we are all (all including 
machines) both enabled and limited by our resources, and that humans and 
machines don't have the same resources. That argument took me off the 
standard top-down AI vector; I didn't see how modelling the human colorist 
was possible. At the same time, I recognised that my program would need a 
great deal of knowledge about color (and the human perception of color, given 
that the program is intended to produce work for a human audience) and it 
never occurred to me that a bottom-up approach could generate that knowledge 
for itself.167 
 
Harold Cohen developed a very unique and personal research project: he learned to use 
computer languages such as Fortran, C and Lisp to produce his own program in order to 
approach the question of image making. In doing so, he coherently continued his own 
activity of painting and his inquiry into the fundamental elements of an image and what 
it means to create a drawing. While many projects developed within artificial 
intelligence research were later regarded as failures – as, for example, in natural 
language procession and translation, or in the area of visual perception –Cohen had 
successfully created a program capable of autonomously generating paintings that have 
been exhibited in museums worldwide and appreciated by a large audience. What is 
undoubtedly unique about Cohen, is the consistency with which he modified and 
improved the written program in order to progress in his artistic and epistemological 
research. For the artist, his work was not simply an opportunity to produce drawings, it 
was first and foremost a means to deepen the understanding of the activity of drawing 
and the production of meaningful forms. 
 
Cohen was inspired and certainly influenced by artificial intelligence research, although 
he did not fully associate with its ideology and methodology and preferred to develop 
his own approach. It is quite clear, from the analysis of his work and his articles, that his 
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research was deeply theoretical, epistemological, and aimed at contributing to a better 
understanding of the functioning of human activities such as creativity and image-
making through the use of the machine and programming languages. However 
conceptual and epistemological his research has been, his focus remains nonetheless 
inscribed within artistic production and the understanding of the activity of drawing. 
Cohen clearly expressed his motivations and his position concerning the use of 
machines in an artistic context in his articles. How has his work and his ideas been 
discussed by critics and curators? The next section analyses the reception of his work. 
2.2.5 Reception of Cohen's Work and Ideas 
Before he started experimenting with machines and programming, Harold Cohen 
received favourable critique for his paintings. In the catalogue published for the British 
pavilion of the Venice Biennale, he was presented as an artist who "makes his pictorial 
statement out of an investigation into the semantics of painting itself."168 As 
demonstrated in the previous sections, it is precisely this desire to pursue his 
investigation into the semantics of painting that will motivate him to engage with 
computing machines after his initial career. 
 
During the first years of presentation of the early computer drawings, the reception, 
based on an analysis of articles from the time, can be said to be quite positive. Herbert 
Francke affirmed that: "He created quite a sensation with his remote control drawing 
machine which he calls turtle because of its looks."169 In an article for the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica edited in 1973, Jack Burnham measures the quality and 
interest of Cohen's work:  
 
There are a few exceptions to the "pretty pictures" school of computer graphics. 
For instance, the English painter Harold Cohen is concerned with a "game 
theory" of strategies for creating paintings according to very primary 
assumptions. Cohen devises programs based on theories of graphic 
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In her publication on the fertile relationship between robots and art edited in 1978, 
regarding the drawings produced by AARON, Jasia Reichardt affirms that:  
 
The drawings are very different from those associated with computer art, but 
resemble Harold Cohen's freehand drawings as well as the more uninhibited 
drawings of young children. The machine demonstrates in one way how such 
drawings might come about.171 
 
Herbert Fancke, Jasia Reichardt and Jack Burnham are specialists in the field of 
computer art at the time when Cohen creates his first drawings. It is not surprising that 
the artist and his work generate a positive reaction among them. It is interesting to note, 
however, that both Jasia Reichardt and Jack Burnham emphasise the distinction 
between Cohen and other computer artists, mentioning it as a mark of quality, instead of 
a lack of it. A position that tends to suggest that the average artistic production made 
with computers, despite the novelty of the phenomenon during the seventies, didn't 
completely convince even such specialists in the field. 
 
During the period of his early production, from 1973 to 1983, Cohen was invited to 
present his work in a number of important institutions and exhibitions, such as The 
Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam, in 1977, the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, 
in 1979, the Tate Gallery in 1983, and the documenta 6 exhibition in Kassel, in 1977. 
Some of the catalogues published during these exhibitions do not propose a critical text. 
The catalogue produced on the occasion of the exhibition at the Stedeljik Museum only 
reproduce a dialogue between the artist and his wife, Becky Cohen. The Catalogue from 
the documenta 6 exhibition only includes a text written by the artist. For the documenta 
exhibition, Cohen is included in the category "Handzeichnungen Utopisches Design, 
Bücher" and, more specifically, in the sub category "Zeichenmaschine", which also 
included the artists Rebecca Horn and Jean Tinguely. Indeed, it is only several editions 
later, that the documenta exhibition would host a section dedicated to computer art. In 
the general introduction to the catalogue, the work of the artist is presented by the 
curator of the drawing section Wieland Schmied with a single, purely descriptive 
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sentence: "The drawing-computer developed by Harold Cohen that constantly creates 
new drawings from a custom program."172 
 
The catalogue of the exhibition at the San Francisco museum, on the other hand, 
presents a critical text written by Andrew Forge, Dean of Yale University School of Art. 
The author makes it clear from the start that the drawings are made by a computer: 
 
We have to be clear what these drawings are not. They are not drawings that 
Cohen has made and then instructed a computer to reproduce or permute. They 
have nothing to do with computer graphics. They are original drawings by the 
computer which, in a sense, makes up its own mind what to do next.173 
 
The conclusion of the author concerning the contribution of Cohen to art is of particular 
relevance, because it provides a qualitative appreciation of his work: 
 
If I understand him correctly, Cohen is telling us that art is, in the most general 
and universal sense, a kind of meditation on the power of the mind to 
symbolize. It is a tonic message, deeply humanistic, and liberating, at least to 
anyone who has suffered the claustrophobia of the historicist tradition, whether 
in the form of art historical theory or the strictures of the art scene.174 
 
It is worth noting that Andrew Forge stresses the humanistic aspect of Cohen’s work, 
his propensity to make a contribution to knowledge through his research. The author 
feels compelled to point out that the work of the artist is not about the machine, but 
rather about art and the human mind. 
 
The catalogue of the exhibition at Tate Gallery, in 1983, proposes a critical text by 
Margaret Boden. In the text, this time, the author clearly links the work of the artist to 
artificial intelligence research: 
 
The interpretative process by which the mind assigns meanings to its ideas are 
compared to the information-processing specified by complex computer 
programs – especially those developed in artificial intelligence.175 
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At the time of the publishing, Margaret Boden was Professor of Philosophy and 
Psychology at the University of Sussex and had conducted research in the fields of 
psychology, computer science and artificial intelligence. Her text for the catalogue of 
the Tate exhibition follows an introduction written by the artist and is preceded by a text 
by Michael G. Compton, curator of the exhibition. The choice to invite Margaret A. 
Boden to contribute to the catalogue suggests that the curator felt important to have a 
critical text by a specialist in the field of cognitive sciences to better present and discuss 
the work of Harold Cohen. 
 
Not all the authors that wrote on Harold Cohen, however, have seen the parallel to the 
computer research as a positive step. Some years later, in the edition addressing the 
"Ästhetik Des Immateriellen" of Kunstforum, if the work of Cohen is described in 
positive terms, it is not because of his use of technology, but because it is considered to 
be an intelligent collaboration with machines in which the artist remains the 
mastermind: "Despite such electronic ‘wonders’, we are fortunately still far from the 
time when art will be literally produced by machines. Ultimately, AARON is nothing 
more than Cohen’s clever assistant."176 'Glücklicherweise', resolves David Galloway, 
the machine is still far from being able to genuinely and autonomously produce art. 
Galloway’s interpretation of the work contradicts, to my understanding, the ambition of 
the artist, who certainly did not consider AARON as simply his ‘cleverer Gehilfe’, or a 
tool. However, the essay shows that, for some art critics, the use of computing machines 
within an artistic context was acceptable providing that the role of the artist was not 
replaced in the creative process. 
 
The association of Cohen's work to artificial intelligence research persisted beyond the 
nineties. In her extensive publication on the work of Cohen, as already discussed, 
Pamela McCorduck described the link with artificial intelligence research. She argues 
that "Harold Cohen was drawn unerringly toward artificial intelligence, which he didn't 
                                                                                                                                                                              
July 1983] (Millbank, London: Tate Gallery, 1983), 15. 
176 "Trotz solch elektronischer "Wunder" sind wir glücklicherweise noch weit erntfernt von der Zeit, in 
der Kunst sprichwörtlich von Maschinen hergestellt wird. AARON ist schließlich nicht mehr als 
Cohens cleverer Gehilfe." David Galloway, "Die Muse in der Steckdose", Kunstforum 97 (1988): 86, 





even know existed as a scientific field"177 and concluded that to "leap beyond all that, to 
make a representation of the very process of art-making itself, is Harold Cohen's 
singular achievement."178 In the same verve, David Thomas measured the significance 
of Cohen’s work in light of his contribution to the artificial intelligence research. In an 
edition on computer art of the discontinued Canadian art journal Parachute, he wrote 
that "one of AARON's original contributions is to artificial intelligence research and our 
understanding of university-based knowledge: AARON has proven that certain aspects 
of drawing activity could share common decision-making processes with other forms of 
knowledge that can be similarly programmed."179 The author boldly concludes that 
"AARON stands at a juncture in the evolution of human identity."180 With the exception 
of some critics like David Galloway, the majority of critics that discussed the work of 
the artist, such as David Thomas, compliment it for its involvement with scientific 
research and the opportunity it offers to contribute to the progress of knowledge. 
 
Harold Cohen turned to computing machines to further develop his understanding of 
image-making. He deemed it important to master the functioning of computers and of 
programming languages, and to pursue his research over the course of many decades. 
On the one hand, the shift from traditional painting to computers could be considered a 
drastic break in his career, on the other it could be considered a coherent step forward in 
his research. If the artist turned to machines, it was not for economical or opportunistic 
reasons, but rather to address epistemological questions that were relevant to him, such 
as the nature of a drawing and the production of intentional forms. By learning to use 
computing machines, mastering several computer languages and eventually writing his 
own program, Cohen was ultimately investigating not only the act of image-making, but 
also tackling questions related to creativity, intentionality and intelligence. He aimed at 
creating an autonomous entity that would eventually evolve and surprise its own maker 
by producing unexpected drawings, thus showing emerging properties and behaviours. 
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Concerning his position toward the technology associated to his work, the artist seemed 
to be between two minds. On the one hand, he often mentioned his relationship and 
collaboration with his colleagues in the artificial intelligence field. Furthermore, his 
critical position concerning the bottom-up approach to artificial life and embodied 
robotics, and his preference for the research based on symbolic representation, further 
affiliated his artistic and epistemological research to the artificial intelligence field. 
Critics and curators who commented on his work have equally stressed this affiliation 
and it is not a surprise that the most exhaustive essays written on the artists are not from 
art historians but rather from specialists in cognitive and computer science. On the other 
hand, he often made clear how his goals and perspectives on machines differed to those 
held by computer scientists, as attested by several articles that he published. 
Additionally, the evolution of his work, in particular after the creation of a program able 
to handle the problem of colouring, is coupled with a divergence of his position away 
from the traditional artificial intelligence approach. What is more, specialists in the field 
of arts and technology, such as Jack Burnham and Jasia Reichardt, commented on the 
uniqueness and the quality of his work compared to the average emerging artistic 









2.3 Edward Ihnatowicz 
2.3.1 From Assemblages to Cybernetics 
In 1968, Edward Ihnatowicz presented his first cybernetic sculpture at the Cybernetic 
Serendipity show in London. In the same year, the artist was commissioned a sculpture 
for the Evoluon, Philip's exhibition space in Eindhoven. The resulting work, Senster, is 
the artist's most ambitious work and a significant one for the history of new media art. 
The work has been regarded as emblematic of the growing interest in the use of new 
technologies in art, a domain in which he became a prominent figure. Edward 
Ihnatowicz was born in Poland in 1926 and moved to Britain in 1943 where he studied 
at the Ruskin School of Art, in Oxford. During the first years of his artistic career, he 
focused on sculpture, in particular experimenting with salvaged and recycled materials. 
Significant biographical information is provided in a publication edited and published 
by the artist himself.181 Additional biographical references are provided by researcher 
Aleksandar Zivanovic,182 and by the airtist’s son, Richard Ihnatowicz.183 In an interview 
with Brian Reffin Smith, Edward Ihnatowicz recalls a turning point in his career: after 
having installed an atelier in his garage in order to create sculptures made out of scrap 
parts, he learned how to dismantle a car break system and discovered the servo system. 
He describes that particular moment as follows: 
 
I can be very precise about when I discovered technology - it was when I 
discovered what servo systems were about. I realised that when I was doing 
sculpture I was intrigued or frustrated, because I was much more interested in 
motion.184 
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From that moment, the artist was motivated by a very constant and coherent struggle to 
achieve a sculpture that would merge his research on motion, behaviour and 
intelligence. He was equally driven by a constant dissatisfaction with his previous 
works, as he admitted in an unpublished text, "Portrait Of The Artist As An 
Engineer".185 The more the artist developed his research, the more it merged with the 
fields of science and technology. He believed that an artist should "use the new 
discoveries to enhance his understanding of the world".186 His growing interest for 
science and technology lead him to work as a research assistant in the Department of 
Mechanical Engineering at University College in London, between 1971 and 1986.  
 
Although Edward Ihnatowicz produced only a few works involving computers and 
cybernetics and passed away at the age of sixty-two, his activity has been important for 
the development of computer art and is still mentioned today in several publications. 
His first work involving the use of hydraulic pistons and electronics was SAM, 
presented at the Cybernetic Serendipity exhibition, curated by Jasia Reichard in London 
in 1968. At first, Edward Ihnatowicz was not directly concerned with issues such as 
artificial intelligence and emerging behaviour: his preoccupations were more sculptural 
than epistemological. The idea behind the work was to realise a sculpture in which the 
formal choices resulted from functional imperatives, similar to the way that industrial 
components are shaped by utilitarian ends. SAM, the title being a short form for ‘sound-
activated mobile’, was an interactive sculpture or, in his own words, his first "attempt to 
provide a piece of kinetic sculpture with some purposefulness and positive control of its 
movement" and, in his opinion, "the first moving sculpture which moved directly and 
recognisably in response to what was going on around it."187 SAM was composed of 
several materials traditionally used in industrial design such as aluminium castings and 
fibreglass, enhanced by hydraulic pistons, microphones and an analogue circuit. The 
sculpture had an anthropomorphic shape and resembled a head mounted on a long 
mechanical neck. The head was composed of a four-leaf clover-like shape of fibreglass 
with the capacity to converge the sound to four microphones spreading horizontally and 
                                                            
185 Edward Ihnatowicz, Portrait Of The Artist As An Engineer (Book proposal, unfinished and 
unpublished, date unknown: at least pre-1988, found in his papers, published on the internet: 
http://www.senster.com/ihnatowicz/articles/index.htm), 5. 
186 Ihnatowicz (1980), 4. 





vertically from its centre. The neck was alternatively composed of four pieces of 
aluminium, cast in vertebrae-like shapes, each supporting hydraulic pistons which 
allowed the whole sculpture to twist and bend and so that the head could be directed 
toward a particular source of sound. Unlike works from Alexander Calder and Jean 
Tinguely, where movements were determined by the wind or by motors, SAM’s 
movement actively responded to the environment. 
 
Ihnatowicz explained that the idea behind SAM was not merely to stimulate 
interactivity, but rather to produce an abstract work of art whose aesthetic was 
determined by functionality instead of arbitrariness. The work is the result of the artist’s 
fascination for industrial components, which he had previously used in his assemblages, 
as well as his admiration for the work of engineers who could provide a rational 
explanation for the formal choices of their products. According to Aleksandar 
Zivanovic, who extensively researched the life and work of Ihnatowicz, the idea of a 
mechanical head came from a film of a lioness that the artist captured in a zoo, whose 
head movement fascinated him and which he decided to imitate.188 This explanation is 
confirmed by the artist’s son, Richard Ihnatowicz, who related his father’s interest in 
animals and their movements which he regularly observed in the zoo.189 Instead of 
applying a predetermined movement to the sculpture, he decided to regulate the 
movement exclusively to sound-response and interactivity, thus removing any 
possibility of arbitrariness in the design of those components that determined the 
movement of the sculpture. The artist’s aim was to produce a work of art, a sculpture 
whose aesthetic would be completely determined by operative principles. SAM received 
a favourable response from public and critics. According to the descriptions of some of 
the critics who visited the exhibition in London, the spectators were truly fascinated by 
the work and tended to interact with it for long periods of time. For example, art 
historian Reyner Banham, in his review of the exhibition, praised the formal quality of 
the work and described it as "about one the most beautiful fragments of sculpture I have 
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seen in a decade – and the most disturbing."190 Even though Ihnatowicz's concerns were 
purely aesthetic in the beginning, aimed at achieving the perfection of functional 
industrial design, the artist soon discovered that movement, perception and interaction 
embodied in an artificial system were the central issues of his research. These central 
questions motivated him to create his most ambitious and important work, Senster, to 
which SAM opened the path.  
 
In the following sections, the analysis of the Senster will focus on the work and its 
presentation in Eindhoven, along with an interpretation of texts written by the artist 
himself and, in conclusion, the articles written on Edward Ihnatowicz and his work. 
2.3.2 The Senster 
In May 1968, Edward Ihnatowicz was commissioned by the Dutch company Philips to 
create a sculpture for their exhibition centre, The Evoluon, in Eindhoven. James 
Gardener, the centre’s exhibition designer, introduced Ihnatowicz to the executives of 
Philips. In 1970, two years after the conclusion of the contract, the artist presented his 
work Senster, which was, to a great extent, a more complex and ambitious work 
compared to SAM. According to Jonathan Benthall it was "probably the most 
technically ambitious computer-based artefact yet made anywhere."191 Many years later, 
Eduardo Kac described it as "the first computer-controlled robotic artwork."192 To give 
an idea of the complexity of the technology involved in this sculpture, Aleksandar 
Zivanovic reported that the computer was insured for the equivalent of today 500’000 
USD in the shipping invoice.193 The sculpture was able to move in response to its 
environment: in addition to responding to sound, as was the case with his previous 
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work, it was also able to respond to movement. The name Senster was coined by 
combining the words monster and sensor, as explained by the artist’s son.194 
 
The cybernetic sculpture was made of a complex body composed of steel tubes, which 
were over four meters long and over two meters tall. The sculpture appeared like a 
robotic animal and was often described as a giraffe: it consisted of a static body with 
three legs and a long, moving neck with a head-like shape on its end. It was equipped 
and controlled with the Philips P9201 computer, a 16-bit system with 8k core memory 
and additional paper tape for external memory.195 According to the son of the artist, 
Ihnatowicz learned how to program and eventually wrote the code for the computer to 
regulate the sculpture, with the collaboration and help of technicians from University 
College of London.196 The electrical and computing device controlled the movement, 
which was powered by an electro-hydraulic servo-system, supplying the power for the 
movement of the six independent mechanical joints of the neck, each reproducing the 
articulation of a lobster claw. The head of the Senster was equipped with four 
microphones and two close-range Doppler radar devices that detected movement. The 
reason Ihnatowicz doubled the input source - responsive to both sound and movement - 
was that he wanted to provoke a more complex and unpredictable reaction to the 
movement of the audience compared to his previous work. Jasia Reichardt wrote that 
the Senster "provoked the kind of reactions which one might expect from people who 
are trying to communicate with a person or an animal. It appeared more as an organic 
creature that is capable of evaluating the messages that are sent, and responding to 
them."197 To render the movement more animal and organic, the artist added to the 
servo-system a regulating device that he called ‘the predictor’, which would provide and 
control acceleration in the movement. Although the Senster could have been 
programmed to provide a large diversity of responses to sound and movement, it was 
originally programmed to move towards slight sources of movement and sound, such as 
an animal hunting for prey, and to move backwards from louder sound sources and 
violent motion, as if frightened. 
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The artist had intended to make the work available to scientists and researchers with the 
purpose of modifying the assembler code of the sculpture in order to test varied 
responses to the environment. In this way, the work could be used as a device for testing 
and improving artificial intelligence programming, thus providing an elaborate tool for 
scientific research. Geoff Simons, chief editor at the National Computer Centre in 
England, even affirmed that in the Senster the "brain (a computer) has learning abilities 
and can modify the machine’s behaviour in light of past experience."198 This might be 
an exaggerated statement and, unfortunately, the author doesn’t provide any source to 
support it. It is likely that Simons erroneously interpreted the artist’s claims about the 
possibility of reprogramming Senster in order to improve its responses to the audience 
and to generate a more lifelike behaviour. However, Ihnatowicz does not assert that the 
computer can independently reformulates its own program in any of his articles. On the 
contrary, the artist clearly declared in an interview with Brian Refine Smith that "it was 
a completely pre-programmed responding system."199 The assembler code is made 
available on the website dedicated to the Senter by Aleksandar Zivanovic.200 Several 
computer scientists and enthusiasts from the Swiss Mechatronic Art Society agreed to 
examine the assembler code and to provide me with an analysis of its structure, 
functioning and qualities. Veli Hämmerli, in particular, came to the interesting 
conclusion that the "Senster program was kept simple and short, it was proven to be 
functional within the 8 KiloByte (of the Philips Computer) of memory space available. 
Random Access Memory (RAM) was a huge cost factor in the early computers."201 This 
analysis of the assembler code confirms that the instructions have been written in a 
practical and efficient manner, to regulate the functioning of the complex hydraulic 
sculpture. The hypothesis that the computer was able to modify its own instructions 
should therefore be excluded. However, the limited number of descriptions from the 
author in the comment row of the document and the absence of more detailed 
documents of higher-level algorithms for the factual regulation of the system prevent 
complete comprehension of the program. 
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The opportunity to work with computing machines seemed to Ihnatowicz the logical 
way to further investigate the question posed by his previous work. To conceive the 
Senster, the artist felt that he needed to further deepen his technical knowledge, in 
particular in the field of computing:  
 
I felt it was time to learn more about digital processing. Digital computing 
worried me because it seemed to require not only a much better knowledge of 
electronics than I possess, but also a knowledge of Boolean logic, Venn 
diagrams and the like. I tackled this problem by first attending a course on 
fluidics, a vogue technology then, in which the various logic functions of AND, 
OR and such could be performed by deflecting jets of air in various ingenious 
devices.202 
 
If the computer and the assembler code were in part responsible for the peculiar 
movement of the Senster, this was the result of the care that the artist took to develop 
the articulations of its body. The artist imitated the joints of a lobster to create the 
articulations. He chose the lobster's claws because they were easier to reproduce, 
compared to the ones belonging to other animals, which were more complex. 
 
The starting point for the Senster was again the idea to produce a sculpture in which the 
aesthetic would be determined by functional needs. But by creating this particular work, 
Ihnatowicz eventually learned that behaviour was what interested him the most. Yet, he 
was not entirely satisfied by the extremely complex movement and technology of the 
Senster and later admitted that "there wasn’t an iota of intelligence in the thing."203 
Additionally, Philips seemed less interested in investing money in the work, as time 
went by, and finally dismissed it out of the exhibition centre in 1974. As explained by 
James Gardner, the work was not generating enough interest in the audience and in the 
press, in the years after its first presentation, and it became expensive to maintain.204 In 
its complete form as a cybernetic sculpture, the Senster doesn't exist anymore. Today, 
the structure of the work is still visible at the location of the former Verburg-Holland 
Company (recently acquired by Delmeco Fishing Technology), in Colijnsplaat in the 
Netherlands, which was commissioned to assemble the structure. Once dismissed from 
                                                            
202 Edward Ihnatowicz, Portrait Of The Artist As An Engineer (Book proposal, unfinished and 
unpublished, date unknown: at least pre-1988, found in his papers, published on the internet: 
http://www.senster.com/ihnatowicz/articles/index.htm), 5. 
203 Edward Ihnatowicz, in the interview with Brian Reffin Smith: Smith (1984), 149. 






The Evoluon, the Verburg-Holland Company had it installed on their own campus, as 
an outdoor sculpture to be appreciated for its aesthetic and historical values. Its 
electronic components and records are mainly lost, but some dedicated robot engineers, 
in particular Aleksandar Zivanovic, have been collecting all sort of documents related to 
the work and distribute them online.205 
 
The Senster is the most significant work created by Ihnatowicz, both in terms of 
production and resonance. Subsequently, the artist created a third and last work of 
cybernetic sculpture, the Bandit, which was commissioned by the Computer Art Society 
for an exhibition at the Edinburgh Festival in 1973. Unsatisfied with the results of his 
previous work, the artist focused on the possibility of an effective interaction between 
the public and the machine. Ihnatowicz created the Bandit in collaboration with his PhD 
students at University College in London. The new work mainly consisted of a 
hydraulically operated lever, powered with pressure sensors and connected to a 
computer. It looked very similar to a slot machine, primarily because of the presence of 
the lever which was to be activated by the public. The title recalled the alternative name 
given to slot machines: the one-armed bandits. The public could interact with the work 
through the lever, moving it and applying pressure to it; in return, the machine would 
apply pressure to the lever and register the response from the public. Eventually, the 
computer would process the information concerning the response of the public from the 
interaction with the lever and would produce the results, through a printing machine. 
The results would output the deductions of the machine, based on statistical analysis, 
about the sex, the age and the temperament of the person involved in the interaction. 
Jonathan Benthall notes that when determining the sex of the person manipulating the 
lever, The Bandit  proved to be accurate 70% of the of the time.206  
 
The idea behind the Bandit was to further develop the possibility of interaction between 
the machine and the audience. Ihnatowicz determined that the Senster was not truly 
interactive and intelligent, but was only responding to some pre-programmed behaviour, 
yet the Senster showed the artist that the audience was fascinated by the behaviour of 
the work more so than its shape. Therefore, he subsequently focused on the idea of 
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genuine interaction in which the machine would respond to the audience, thus paving 
the way for a more complex intelligent behaviour. Furthermore, art critics like Jonathan 
Benthall saw the Bandit as being representative of a sexual metaphor, and appreciated 
the work for its symbolical and artistic significance as well as for its propensity to raise 
philosophical questions such as "what it means to distinguish an object from a 
presence."207 After the Bandit, the artist was unable to create any further important 
works due to lack of funding.208 
 
Ihnatowicz hoped that his works, in particular the Senster, could become a playground 
not only for visitors, but also for researchers. His desire was for computer scientists and 
robotics researchers to visit the Evoluon where they would experiment with the machine 
and in particular with the computer which directed the impressive sculpture. He hoped 
that the Senster could eventually learn new, unexpected behaviours from its interactions 
with spectators and from the development of sophisticated programs. In this sense, the 
work was intended by the artist to display generative qualities. According to Alexander 
Ivanovic, the artist spent four months, from September to December 1970, in 
Eidenhover to reprogram the Senster and to observe the reaction of the visitors. From 
these observations, the artist concluded that movement was what mostly intrigued the 
spectators. Researcher Donald Michie and journalist Rory Johnston, in their 
promotional book on artificial intelligence and machines, also reported on Ihnatowicz’s 
experiment in which he tried to produce different behaviours: 
 
He also noticed a curious aspect of the effect the Senster had on people. When 
he was testing it he gave it various random patterns of motion to go through. 
Children who saw it operating in this mode found it very frightening, but no 
one was ever frightened when it was working in the museum with its proper 
software, responding to sounds and movement.209 
 
The fact that Ihnatowicz was experimenting with random patterns is a sign of his 
intention to create unexpected behaviours. The investigation of complex phenomena 
such as intelligence and understanding was the central objective of the artist's research. 
He was convinced that such phenomena could be understood by means of simulating 
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them in an artificial system. Inhatowicz believed that, in order for a machine to be able 
to produce behaviours such as thinking, it needed to operate and control a physical 
device, thus having a purpose and an occurrence in the physical world. Ihnatowicz’s 
central idea is very clear: intelligence is not a phenomenon that can occur in an abstract 
environment, rather it needs a physical environment in order to emerge and evolve, an 
environment with which the artificial system needs to interact. Hence, for the artist, two 
important concepts are related to the concept of intelligence: the concept of perception 
and the concept of interaction through movement. These concepts are often mentioned 
in the texts published by the artist during his life. The following section will discuss 






Figure 11   Evoluon Eindhoven, view of the exhibition and congress centre today.  










Figure 12   Evoluon Eindhoven, view of the exhibition and congress centre today.  










Figure 13   Evoluon Eindhoven, view of the exhibition and congress centre today.  










Figure 14   View of the remaining structure of the Senster by Edward Ihnatowicz in Colijnsplaat, 










Figure 15   View of the remaining structure of the Senster by Edward Ihnatowicz in Colijnsplaat, 











Figure 16   View of the remaining structure of the Senster by Edward Ihnatowicz in Colijnsplaat, 











Figure 17   View of the remaining structure of the Senster by Edward Ihnatowicz in Colijnsplaat, 











Figure 18   View of the remaining structure of the Senster by Edward Ihnatowicz in Colijnsplaat, 











Figure 19   View of the remaining structure of the Senster by Edward Ihnatowicz in Colijnsplaat, 











Figure 20   View of the remaining structure of the Senster by Edward Ihnatowicz in Colijnsplaat, 










Figure 21   View of the remaining structure of the Senster by Edward Ihnatowicz in Colijnsplaat, 









2.3.3 The Understanding of Understanding 
Through his work, Ihnatowicz developed a personal and peculiar approach, not only 
toward art but also toward specific topics related to technology and in particular 
artificial intelligence. What were his primal concerns and what was his position with 
regard to the computing machine and the scientific research associated with it? The 
constant struggle to achieve what he would consider the ultimate sculpture and his 
perpetual dissatisfaction with his previous results show that the artist was not only 
ambitious but that he also had a clear vision of his goals. Additionally, Ihnatowicz 
seemed to refuse to limit himself to a single domain, be it art, science or technology: he 
preferred to develop his own approach and to find his own solutions. Because the artist 
aimed at investigating the functioning of the human mind through the use of computers 
and robotics, it is comprehensible that his work has been mainly associated with the 
field of artificial intelligence. He was convinced that "the understanding of 
understanding must remain one of the most inspiring goals of our civilization"210 and in 
order to do so, for the artist, neither the arts alone nor the sciences could achieve this 
goal. 
 
Here is a vital and quite intangible problem of equal fascination to an artist and 
a scientist which, I suspect, will not be solved by either scientific methodology 
or artistic intuition alone. If through my work, I succeed in making someone 
aware of the complexity and the depth of understanding of the nature of 
perception required to solve this problem I shall be more than satisfied.211 
 
This statement offers an interpretation of his position about the distinction between 
artistic and scientific research. It seems that the artist believed in an approach that 
would combine scientific progress with artistic creativity. According to Ihnatowicz, this 
was the only possible way to successfully advance in the understanding of intelligence, 
or, in his words, the 'understanding of understanding'. According to his views, neither 
science nor art alone will achieve comprehensive knowledge of such a complex process. 
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Artistic creativity was, in his opinion, a necessary complement to the scientific 
methodology. 
 
If an understanding of intelligence was his main objective, the artist soon discovered 
that it was through the study of the functioning of perception that some steps could be 
made in this regard. He expressed his thesis very clearly in one of his few published 
articles: 
 
Even more intriguing is the possibility of investigating and simulating the 
behaviour of complete systems, both natural and artificial and their responses to 
changing environments because this leads us directly into the realm of 
perception which, to my mind, is the central problem of intelligent life.212 
 
Hence, perception was for Ihnatowicz the key to understanding intelligence and to 
eventually producing an artificially intelligent behaviour. He also believed that 
perception could only take place in a moving body, a body that would need to interact 
and relate to a physical environment. In another article, he expressed this idea: 
 
It appears that not only is the physical motion of animals, when it is not 
random, controlled by some form of perception, but perception is equally 
dependent on some form of motion.213 
 
Hence, for Ihnatowicz perception and movement are not subordinate to each other but 
are rather interdependent. In an unpublished article, distributed online by Aleksandar 
Zivanovic, the artist further supports this position: 
 
Our stipulation that the motor output and feed-back are the necessary corollary 
of any intelligent system suggests that learning or perception cannot take place 
in the absence of active, physical interaction.214 
 
Motion, perception and, ultimately, intelligence were the central concepts of his 
investigations, the ingredients of his artistic research. According to Ihnatowicz there 
could be no intelligence without perception, and, in turn, there could be no perception 
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without motion. From such hypothesis the artist deduced the prescriptions to concretely 
investigate intelligence through cybernetics: 
 
It seems likely that the most promising way of investigating the problems of 
intelligence would be by constructing an artificial organism and observing its 
performance in a real environment and in real time. (...) concept forming in any 
machine or organism can only occur in relation to the organism's physical 
structure and only through a dynamic interaction with its environment.215 
 
At a time when computer art started to emerge and the corresponding scientific field 
was dominated by the artificial intelligence research, Ihnatowicz developed a peculiar 
position by supplementing his artistic production with a very personal and original 
interpretation of some ongoing epistemological questions discussed within the cognitive 
sciences. In keeping with his opinions, the artist focused on creating moving machines 
instead of complex computer programs. The control of physical motion appeared to him 
to be the only possible way to approach the question of intelligence, and hence achieve 
the development of an emerging behaviour in an artificial machine. 
 
Ihnatowicz never used expressions such as ‘emerging behaviours’, ‘artificial life’ and 
‘bottom-up’: these concepts and terms would become widely employed only some 
decades later. Nevertheless, artificial intelligence was very popular at the time when the 
artist created his cybernetic sculptures, and his work has subsequently been linked to it. 
The artist himself refers to the artificial intelligence research in his own articles. What 
were his opinions regarding this scientific discipline?  
 
Brian Reffin Smith, during an interview with the artist, asked him directly about his 
opinions on artificial intelligence research. Ihnatowicz confesses his scepticism towards 
that scientific field: 
 
Brian Reffin Smith: Is this where you tend to diverge from conventional 
artificial intelligence work? 
Edward Ihnatowicz: I think so, yes. I am firmly convinced that thinking can 
never be demonstrated in a computer unless that computer is a controller for 
some physical device. The complete cycle of perception, response and 
observations on the effect of the response on the thing perceived must be 
included.216 
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If thinking cannot be demonstrated in a computer lacking any physical output, the artist 
further suggested that thinking could not possibly occur in a system that doesn't have a 
purpose in a physical environment. However, this was exactly what artificial 
intelligence research was attempting to do, by envisaging the possibility to reproduce 
intelligent behaviour in a computing machine, independent of any relation to the 
physical world. This particular approach is today described as a top-down approach, 
because it imposes a pre-constructed model of intelligence on the machine and limits 
the reproduction of intelligence exclusively through programming, rather than allowing 
potential for interaction with the physical environment. Ihnatowicz criticises this 
approach because he considers it as being inefficient, as the interview clearly points out. 
Hence, although his work is often associated to artificial intelligence, in truth his 
position diverges from the main approach within this field of research, in particular 
regarding the question of the possibility of reproducing and demonstrating an intelligent 
behaviour. He further clarifies his ideas in an unpublished paper, found and distributed 
online by Zivanovic:  
 
The minimum requirements for a cognitive system are: one directional sensory 
input, one proprioceptive feedback and one motor output. (...) it would have 
important implications for such areas of AI as scene analysis and pattern 
recognition where most of the work is done without any reference to motor 
functions.217 
 
The conditions for an intelligent behaviour to occur in an artificial system, according to 
Ihnatowicz, necessitate interaction with the environment through sensory and feedback 
tools and a motor device enabling the system to respond to inputs. In other words, the 
artist believed that intelligence would not emerge from a finite and isolated program but 
rather through the physical interaction with the environment. 
 
Perception, movement, and interaction in a physical environment: those are the 
problems that Ihnatowicz focused upon through his life and work. He was convinced 
that artificial intelligence could not be possible unless these questions were successfully 
dealt with and solved in an artificial system. This position strongly disagrees with the 
idea that artificial intelligence can be simulated and programmed in a machine by means 
                                                            





of symbolic computation alone, a position that dominated the first thirty years of 
artificial intelligence research. A decade after the creation of the Senster, roboticists 
such as Rodney Brooks in the Untied States, Luc Steels in Belgium and Rolf Pfeifer in 
Switzerland, questioned the validity of the symbolic computation approach in the fields 
of robotics and proposed a revolutionary approach, stressing the importance of adaptive 
behaviour. Their main idea was that a machine wouldn’t be able to evolve and thus truly 
develop intelligent behaviour unless it were given the time and the possibility to do so 
in a physical environment. Humans learned and developed intelligence by living and 
interacting within their environment, and according to Brooks, the same process is 
necessary for machines and artificial systems if they are to evolve and display 
intelligent behaviour. The American robotic scientist described his main idea in a 
famous article published in 1990: 
 
Nouvelle AI is based on the physical grounding hypothesis. This hypothesis 
states that to build a system that is intelligent it is necessary to have its 
representations grounded in the physical world. (...) Accepting the physical 
grounding hypothesis as a basis for research entails building systems in a 
bottom up manner.218 
 
This argument is somehow similar to the one proposed by computer scientist 
Christopher Langton in his definition and description of artificial life:  
 
The most promising approaches to modelling complex systems like life or 
intelligence are those which have dispensed with the notion of centralized 
global controller, and have focused instead on mechanisms for the distributed 
control behaviour.219  
 
Langton stressed the significance of interaction between multiple machines in order for 
them to generate intelligent behaviour, in a fashion similar to the swarm intelligence 
approach, or to the concept of the society of mind proposed by Marvin Minsky.220 
Langton’s position, nonetheless, corresponds with that proposed by Rodney Brooks in 
affirming that intelligence cannot be reproduced  by a top-down programming process, 
but rather evolves from an artificial system that needs to deal with simple tasks and has 
the possibility of interacting with other artificial systems and their environment. Brooks 
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and Langton are two of the most important figures in what is today known as the 
bottom-up approach in robotics, artificial intelligence and artificial life. Their 
approaches to explanatory models of intelligent behaviours are associated with 
embodied cognitive science. Their position is now considered a turning point in the 
development of AI and robotics and it is indeed interesting to note the way in which 
Ihnatowicz’s ideas overlap with a stance that would later create a scission in scientific 
research.  
 
In his writings, the artist affirms the importance of movement, perception and 
interaction as fundamental elements in the conception of an intelligent machine. The 
similarities between Ihnatowicz and researchers like Brooks and Langton not only 
demonstrate that the artist was a forerunner in his approach regarding the question of 
intelligence and robotics, it also strengthens the supposition of his disagreement with 
traditional artificial intelligence research, as already expressed in his interview with 
Brian Reffin Smith. However, his work was commonly associated with artificial 
intelligence by the majority of critics and historians. This association is comprehensible, 
given that during the years of his artistic production this discipline was the dominant 
one. In retrospect, it is nonetheless inaccurate. On the one hand Edward Ihnatowicz 
rejected the dominant approach of artificial intelligence research, believing that it would 
not achieve concrete results, yet on the other he affirmed the need for collaboration 
between the arts and the sciences. In conclusion, Ihnatowicz was passionate about the 
idea of merging the arts and the sciences and encouraged artists to embrace new 
technologies. He believed that this collaboration would ultimately lead to a better 
understanding of the human mind, more specifically, and of knowledge in general. 
2.3.4 Reception of Ihnatowicz's Work and Ideas 
With the Senster, Edward Ihnatowicz created a spectacular work for an important 
venue, commissioned by a leading company in technology and did so relying on 
important financial and technological support. How did critics and the public respond to 





commented on by art critics and journalists at the time of its presentation, while articles 
and chapters in specialized books and magazines dedicated to computer art and new 
media still refer to the work today, although there is not one comprehensive publication, 
to my knowledge, exclusively dedicated to the work of the artist. In 2012, the Tate 
Modern dedicated a section of its online exhibition on disappeared works of art, "The 
Gallery of Lost Art", to the Senster. The article concerning the work of Ihnatowicz is 
featured in the 'Discarded' section of the exhibition’s printed catalogue. The suggestive 
title of the article, 'Corporate Power' implies that the loss of the work is to be attributed 
to the commissioning company and its ruthless decision to discard the work. Jennifer 
Mundy, curator of the project, describes Ihnatowicz as "a British pioneer in robotic art", 
adding that the Senster "is remembered today as one of the most important works in the 
history of robotic and computer art, although it functioned for only four years."221 
 
An analysis of articles written on the work of Edward Ihnatowicz during his lifetime 
provides some answers concerning the reaction of the critics and public. Many articles 
simply describe the work and its technology. My analysis of the articles aims to provide 
a qualitative appreciation of the critic toward the work, as well as inferring the reaction 
of the general public from their description. In particular, I was interested in 
understanding the critics’ perspective of the artist’s take on research associated with 
computing machines. Most of the substantial articles written on Ihnatowicz during his 
lifetime are from curators and art critics involved in the crossover between the arts and 
technology. Jasia Reichardt, who presented in her famous exhibition the artist’s first 
cybernetic sculpture, clearly expressed her interest for his work in her essays. It appears 
that she shared Ihnatowicz's hope that one day a machine will achieve spectacular 
results in imitating the human capability of understanding. She considers the Senster as 
a significant step in the accomplishment of this hope: "While what Senster does is more 
fundamental than what it is, the ultimate machine will be a more complete being with 
the hardware determined by software."222 Jasia Reichardt associated the Senster to some 
of the traditional programs developed by artificial intelligence research, for example 
"the program DOCTOR developed in America, where patients had a conversation with 
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a computer and were convinced that their partner in dialogue on the teletypewriter was a 
human doctor sitting in another room."223 In Reichardt’s articles the conviction that art 
and technology should work together and share the same goal often surfaces. She 
further affirmed that "Innovation in the field of robotics could well come from art as 
well as from industrial robotics because the goals of art are not clearly defined and most 
intangible problems could lend themselves to its ad hoc methods."224 This last passage 
suggests that for the British critic and curator, it wouldn’t be inappropriate to consider 
that the artistic production should substantially contribute to technological and scientific 
progress. 
 
The art critic Jonathan Benthall also praises the collaboration between the arts and 
technology as put forward by Jasia Reichardt. According to Benthall, it is indeed this 
specific dialogue between arts and technology that delineates a criterion for the 
appreciation of Ihnatowicz’s work. The critic stresses how the artist exemplifies the 
union between arts and technologies and how respected he is among the scientific 
community: "Edward Ihnatowicz is a very respected worker in this field since he 
conceives of his work as art and yet is taken seriously by scientific researchers in 
robotics and 'artificial intelligence'."225  Benthall seems to suggest that the degree of 
respectability that an artist engaging in new technologies receives in the related 
scientific field proof of his artistic quality. The critic finally resolves that "the Senster is 
no monument to an artist's genius but a step towards new forms of creative 
collaboration on the highest level between scientists and artists"226 and describes 
Ihnatowicz as being "among the few artists making real headway."227 
 
The posthumous analysis provided by Aleksander Zivanovic equally emphasises 
Ihnatowicz’s contribution to technology:  
 
Ihnatowicz was remarkable in not only being an artist, but also a talented self-
taught engineer. Much of his work was exploring concepts in artificial 
intelligence, particularly the link between perception and intelligence. His work 
is still very much relevant in the field of robotics and AI, and now that 
                                                            
223 Ibid., 292. 
224 Reichardt (1978), 56. 
225 Jonathan Benthall, "Computer arts at Edinburgh", Studio International, October (1973): 120. 
226 Benthall (1972), 83. 





computers are orders of magnitude more powerful than those available to him, 
it is perhaps timely that some of his ideas are revisited.228  
 
Zivanovic similarly considers the artist’s involvement with scientific research, linking 
his work to artificial intelligence and robotics, and suggesting that his ideas could 
significantly contribute to the improvement of these disciplines even today. 
 
The designer of the Evoluon, James Gardner, recalls the collaboration with Ihnatowicz 
in his autobiographical book, he describes the Senster as being "the eighth wonder of 
the world for eighteen months."229 Some years later, the Senster was still described by 
Donald Michie and Rory Johnston as "one of the most influential kinetic sculptures ever 
made,"230 while Brian Reffin Smith considered its author to be "a mixture of artist, 
sculptor, engineer, artificial intelligence worker and teacher, his ideas have provided 
food for thought for many workers in the area" adding that the Senster is "probably the 
single most famous piece of such work in the world."231  
 
After the death of the artist, the work is mentioned in publications that mostly retrace 
the history of computer art and robotics. In his study on emerging behaviours and the 
artistic use of new technologies, Paul Brown affirms categorically that the Senster is 
"arguably the first great masterwork of the computer art convergence."232 The work is 
again mentioned in a text by artist Eduardo Kac, retracing a personal history of new 
media art. Kac affirms that the Senster was "the first physical work whose expression in 
space (its choices, reactions, and movements) is triggered by data processing (instead of 
sculptural concerns)."233 Kac compares Ihnatowicz to two other pioneers of robotic art, 
namely Nam June Paik and Tom Shannon, yet he affirms that he is "perhaps the least 
known of the three pioneers."234 The article by Kac, written in 1997, distinctly shows 
that only two decades after the success of the spectacular cybernetic sculpture at the 
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Evoluon, the significance and renown of Edward Ihnatowicz starts to fade, even within 
the history of computer and robotic art. 
 
The reaction of the public, during the presentation of the Senster in the Evoluon, is also 
reported in the articles written on the work. Jonathan Benthall witnessed a marked 
interest from the public, concluding that "it will be easier to say how fully successful the 
Senster is when it has settled down with the half a million visitors who come to the 
Evoluon annually, and with the scientists who wish to experiment with it."235 A decade 
later, Donald Michie and Rory Johnston recall that "the crowds at the Evoluon in 
Eindhoven, Holland, where it was on show reacted with enormous excitement. Children 
would shout and wave at it, call it names, and even throw things."236 Similarly, Ans van 
Berkum and Tom Blekkenhorst write that "the Senster was the star of Evoluon in 
Eindhoven, Holland: so much so that the electronics company who commissioned it 
apparently grew jealous that spectators spent hours watching it, rather than the deeply 
wonderful displays of light bulbs, and eventually 'killed' it."237 Aleksandar Zivanovic, 
concludes in his research that: "People seemed very willing to imbue it with some form 
of animal-like intelligence and the general atmosphere around it was very much like that 
in the zoo."238 These comments don't leave any doubt about the enthusiastic reaction of 
the public and the interest that it generated. 
 
The examination of the articles and texts written on the artist permit several conclusions 
to be drawn. Ihnatowicz was considered an influential artist during his lifetime, in 
particular by critics and curators interested in the use of computer and technology in art, 
and his work has often been associated with artificial intelligence research. 
Furthermore, his work, in particular the Senster, appealed to a wider public and was 
considered a spectacular installation during its exhibition. While it is perhaps easy to 
understand the positive reaction to the work by a public of families and children, it is 
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nevertheless interesting to consider that the artist was very well received during his 
lifetime by specialists working on the intersection of the arts and technologies. In recent 
times, the artist has been described as a pioneer, though many critics and historians 
admit that today’s artistic community has largely forgotten him. What is even more 
important to note, is that almost all the articles on the artist often ignore any aesthetic 
considerations or formal descriptions of his work and rather focus on its technological 
aspects. While active as an artist, Edward Ihnatowicz was unanimously acclaimed as 
being a great engineer. His work and his artistic contributions were appreciated mostly 
because of his expertise in approaching its goals, an approach that was described as 
bearing many similarities to a scientific one. Rather than praising the aesthetic or 
conceptual qualities of his work, it is the artist’s technological achievements that were 
emphasised in the articles dedicated to him. From these considerations we can conclude 
that, in the early years, critics and curators interested in the use of computers within an 
artistic field seriously considered the possibility of artists contributing to scientific 
research, a contribution that was important for establishing some criteria to judge the 
quality of their work. 
 
Financed by a private company, the exhibition at the Evoluon was a major one and an 
example of an exhibition with a focus on art and technology. The years prior to the 
presentation of the Senster saw the foundation of the Computer Art Society in London 
and of the Experiments in Art and Technology (EAT) network in New York, officially 
lunched in 1967, as well as the creation of Leonardo, which is today a leading 
publication for the intersection of art and technologies. The question of the separation 
between new media art and contemporary art did not exist at that time. Quite the 
opposite: some art critics and curators like Jack Burnham and Jasia Reichardt believed 
that new technologies were the future of contemporary art. Analysis of the Senster, its 
context of creation, the motivation of the artist and the reaction of the public and the 
critics, suggest that the use of technology in an artistic context was, during these years, 
driven by a genuine hope that it could contribute to the development of science and 
society. However, this optimistic approach to new technologies was mostly fostered by 
critics, curators and companies such as Philips who were willing to finance artistic 





intelligence and to the computing machine has to be understood in terms of a very 
personal and visionary conception of the dialogue between the arts and the sciences, as 
is exemplified by Edward Ihnatowicz. 
2.4 Art, Computers and the Contribution to Knowledge 
Harold Cohen and Edward Ihnatowicz developed a very personal use of computing 
machines in order to pursue their artistic explorations. Both of them wrote articles in 
which they presented and discussed their visions and their research. Although they 
produced works of art distinctive from one another, they also addressed similar issues. 
They developed a profound knowledge and expertise of the technologies without simply 
exploiting the machine as a tool for their artistic ends. They both shared the desire to 
contribute, through their work, to a better understanding of the functioning of the human 
mind and the abilities associated with intelligence and creativity. Finally, they aimed to 
create an artificial system - be it a cybernetic sculpture or a program running in a 
computer - that would display what would today be called an emerging behaviour. 
However, Ihnatowicz and Cohen’s approaches and opinions do diverge at point. Most 
of these differences result from the nature of the works and are important to our 
understanding of their specificities. These particular aspects are, more precisely: 
interactivity, formal qualities, relevance and complexity of the code involved and, 
lastly, the idea of how to reproduce a human-like behaviour in a machine. 
 
When comparing the works of the two artists, what is most striking is the importance 
attributed to interactivity. For Ihnatowicz, interactivity is not only one among many 
qualities of the work, but it is possibly the most important, fundamental aspect of it. In 
SAM and in the Senster the sculptures react with their own movement to sounds and 
noises made by the audience, thus allowing the spectators to interact with them: 
children, in particular, were observed to be extremely excited by the opportunity to play 
with the moving sculpture. In the Bandit the possibilities of interaction are further 
explored: the work was able to respond to the actions of the spectator with a judgment 





would be able to display a realistic behaviour. According to Ihnatowicz, therefore, 
interactivity was the most important aspect of his artistic research as it was the key 
element for the production of emerging behaviour. 
 
In Harold Cohen's work, conversely, there is absolutely no interactivity between the 
work and the spectator. The spectator has no influence over the work and the way it 
functions, nor on the drawings and paintings that the work generates. The artist stated 
explicitly in numerous publications, that AARON is not a tool and there is no interaction 
between it and the spectator. Once AARON has been programmed by its author and once 
it is started, it works on its own. If the artist constantly reprograms his work to improve 
the quality but also the autonomy of the machine – which could be considered an 
interaction between the author and the work - this interaction takes place during the 
production of the work and it is not a quality of the work itself. Edward Ihnatowicz had 
wished that the Senster would be constantly reprogrammed in order to display 
increasingly complex behaviour, a wish that remained unfulfilled. This is exactly what 
Harold Cohen did with AARON throughout his life. What is more, Cohen admitted at 
one point that he eventually hoped to produce an autonomous machine, a machine that 
would be able to adapt itself in a substantial way, thus ultimately excluding the need for 
its author to reprogram it. This radical position by Harold Cohen seems to have been 
abandoned in recent times: the artist decided to begin a new dialogue with AARON by 
painting by hand the printed drawings produced by the program, as in the first decades 
of its existence. However, AARON continues to produce drawings independently 
without any interactive process. The difference of interactivity involved in the works of 
Ihnatowicz and Cohen is representative of their visions for an efficient artificial system. 
 
Although the analysis of the works of the two artists often concern the investigation of 
the technologies employed, it is also interesting to consider their formal qualities. The 
works created by Ihnatowicz are interactive, cybernetic sculptures made predominantly 
of cast aluminium and steel parts which are powered by electrical wires and hydraulic 
systems. As sculptures, they are unique pieces with finite dimensions and forms. 
Unequivocally, Ihnatowicz's works display aesthetic qualities. Although these qualities 





works, the artist admitted to having put a lot of care into designing the individual pieces 
that made up his sculptures. In truth, his works were initially motivated by a formal 
intent, namely the objective to create a sculpture whose shapes were dictated by its 
functions, thus transposing to the field of art the imperatives of modern design. 
Working on the formal qualities of a sculpture was the initial purpose, the starting 
problem of the artist, one that would hunt him through his entire career. The aesthetic 
qualities of the sculpted parts were likewise supposed to contribute to the works 
potential interactive capabilities. Indeed, in Ihnatowicz’s sculptures interaction relied on 
movement, which in turn depended on the formal solution of the whole sculpture and 
each of its individual components. In addition, the aesthetic qualities of the individual 
parts further contributed to the sculpture’s life-life behaviours, both in terms of its 
movement and its general shape. The fact that the artist paid so much attention to the 
formal qualities of his works, is coherent with his artistic visions and goals in creating a 
seemingly living, moving sculpture.  
 
The question of formal qualities is more difficult to consider in the work of Harold 
Cohen. Although AARON is embodied in a physical object - the hardware - it is not a 
unique and finite work: it evolved over the course of a number of decades, and 
consequently changed its physical characteristics on several occasions. However, the 
physical object is not necessarily determinant for the uniqueness of the work. AARON 
could, indeed, be described in terms of its hardware and physical features and be 
appreciated for the aesthetic qualities of the design and shapes of the machinery that 
runs it. But AARON is a computer program, independent of any physical support. If the 
task of appreciating its aesthetic qualities is to be taken seriously, it would be more 
appropriate to consider the formal aspects of the written program - be it in Fortran, C or 
Lisp – in order to evaluate, for example, how some programming problems have been 
elegantly and brightly solved by the author, rather then considering the formal qualities 
of the hardware involved. This task, however, would obviously provide little insight 
into Cohen’s artistic research and the significance of AARON as an artwork. On the 
other hand, AARON does produce physical drawings and these tangible objects, which 
are created by the program, can be considered for their aesthetic qualities. It is the 





that can autonomously produce such objects. It is therefore important that these 
drawings possess aesthetic qualities themselves, if they have to fulfil their status of 
drawings, instead of being simply contemplated as randomly generated marks on paper. 
The question of the formal qualities, in Cohen’s work, is thus extremely complex and 
difficult to grasp. As a work, AARON is completely alien to any aesthetic consideration, 
yet the aesthetic qualities of its productions, - justifying its very nature - are extremely 
relevant. The drawings produced by AARON are, after all, the result of AARON as a 
creative machine; they allow the audience to appreciate AARON as a producer of 
artworks. In a way, one could consider that the aesthetic qualities of AARON’s works 
are the expression of its peculiar creative behaviour, its identity and stylistic 
consistency. Consequently, to affirm that formal qualities are completely irrelevant in 
Cohen’s work would be a mistake, yet the artist deals with them in a completely 
different way compared to Ihnatowicz. While Ihnatowicz paid much attention to the 
formal aspects of his works, as a sculptor would do, for Cohen the aesthetic qualities are 
absolutely irrelevant for the appearance of AARON itself, but are fundamental for its 
activities and its identity, in a more conceptual manner. If Ihnatowicz worked on the 
aesthetic qualities of his sculptures while creating them, in order to imitate a living 
behaviour, Cohen contemplated the nature of aesthetic qualities while programming his 
work to create an autonomous drawing machine. 
 
Both artists have employed computer technology and have consequently developed a 
programming language for their artistic purpose. They have been commonly associated 
with research in artificial intelligence because of their use of computers and their 
attempt to imitate some aspects of human intelligence with them. What is the relevance 
and the complexity of the code source involved in their works? Computer technology 
was exploited only in Ihnatowicz’s second work, the Senster. The program developed 
was mainly applied to regulate the hydraulic pistons and the sensors in order to provide 
the work with an interactive movement. The artist admitted that the computer program 
was quite simple and he wished that other computer engineers could have experimented 
with it in order to improve on the original version. Aleksandar Zivanovic describes the 
program with the following words: 
 





style of the code that he was not a professional programmer (I wish he'd put in 
more comments!) but the code is remarkably sophisticated. He got some help 
from Peter Lundahl, the Evoluon sysadmin, who also added refinements to the 
software after Ihnatowicz left at the end of 1970.239  
 
Although Aleksander Zivanovic admits that the Senster's code was 'sophisticated', it 
was nevertheless a functional code that simply directed the movements of the sculpture 
to be attracted or repulsed by sounds and movements. In fact, Ihnatowicz never really 
developed or aimed at developing a very complex computer program, because he didn’t 
believe that an intelligent system could be accomplished through programming and 
symbolic representation alone. The technology which he mastered, in order to create his 
work, was associated with mechanics and cybernetics, rather then programming. In his 
words: "Computers can deal only with numbers and we are very far from knowing how 
we could represent numerically not only values but such concepts as colour, mass, 
speed or indeed such basic ideas as what and where."240 If in the Senster the computer 
program played only a marginal role, in AARON the programmed code is the very 
essence of the work. AARON is the code that its author is constantly rewriting and 
updating. The artist learned how to write and program in several languages before 
turning to Lisp, which he found efficient enough for his purpose and has used it ever 
since. Although the source code is not publicly accessible, the artist has described its 
functioning, the technical problems he faced and how he managed to solve them in 
detail. Before using a large inkjet printer, Harold Cohen also built some plotter and 
turtle devices for the production of the paintings, yet the objectives that the artist was 
aiming at were not solved in the hardware alone but rather in the code itself. 
 
Both artists intended to create artificial systems that would display emerging properties, 
although this specific expression is not used in their publications. They nonetheless 
diverged on how to achieve such goal. In Ihnatowicz’s case, these properties would be 
displayed in a sculpture supposedly capable of acting and reacting in a life-like manner 
while altering its behaviour based on its interaction with the audience. His sculptures 
display - through their sculpted parts, their peculiar movement and their possible 
interactions - some features that surpass the properties of their individual elements and 
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surprise the audience for their affinity with organic, animal behaviour. Ihnatowicz 
affirmed that "concept forming in any machine or organism can only occur in relation to 
the organism's physical structure and only through a dynamic interaction with its 
environment."241 Hence for Ihnatowicz, the reproduction of an emerging behaviour, in 
this case a cognitive one, has to be generated in a machine that is able to operate, 
through sensors and interactive movement, in a physical environment. In Cohen’s case, 
these properties would surface with the creation of a computer program capable of 
modifying itself and creating drawings that would surprise even its own author. Cohen's 
considerations regarding cognitive behaviours are exposed in an article published in 
1995, in which he also explains the intellectual motivation behind his research: 
 
AARON began its existence some time in the mid-seventies, in my attempt to 
answer what seemed then to be — but turned out not to be—a simple question. 
‘What is the minimum condition under which a set of marks functions as an 
image?’ On the simplest level it was not hard to propose a plausible answer: it 
required the spectator's belief that the marks had resulted from a purposeful 
human, or human-like, act. What I intended by "human-like" was that a 
program would need to exhibit cognitive capabilities quite like the ones we use 
ourselves to make and to understand images.242 
 
He programmed AARON in order to enquire about those minimum conditions. In the 
artist’s opinion, the work would challenge our notions of intelligence and creativity 
because it would be capable of autonomously producing objects that are usually 
considered the result of an intentional human-like cognitive act. Emerging properties 
such as the possibility of displaying ‘cognitive capabilities’, in Harold Cohen’s view, 
arise in the program’s faculty to autonomously deal with forms and colours and to 
create unpredictable results. Unpredictable to such extent that it would be impossible for 
the audience to assert whether or not the drawings created by the program are the result 
of a purposeful, cognitive act. 
 
Both Ihnatowicz and Cohen aimed to produce an artificial system, be it a cybernetic 
sculpture or a computer program, which would challenge our notions of peculiar human 
activities such as intelligence and creativity, eventually building a machine that would 
surprise the spectator with an unpredictable behaviour. While Edward Ihnatowicz 
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believed that interactivity was the key to creating living behaviour, a belief arising from 
his observations of organic life forms, Harold Cohen believed that machines and 
humans are fundamentally different and don’t share the same environment, leading him 
to concentrate his efforts on investigating the nature of drawings. 
 
During the early years of computer art, two of the most significant pioneering artists 
believed that they could use computing machines in an artistic context to create works 
capable of surprising their spectators and challenging assumptions concerning 
intelligence and creativity. Be it through movement and interaction with the 
environment, as in the case of Edward Ihnatowicz, or through the autonomous activity 
of drawing by a machine, as in Harold Cohen’s work, the two artists aimed at 
reproducing and imitating, through an artificial system, some peculiar behaviours 
commonly attributed to living beings. They both believed that a deep understanding and 
mastering of the technologies employed was essential to obtain the artistic quality they 
aimed at, as well as a means of deepening their approach. The majority of critics and 
historians have appreciated this aspect of their works by celebrating their innovative 
role in the use of technologies associated with computing machines and their 
applications. The association of the work of the two artists with scientific research, in 
particular cybernetics and artificial intelligence, has been equally emphasised in most of 
the articles written on them. On the other hand, Ihnatowicz and Cohen truly developed a 
very personal exploration of the technologies that they employed, independent from the 
philosophy and the approach advocated by the scientific research to which they were 
constantly linked. Above all, the cybernetic sculpture and the drawing program that they 
created were the result of their personal artistic preoccupations, for the most part 
addressing questions about how to imitate life through a moving sculpture and how to 
understand the ‘semantics of painting’. These two pioneering artists did not engage in 
an explicit act of subversion of the computing machine, indeed, quite the opposite. They 






3.1 Divergent Positions After the Seventies 
The invention of computing machines, followed by the development of a variety of 
fields of research such as cybernetics, robotics and artificial intelligence, excited the 
imagination of researchers, artists and philosophers. During the seventies, artists like 
Harold Cohen and Edward Ihnatowicz developed works that exploited the possibilities 
offered by computers to explore questions pertaining to creativity, perception and 
intelligence. However, not all researchers and critical theorists were unanimous in their 
praise of the benefits of the implementation of computing machines within society. 
Some critics began to question the validity of scientific research associated with 
computers and digital technologies, as well as the impact of the information revolution 
on society. What were the positions of those who opposed computers and artificial 
intelligence, and how influential were their views? Which arguments were put forward 
when questioning the dangers associated with these discoveries? Furthermore, how has 
computer-generated art developed since the pioneering years of this kind of production? 
Can we identify a parallel between the arguments advanced against artificial 
intelligence research and the positions of some media artists? 
 
In the following sections, I will investigate some important criticisms of artificial 
intelligence and computing machines, in order to understand the theoretical framework 
surrounding the oppositional tendencies that have emerged in the current new media art 
field. I am interested in mapping the perception of the impact of computing machines 
within society, as well as the reception of artificial intelligence research. Firstly, I will 
consider the seminal texts written by researchers, critical theorists and philosophers. 
Then, I will analyse the positions of artists that used computing machines during the 
eighties and nineties in order to understand the evolution of this artistic practice and to 
question whether a parallel of the critical discourse against artificial intelligence and 





generative approaches. This analysis will provide insight into some of the ongoing 
discussions within the current field of new media art, while also highlighting any shift 
in perception regarding the place of digital and media technologies within this artistic 
field. 
 
In order to appreciate the complexity of the evolution of an artistic production, the 
analysis is less effective if limited to a set group of artists. For this reason, I have 
preferred to develop my research horizontally and in multiple directions. My method is 
grounded in media research, content analysis, interviews, data collections and 
observations. I have researched and analysed a large number of publications, catalogues 
and essays written on this topic, retaining the recurring names and positions. I have 
interviewed prominent artists of the period and conducted a detailed analysis of two 
important institutions for digital and media art: the Ars Electronica festival and the 
Leonardo journal. In addition, a number of dialogues and discussions with a variety of 
personalities currently working in the media art field have also supplemented my 
research.  
3.2 Opposition of AI and the Computing Machine from Within  
Voices of opposition, questioning the validity and morality of artificial intelligence and 
the dangers of a wider implementation of computing machines within our society, can 
be found within the discipline itself. In a book first published in 1950 Norbert Wiener, 
the father of cybernetics, praised the benefits of automation, but at the same time 
expressed concern about the dangers of society becoming overly dependant on 
machines. He affirmed that "it is perfectly clear that this will produce an unemployment 
situation" - Wiener is here referring to the introduction of automated labour – and 
continues his line of thought to declare that "the new industrial revolution is a two-
edged sword."243 
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Some years later, in 1964, Hubert Dreyfus was the first philosopher to investigate 
artificial intelligence research in his controversial article "Alchemy and Artificial 
Intelligence".244 In his article, Dreyfus questioned the fundamental ideas upon which the 
concept of artificial intelligence was based, highlighting the limits of the research and 
the fragility of its predictions. The article, based on a talk given by the author at Rand 
Corporation in 1964, provoked significant reaction among researchers, according to 
Daniel Crevier.245 The philosopher further developed his thesis in his following 
publication, Mind over Machine, published in 1986, and written in collaboration with 
Start E. Dreyfus and Tom Athanasiou. The authors expressed their concerns not only 
regarding artificial intelligence research, but also for example, in relation to the growing 
use of computing machines as a pedagogical tool in schools. But the strongest attack on 
artificial intelligence was an epistemological one: the authors contested the primary 
assumption that the human mind, and its cognitive properties, operates as a complex 
information processing machine and can thus be simulated and reproduced in a 
computer. 
 
Current AI is based on the idea, prominent in philosophy since Descartes, that 
all understanding consists in forming and using appropriate representations. 
Given the nature of inference engines, AI's representations must be formal 
ones, and so common sense understanding must be understood as some vast 
body of precise propositions, beliefs, rules, facts, and procedures. Thus 
formulated, the problem has so far resisted solutions. We predict it will 
continue to do so.246 
 
Inference engines, or expert systems, were considered as one of artificial intelligence’s 
highest achievements, and were applied in medical diagnosis, for example. They relied 
on the constitution of a large knowledge base. By discussing cases in which human 
understanding relies on common sense knowledge, such as natural-language 
understanding and learning, the authors argued that artificial intelligence will eventually 
fail in these domains and will therefore be unable to reproduce cognitive human-like 
behaviours. In addition to attacking artificial intelligence research on epistemological 
grounds, the authors further supplemented their critical analysis with ethical 
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considerations concerning the future use of computers in education and in management. 
They warned against the growing propensity to rely on machines instead of human 
beings in environments necessitating decision-making. 
 
At the end of the seventies, computer engineer Joseph Weizenbaum strongly criticised 
not only the validity of artificial intelligence research but also its ethical values. For 
Weizenbaum, "the achievements of the artificial intelligentsia are mainly triumphs of 
technique. They have contributed little either to cognitive psychology or to practical 
problem solving."247 The author deliberately used the term ‘intelligentsia’ to imply that 
the people working within this field created a closed group of researchers promoting 
their positions and protecting their own field. In his opinion, they failed to achieve their 
goals and to fulfil the promises made to secure the funding of their work and to win 
popularity among a wider public. But to Weizenbaum, what is more alarming is the 
increasing automation of additional sectors of our society, which, in his opinion, is 
inexorably followed by an increased loss of control and responsibilities: 
 
Modern technological rationalizations of war, diplomacy, politics, and 
commerce (such as computer games) have an even more insidious effect on the 
making of policy. Not only have policy makers abdicated their decision-making 
responsibility to a technology they do not understand - though all the while 
maintaining the illusion that they, the policy makers, are formulating policy 
questions and answering them - but responsibility has altogether evaporated.248 
 
If Wiener sensed the dangers of an automated society but remained optimistic about our 
aptitude to control and turn the process of automation in our favour, Weizenbaum 
affirmed that the implementation of computing machines within society was already 
producing negative outcomes. 
 
The critical positions in opposition of artificial intelligence based on epistemological or 
ethical considerations, as put forward by Dreyfus and Weizenbaum, were not the only 
attacks. Another criticism came from the field of robotics and the new-born field of 
artificial life. When they surfaced in the eighties, embodied robotics and artificial life 
strongly objected to the methodology employed by traditional artificial intelligence 
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research, rather than its purpose or its ethical implications. According to computer 
scientist Christopher Langton, founder of artificial life research, and to Rodney Brooks, 
eminent developer of subsumption architecture in robotics, the biggest fallacy of 
traditional artificial intelligence research was its grounding in symbolic representation. 
Traditional AI tried to generate a specific behaviour in an artificial system by 
reproducing it in a top-down fashion from a natural system. Both Langton and Brooks 
suggested that complex behaviours such as intelligence and consciousness cannot be 
reproduced by imitating a model, but rather have to evolve from simple, basic capacities 
through interaction with an environment, in a bottom-up fashion. The following 
passages, the first by Rodney Brooks and the second by Christopher Langton, 
summarise their ideas: 
 
Nouvelle AI relies on the emergence of more global behaviour from the 
interaction of smaller behavioural units. As with heuristics there is no a priori 
guarantee that this will always work. However, careful design of the simple 
behaviours and their interactions can often produce systems with useful and 
interesting emergent properties.249 
 
The key concept in Artificial Life is emergent behaviour. Natural life emerges 
out of the organized interaction of a great number of non living molecules, with 
no global controller responsible for the behaviour of every part. Rather, every 
part is a behaviour itself, and life is the behaviour that emerges from all of the 
local interactions among individual behaviours. It is this bottom-up, distributed, 
local determination of behaviour that AL employs in its primary 
methodological approach to the generation of lifelike behaviours.250 
 
These concepts and approaches greatly diverge from research based on symbolic 
representation and consequently put artificial intelligence in question. Instead of 
focusing on the reproduction of properties within a system, they focus on the concept of 
emergence itself, attempting to initiate it from the bottom up. This paradigm shift in 
approach certainly contributed to the success of these new disciplines. Embodied 
robotics and artificial life, in which the concept of emergence played a central role, 
offered not only an alternative to artificial intelligence but also a way to overcome 
previous criticisms of the field and its unaccomplished promises. Instead of trying to 
artificially recreate intelligence, or other complex behaviours, the bottom-up approach 
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focused on the process of the system and its potential to generate a higher order of 
complexity autonomously. In a way, the process of emergence itself became the goal of 
the research. 
3.3 Questioning Modern Technologies in the Post-Industrial Society 
The question of the dangers of modern technologies in post-industrial society has been 
an ongoing debate within the humanities. A notable example and frequently quoted 
essay in recent philosophical literature is Martin Heidegger’s "Die Frage nach der 
Technik."251 Considering the etymology of the word technology, Heidegger affirms that 
in recent times its meaning shifted from the original significance denoting 
craftsmanship, intellectual and artistic activities to a newer meaning mostly signifying 
manufacturing. According to Heidegger, as new technologies are developed, society 
becomes less aware of the very nature of these technologies. Heidegger uses the 
example of the hydroelectric power plant which supplanted the ancient windmill to 
illustrate his concept. The German philosopher doesn’t seem to consider new 
technologies as being negative per se, but assigns the responsibility of understanding 
their nature and their functioning to the people, thus suggesting a normative approach to 
the question of technology. 
 
Further developing the thoughts of the German philosopher, Herbert Marcuse examines 
the exploitations of modern technologies by a capitalist society in his book One-
dimensional Man, published in 1964. Marcuse attributes the homogenization of the 
post-industrial society to the emergence of new technologies. For him, "in the face of 
totalitarian features of this society, the traditional notion of the ‘neutrality’ of 
technology can no longer be maintained."252 As an instrument of the capitalist system, 
technologies are used by the leading classes to drive consumption. The only purpose of 
the development of science and technology, in his opinion, is the control of both 
humans and nature by a small elite: 
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The industrial society which makes technology and science its own is organized 
for the ever-more-effective domination of man and nature, for the ever-more 
effective utilization of its resources.253  
 
Although Marcuse does not specifically question the validity of artificial intelligence or 
computing machines, his critique encompasses post-industrial society as a whole, 
together with its machines and products of commodity. Marcuse holds positivist, 
rational philosophy as the predominant ideology of post-industrial society and considers 
it dangerous to the evolution of mankind. He sees the refusal of technology as the only 
way to escape such a normalised, sterile and oppressive society, suggesting therefore an 
attitude of rejection and opposition. Contemporaneously to Marcuse, the American 
philosopher Lewis Mumford developed a similar analysis and conclusion.254 
 
In the decades that have followed, poststructuralist philosophers have further developed 
the critical analysis of modern technologies, stressing their dangers and, most 
importantly, their exploitation of capitalist society. According to these positions, 
modern technologies emphasised the discrepancies between the working and the ruling 
classes and, moreover, contributed to the increase in unemployment arising from a 
surge in the automation of certain tasks. Such a pessimistic approach is exemplified by 
the famous essay by Gilles Deleuze "Post-scriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle", 
published in 1990, in which the philosopher points out that the evolution of 
technologies has primarily served a society of control determined by the rules of 
capitalism: 
 
The old societies of sovereignty made use of simple machines - levers, pulleys, 
clocks; but the recent disciplinary societies equipped themselves with machines 
involving energy, with the passive danger of entropy and the active danger of 
sabotage; the societies of control operate with machines of a third type, 
computers, whose passive danger is jamming and whose active one is piracy 
and the introduction of viruses. This technological evolution must be, even 
more profoundly, a mutation of capitalism.255 
 
While Marcuse considered machines to be responsible for the emergence of a one-
dimensional society, Deleuze identifies the computing machine as a specific instrument 
                                                            
253 Ibid., 17. 
254 Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967). 






of control in present-day capitalist society. These critiques, pointing out the oppressive 
nature of technological progress (in particular communicative technologies) are echoed 
in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s renowned work, Empire, published in 2000. In 
their analysis of contemporary colonialism, propagated by what they refer to as 'the 
Empire', the authors reaffirm the role of computing machines as an instrument of 
control. What is more, they also established that the control of the production and 
governance of these technologies by a privileged group of companies has increased the 
inequalities between countries on a global scale: 
 
The new communication technologies, which hold out the promise of a new 
democracy and a new social equality, have in fact created new lines of 
inequality and exclusion, both within the dominant countries and especially 
outside them.256 
 
Hardt and Negri assert that the corporations running and developing the communication 
technologies, producing new hardware and software, have an increasing control on the 
society and territories in which the technologies are implemented. These corporations, 
which are expanding beyond national borders, are taking part of a new form of 
sovereignty "composed of a series of national and supernational organisms united under 
a single logic of rule."257 On the other hand, the authors reflect on the possibilities of 
resistance offered by the refusal to adhere to the conventions and rules of this series of 
national and supranational organisms, namely the Empire. In their view, resistance 
should also be enacted on a global level. 
 
The radical opinion held by Herbert Marcuse and Lewis Mumford (both of whom 
advocate for an uncompromising refutation of new technologies) is not the only stance 
among philosophers. For others the broadening of the debate to include questions of 
democracy and cultural production, presents an alternative solution to the 
implementation and regulation of modern technologies in society. One example is found 
in the essay co-written by Paul Virilio and Sylvère Lotringer, originally published in 
1983. The authors express their disillusion with technology and progress: 
 
Since the eighteenth century - since the Age of Enlightenment, to use the well-
known terminology - we have believed that technology and reason walked 
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hand-in-hand toward progress, toward a "glorious future", as they say. (...) 
Thus, my intention is to say: No more illusions about technology. We do not 
control what we produce.258 
 
The authors elaborate on the danger of a technological world over which individuals 
have little access, knowledge or control. However, it is within a technological world and 
not through the refusal of it that Paul Virilio, questioned by Sylvère Lotringer, sees the 
solutions to improve our society: 
 
I don't believe we can refuse technology, go back to Year One, so to speak. We 
can't stop everything to give ourselves time for reflection. I believe it's within 
the inquiry into technology that we'll find, not a solution, but the possibility of a 
solution.259 
 
Paul Virilio and and Sylvère Lotringer’s suggestion of inviting society to discuss and 
monitor the technologies implemented, is also stressed by Andrew Feenberg, who calls 
for more debate on the question of technology and the construction of an alternative, 
modern society: 
 
Modernization itself, I argue, is a contingent combination of technical and 
cultural dimensions subject to radical variation. Aesthetics, ethics, and culture 
can play a role alongside science and technology in the emergence of 
alternative modernities.260 
 
Feenberg introduces the role of culture and artistic production into the debate about new 
technologies and the part they play in shaping modern society, to conclude that: "a 
multicultural politics of technology is possible."261 A similar position was more recently 
expressed by art historian Frank Popper, who dedicated many publications and curated 
several exhibitions on the creative use of new technologies in art: "A main thread in this 
book, and the reason I stress the biographical details of the artists, is my desire to show 
how technology is - or can be - humanized through art."262 Popper seems to embrace the 
conviction that artists should contribute to a better understanding of modern 
technologies. However, he also suggests that artists can play a role in the evolution of 
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society by participating, through their works, in the debate around technological 
progress. In this sense, his argument mirrors Feenberg’s.  
 
While progressive philosophers such as Feenberg see the possibility of a humanisation 
of technology through art and culture, authoritative voices among more conservative 
thinkers such as Daniel Bell, Francis Fukuyama, and Neil Postman, are more severe in 
their critique of modern technologies. They argue that society should return to 
traditional moral values and not delegate important choices concerning its evolution to a 
restricted circle of scientists and specialists. They advocate for the decision-making to 
be restored to, religion (Bell), the government (Fukuyama) and the family (Postman) 
respectively. In Our Posthuman Future,263 for example, Francis Fukuyama warns us 
against an uncontrolled development of scientific and technological progress and 
advocates for federal regulation of scientific research. Fukuyama’s comments mainly 
refer to recent fields of research such as bioengineering and evaluating the dangers of 
eugenics, but his arguments and admonitions concern artificial intelligence, as well. In a 
short chapter, for instance, Fukuyama affirms that artificial intelligence research simply 
neglected to understand the role played by consciousness and emotions in human 
intelligence, predicting that it will most likely fail to achieve its goals.264 
 
When it comes to artificial intelligence in particular, a peculiar example of a recent 
critical stance is that prompted by the visionary ideas of Raymond Kurzweil and Hans 
Moravec. The two researchers offered an enthusiastic and visionary prediction of the 
achievements that the evolution of computing machines and artificial intelligence will 
allow, supported by alleged scientific arguments. Kurzweil’s detailed prediction of 
society provides an admirable example of a confident faith in the success of artificial 
intelligence research. One of his most extensive books, The Singularity is near,265 
synthesises his research and visions. Kurzweil audaciously affirms that the realisation of 
a complete and effective artificial intelligence will be reality within a couple of decades; 
such artificial intelligence will be similar in every aspect to the human mind and even 
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more efficient. Kurzweil predicts that, in the near future, the human body will 
inexorably become obsolete, and that technology will also allow for the complete 
recreation of an individual human mind outside the organic body. This particular 
moment, the singularity, is described as the fundamental turning point in the evolution 
of humanity. In Kurzweil’s optimistic and somehow uncanny prediction of our future, 
humans will be able to factually download and upload their brains into non-organic 
hardware, thus opening the possibility to create a general net of brains connected with 
each other, and potentially capable of building a completely new society. Kurzweil 
carefully support his thesis with mathematical arguments, mostly relying on the well-
known Moore’s law, which describes the exponential evolution of power computation 
in the production of computer processors. According to Kurzweil, Moore’s law supports 
the evidence that our technology will eventually lead to the creation of a machine with 
the computational capacities of the human brain. If Kurzweil’s visionary predictions 
inevitably gathered supporters, he nonetheless encountered some opponents with whom 
he openly compared his theories. As early as 2002, his publication Are we spiritual 
machines? included articles by authoritative voices from the sciences and the 
humanities that challenged his own predictions, to which Kurzweil replied.266 Among 
the opposing authors, eminent personalities such as analytical philosopher John Searl, 
biochemist Michael Denton and ecologist and artist Thomas Ray were invited to 
express their opinions. Despite Kurzweil's passionate advocacy for artificial 
intelligence, his visionary predictions and somehow questionable arguments might have 
in part contributed to discrediting artificial intelligence research, at least to a portion of 
the audience. By further developing the myth of an all-powerful artificial intelligence to 
come, relating it to the vision of the global village and finally promising a future where 
the machine will eventually overcome the human body, Kurzweil excited not only his 
supporters, transhumanists and posthumanists alike, but he also strengthened the 
opinions of those who objected the validity and the credibility of artificial intelligence 
research. 
 
The visionary ideology exemplified by Kurzweil met severe opposition in the writings 
of the historian and political scientist Richard Barbrook, a prominent intellectual known 
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for his contributions in the fields of communication and society. In one of his earliest 
online articles "The Sacred Cyborg" published in the online magazine Telepolis, he 
described in mocking terms the researchers in this field, portraying them as nothing 
more than contemporary mystics who attempt, through modern technologies, to 
accomplish archaic aspirations and obsessions, such as the autonomous creation of life 
and the achievement of immortality.267 
 
In a later publication, Imaginary Futures, Richard Barbrook, further attacks the 
ideology behind artificial intelligence research, affirming that the goal of creating a 
thinking machine was a myth and illusion, conceived and sustained by researchers in 
the field to mislead public and private funding. In Barbrook’s view, by creating 
expectations that would never be fulfilled, the researchers were allowed to constantly 
preserve their financial support. He further asserted that the real purpose of artificial 
intelligence was the production of sophisticated technologies for the army and that the 
epistemological goals expressed by the researchers were merely a way to justify their 
activities to the public and cover their militaristic objectives. As he affirmed: "the 
imaginary future of artificial intelligence disguised the original motivation for 
developing IBM's mainframes: killing large numbers of people."268 Additionally, 
Barbrook suggested that artificial intelligence has been elaborated as a lure to serve the 
leading companies in their deception of the public but also their employees and 
syndicates. In his view, these companies were responsible for promoting the myth that 
intelligent machines will eventually free workers from hard labour. According to 
Barbrook, computers and machines only served the interests of the patrons, increasing 
profits while producing even more unemployment. In his words: "The imaginary future 
of artificial intelligence was a way of avoiding thinking about the likely social 
consequences of the mass ownership of computers."269 Published in 2007, the strong 
criticism against artificial intelligence expressed by Barbrook proved that the distrustful 
positions advanced by researchers and philosophers like Weizenbaum, Dreyfus and 
Marcuse are still present today. 
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Undeniably, the question concerning advancements in technology and the way in which 
it conditions society has generated lively debate. Despite the initial enthusiasm for 
artificial intelligence and computing machines, as the debate evolved these new 
technologies faced a number of attacks and an increasingly bad reputation. The negative 
critique of artificial intelligence and computing machines came both from researchers 
involved in the field as well as from a variety of philosophers and critical theorists. 
Their arguments can be categorised into two main groups: on the one hand, 
epistemological arguments focused on the scientific goals of the research and its 
approaches; on the other, ethical arguments addressing the consequences of the research 
and its impact on society. 
 
The epistemological arguments against artificial intelligence view the discipline’s 
research goals, including the creation of autonomous intelligence and consciousness, as 
unachievable. Furthermore, the arguments question the value of this research and 
whether it makes any real contribute to knowledge at all. Similar arguments have been 
discussed by researcher Joseph Weizenbaum and philosopher Hubert Dreyfus. Another 
group of epistemological arguments questioned the approach to traditional artificial 
intelligence research, accusing it not only of improper goals, but also of using improper 
approaches to achieve them. These arguments have been advanced by researchers in the 
field of robotics and artificial life, respectively by Rodney Brooks and Christopher 
Langton, for instance. 
 
On the other hand, ethical arguments against artificial intelligence and computing 
machines are usually inscribed in a general critic of post-industrial society and 
communication technologies. These arguments can be further divided into three groups. 
A first group of ethical arguments accuse artificial intelligence and computers of 
serving the interest of capitalist society, and more specifically the interests of the ruling 
class and the powerful corporations, in which labour is replaced by automates, resulting 
in unemployment and alienation. These arguments have been discussed by Gilles 
Deleuze, Herbert Marcuse, Lewis Mumford and Richard Barbrook, for example. 





technologies serve the interests of private corporations acting on a global scale and thus 
contributing to the disparities between developed and underdeveloped countries. In 
addition, it should be mentioned that some philosophers such as Paul Virilio, Sylvère 
Lotringer and Andrew Feenberg advocate for a creative use of technologies in order to 
prevent the monopoly of knowledge by the ruling class. 
 
A second group of ethical arguments, focusing more specifically on artificial 
intelligence, points out its complicity with the defence industry. This thesis has been 
discussed by Norbert Wiener, Joseph Weizenbaum, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 
and strongly supported by Richard Barbrook.  
 
A third group of arguments, put forward by rather conservative philosophers such as 
Daniel Bell, Francis Fukuyama, and Neil Postman, have criticised scientific research 
and modern technologies as being a threat to the fundamental moral values of society. 
The three philosophers proscribe that scientific research and applications of 
technological innovation should be regulated by higher moral entities and not abdicated 
to corporations and researchers alone. 
 
These voices are exemplary of a variety of critical stances towards scientific research. 
They are not delimited to a geographic area or a specific time span, but they are the 
answer to the development of the implementation of computing machines in our society. 
The next section will attempt to establish if these critiques are limited to scientific 
research and the humanities or if similar arguments have been developed within the 
artistic field as well. 
3.4 Artistic Positions on AI in the Eighties and Nineties 
It has not been an unusual practice to complement festivals dedicated to new media art 
with panels and debates on philosophical and sociological questions about the impact of 
new technologies on life and society, to which prominent researchers from the 





these issues in their works and writings. In particular, the debate concerning artificial 
intelligence has received significant attention from artists that were producing works of 
generative art. The Ars Electronica festival and the Leonardo journal have provided 
fertile ground for the ongoing debate. What were the positions of prominent artists 
using computing machines on these topics after the seventies? The following section 
attempts to answer this question, mapping the territory of computer generated art during 
the eighties and nineties, by examining the work and the position of a selection of 
prominent artists that not only used computing machines and generative approaches to 
create works of art, but overtly discussed some of the topics associated with these 
technologies. 
 
Almost forty years after Jack Burnham’s prediction of the outcome of an aesthetic of 
artificial intelligence, artist and curator Peter Weibel reformulates the significance of 
the impact of the computer in society and in the representation of the human mind, as 
well as on the artistic production.  
 
The current state of development in computer technology represents the 
pinnacle of technological and scientific research and development, which has 
accompanied a history of thousands of years of human evolution. It should thus 
surprise no one if our current perception of the human mind is that of a parallel-
processing network computer.270  
 
Considering the human mind as the equivalent of a computer - or a network of 
computers - is the key assumption of traditional artificial intelligence research. 
Expressed at the end of the nineties, Weibel’s statement exemplifies the faith in 
computing machines and artificial intelligence within the section of artistic community 
that seeks to promote stronger relations between the arts and the sciences. 
 
The enthusiasm for new technologies and the possibilities it affords to both society and 
artistic production strongly characterised the work and ideas of another pioneering artist 
in this field: Roy Acott. The artist envisaged a telematic revolution and the advent of a 
new society based on connectivity. He affirmed that the relational capacities of human 
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beings, powered by machines, are opening a new, emerging future not only for artistic 
creation but also for humanity as a whole. 
 
The very term 'information technology' sounds cold and rather alienating, like 
the outer offices of some Kafkaesque institution. In fact, the opposite is the 
case, and computer-mediated networks, in my view, offer the possibility of a 
kind of planetary conviviality and creativity that no other means of 
communication has been able to achieve. One reason may be that networking 
puts you, in a sense, out of body, linking your mind into a kind of timeless 
sea.271 
 
Such a vision was already exemplified in his work La Plissure du Texte, an obvious 
reference to the Roland Barthes’s book, Le Plaisir du Texte. Among the most famous 
work created by Roy Ascott, it was conceived for the exhibition Electra, l'électicité et 
l'électronique dans l'art du xxe siècle curated by Frank Popper at the Musée d’Art 
Moderne in Paris in 1983. The exhibition’s central theme was based on a survey of the 
use of electricity in art. Roy Ascott exploited the ARTEX network272 to create a work 
that would involve and connect not only several other participants, mostly artists and 
student, but also different cities through a world-wide network. A total of eleven cities 
were involved in the project which began on December 11, 1983 and lasted until 
December 23, 1983. The work consisted of a collaborative text, revolving around the 
idea of a fairy-tale using a similar approach to the surrealist method of the cadavre 
excquis. In the press release, Ascott described the project as a "collaborative story 
telling project using a computer timesharing network of artists located in Europe, North 
America and Australia."273 The fable resulting from the collaborative work is a 
fragmented text written in English and French and composed of descriptive paragraphs, 
dialogues, as well as some ascii-art images. The second important telematic art project 
by Roy Ascott, Aspects Of Gaia – Digital Pathways Across The Whole Earth, was 
created for the Ars Electronica Festival in Linz in 1989. As for his previous project, the 
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artist implemented the use of networks, in this case EARN, BITNET and I.P.SHARP, to 
join forces with other artists. More than 100 artists from all over the world collaborated 
on the project, to which more emphasis on images and sound was given this time. The 
project was co-directed by Roy Ascott, together with five other artists: Don Foresta, 
Tom Sherman, Tomaso Trini, Maria Grazia Mattei and Robert Adrian X. The public at 
Ars Electronica was also able to interact with the artistic material created by the artists 
involved. Aspects of Gaia tackled questions related to the earth as a whole and as a 
living organism, suggesting references to the ideas of British chemist James Lovelock 
and his theory of Gaia. It was composed of two pieces displayed at the Brucknerhaus in 
Linz. On the upper level of the building, a large horizontal screen displayed images and 
texts coming from the world. The images could then be manipulated by acoustic sensors 
or with a computer mouse. The second part of the work was installed outside the 
building: the public was able to join a ride on a trolley installed with LED screens that 
would display the collected data about Gaia, the earth.  
 
These collaborative works by Roy Ascott depict his positivistic vision of a society that 
is moved forward by technology. In his article Gesamtdatenwerk, originally published 
in Kunstforum in 1989, the artist explains his visionary idea of a society that is 
empowered by a network created by both humans and machines. 
 
Computer networking provides for a field of interaction between human and 
artificial intelligence, involving symbiosis and integration of modes of thinking, 
imagining and creating, which, from the point of view of art, can lead to an 
immense diversity of cultural transformations, and which, in science and 
philosophy, can yield enriched definitions of the human condition.274 
 
Although the ideas of Roy Ascott are somehow more visionary, abstract and poetic then 
the reflections of pioneers such as Cohen and Ihnatowicz, they display a similar and 
genuine interest in using the computing machine to contribute to the enlightenment of 
society. 
 
The relationship between computing machines and the arts, are also at the core of 
Stephen Wilson’s investigations, consisting of both artistic productions and theoretical 
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writings. The American artist is probably best known for his comprehensive study of 
artists involved in scientific research and new technologies.275 Wilson obtained his 
MFA in generative systems and performance art at the Art Institute of Chicago and 
teaches Information Art at San Francisco State University. Wilson developed his works 
in a manner consistent with the contemporary art world, by creating complex and 
interactive installations designed to be specifically experienced in exhibition spaces. His 
work is characterised by artificial intelligence research and the application of computing 
machines. One of his most famous installations, Excursions in Emotional Hyperspace, 
shown at the NCGA Art Show in San Jose in 1986, consisted of four dummies arranged 
in the four corners of a room, each displaying specific and individual attributes to 
further accentuate their personalities. Each dummy had its own story to tell and started 
to speak as soon as a spectator approached it. The work Is Anyone There?, equally 
confronted the spectator with artificial characters. In this work, a computer was 
programmed to recurrently call five different public phones in San Francisco in 1992, 
the public was invited to answer the call and engage in a conversation with a fictional 
character directed by a computer. The technology allowed for a short discussion 
between the computer and the spectator, but the main focus of the artist was on the 
discussed topics relating to everyday life, and the reaction of the spectators to the 
machine. In this way, Wilson’s works attempted to mirror some goals in artificial 
intelligence, in particular the possibility of a dialogue and even an exchange of 
emotions between real people and artificial agents. In his essay, "Artificial Intelligence 
Research as Art", published in 1995, Wilson explicitly mentions the influence that the 
scientific research had on his artistic approach. Furthermore, he expresses the belief that 
artificial intelligence research should indeed pursue ambitious epistemological goals, to 
which artists should explicitly be invited to contribute. 
 
At its core, artificial intelligence research is about much more fundamental 
issues than construction of the next year's model of expert system. The culture 
desperately needs the definitions of research agendas, the generation of 
hypotheses, and the pursuit of research questions in this field to reflect the 
perspectives and wisdom of people from a wide range of disciplines, including 
the arts and humanities.276 
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This passage by Stephen Wilson manifests, on the one hand, his faith in the research 
and its potential to contribute to society. On the other hand, it criticises the research for 
its lack of more ambitious goals aimed at the betterment of society and suggests that the 
formulation of such goals can be done with the collaboration of other disciplines, not 
the least the arts. This position is very similar to that of Paul Virilio, Sylvère Lotringer 
and Andrew Feenberg, as previously discussed. 
 
Another notable artist that has integrated the use of computers and the investigation into 
artificial intelligence applications in art is the American artist David Rokeby. His most 
notable work, Very Nervous System, was presented at the Venice Biennial in 1986. The 
work consists of an interactive device translating the human body movement into an 
environment of sounds. But it is another work, The Giver of Names, a work in progress 
started in 1990, which intends to mimic more specifically some of the advancements in 
artificial intelligence. The Giver of Names consists of a computer program that, coupled 
with a camera and a video projector, is capable of recognising random objects submitted 
to its attention by a spectator. The computer program is able to recognise the forms of 
the objects, thus displaying vision recognition abilities, which is possibly one of the 
most ambitious goals of artificial intelligence research. Additionally, it can perform 
some speculation about the objects and their functions. However, for the artist, the most 
significant output produced by the machine is a poetic gesture, inviting the spectator to 
ponder topics such as the problem of semantic definition, names, objects and identity. 
Central to Rokeby’s reflections is the distinction between reality and virtual reality. The 
artist warns of the increasing difficulty, in a world dominated by technology, of 
distinguishing between the two. His ideas concerning new technologies such as 
computers, the Internet and interactive media in general, seems to be twofold: 
 
Yes, interactive media can empower and enfranchise. But they simultaneously 
create new kinds of constraints on abstract and psychological levels, constraints 
that are more difficult to understand and critique than the familiar biases of the 
press and broadcast media.277 
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The reason why Rokeby engaged particularly with new interfaces permitted by 
computers and modern technologies, is precisely because of the interactive possibilities 
that they allow. The artist concludes his essay by affirming that interactivity implies 
responsibility, and that new technologies should be approaches with caution. 
 
The possibilities opened by the use of computers and the simulation of an intelligent 
artificial agent inspired many artists to create works in which interactivity played an 
important role. As in the works created by Stephen Wilson and David Rokeby, these 
approaches aimed to produce either a realistic dialogue or a creative interaction with the 
spectators. In this respect, it is interesting to read the writings of Kenneth Feingold, 
another prominent figure among artists investigating artificial intelligence and its 
possible applications in art. His first installations, such as Séance Box No.1, 1998, and 
Head, 1999, were an attempt to create works that could effectively converse and interact 
with the spectator, hence pursuing the objective to create an artificial creature imitating 
and displaying intelligent behaviour. The interest of the artist in artificial intelligence 
research was motivated by the opportunities it opened for the discussion of 
philosophical topics: 
 
But I feel that Artificial Intelligence is not a technical problem, as he would 
have it; rather, it is a philosophical problem, a question of attaining an 
understanding not of "what is a brain?" but instead, "what is a human being? 
What is intelligence? What is thought? What is communication? What are the 
relationships between the technical aspects of thought, and what we think of as 
personality?278 
 
In a similar way as Stephen Wilson, Kenneth Feingold regards artificial intelligence 
research as an inquiry into greater ontological and epistemological questions, rather 
than a technology at the service of industry or the military. This is the reason why he 
decided to engage with this field as an artist. For this purpose, Feingold admits to 
having studied the literature around traditional artificial intelligence and having learned 
to program. He later realized, nonetheless, that the spectators were only interested in 
testing the effectiveness of the work’s intelligence and that they completely ignored the 
artistic qualities and conceptual intentions behind the works. He eventually lost interest 
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in his former projects, discarding possibilities of interaction between the spectator and 
the work to create moving sculptures that would dialogue between themselves, often 
mimicking philosophical discussions, instead of attempting a realistic dialogue with the 
spectator. His later works, such as If/Then (2001), could be interpreted as parodies of 
human existence but they also seem to mock the possibility of a veritable artificial 
intelligence. 
 
With a somehow similar purpose, Japanese artist Naoko Tosa approached artificial 
intelligence and incorporated computers into her artistic productions to explore 
emotions and philosophical questions, instead of attempting to imitate scientific 
research. In her essay, she affirms that the research developed by scientific laboratories 
"handle emotions in a superficially symbolized forms and fail to encompass such 
delicate emotional communications like bargaining."279 In her article, the artist 
explicitly refers to laboratories like the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, the 
Carnegie-Mellon University and the New York University's Media Research Lab. 
Naoko Tosa has created works exploiting artificial intelligence techniques precisely 
with the purpose of covering the areas that are usually omitted by scientific research, 
areas such as emotion, poetry and beauty. Her most exemplary work in this sense is 
Neuro Baby, developed since 1993. The Japanese artist concedes that new technologies 
and machines sometimes scare public opinion by generating fears about the 
dehumanisation of society. It is precisely the reason why, in her opinion, it is an artist’s 
duty to understand them and use them, in order not to leave the control and the 
exclusive knowledge about these technologies to the researchers alone. 
 
But artificial intelligence was not the only scientific field that seduced artists using 
computers. During the nineties, after the emergence of artificial life and embodied 
robotics, artists started to produce works drawing on these recent fields. Creator of The 
Flock, Kenneth Rinaldo is one of the most famous artists embracing artificial life to 
produce impressive installations. The Flock, developed in 1992, consists of several 
mechanical arms hanging from the ceiling and interacting with the spectators by 
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swinging around and pulling back and forth. The installation is composed of grapevines, 
electrical cables, sensor devices and sound captors that detect the presence of the 
spectator causing the work to react to the volume of the voice, thus reproducing a 
seemingly live and intelligent behaviour. The artist later developed the work into a 
larger installation, Autopoiesis, composed of a larger number of arms. Kenneth Rinaldo 
recognizes the influence of the theories of Norbert Wiener both on his ideas and the 
generation of artists to which he belongs: "Many of these artists were inspired by 
Norbert Wiener and his writings (…) by modelling natural systems."280 He also 
acknowledges the influence of artificial life research and affirms his belief in a joint 
effort between the arts and scientific research: "the greatest potential for the arts and 
Artificial Life techniques is that they have presented opportunities (...) to develop true 
relationships with the computer."281 Although Kenneth Rinaldo adopted recent artificial 
life and embodied robotics theories in his artistic production, he did not altogether 
discard traditional artificial intelligence research. The artist conceded that his work was 
influenced by the ideas and research of Rodney Brook: "The architecture of the system 
is loosely based on some ideas called subsumption architecture from MIT."282 I had the 
opportunity to question him concerning his position in regard to the two conflicting 
approaches, the top-down and the bottom-up.  In his opinion, the two approaches are 
possible and co-exist in his work.  
 
I think human bodies and most biological creatures are both responding to cues 
from higher drives and directed behaviour (top down) and more bottom up 
drives and cues (...) I believe bottom up emergent behaviour is how we have 
evolved and I think the emergence of intelligent robotic forms will be as 
layered as a human body.283 
 
As indicated by these sentences, the artist did not discard the traditional ideas and 
approach of artificial intelligence research. In his opinion, both approaches are 
complimentary in the development of emerging behaviours. But if artists like Kenneth 
Rinaldo believed in the conjunction of traditional artificial intelligence research with the 
more recent artificial life one, many artists using computers in the nineties embraced the 
new paradigm and strongly discarded the old one. 
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Simon Penny, for example, has taken a very critical stance against artificial intelligence 
and its related top-down approach. The works of the Australian artist, share many 
similarities with the robotic experiments carried on by Rodney Brook, for example. His 
work Petit Mal, a project started in 1989, consists of an anthropomorphic robot on 
wheels, capable of interacting with spectators in gestural, embodied ways, displaying 
emotional-like features rather then articulated language skills. Penny considers research 
in artificial intelligence as simply wrong and based upon erroneous assumptions, as the 
result of an enduring philosophical fallacy regarding the mind-body problem. 
 
It is through examples such as these that we can see just how clearly so called 
`objective science' can be heavily value laden, perpetuating dualistic and 
colonialising ideologies. High tech enterprises, such as Artificial Intelligence 
and Top-down robotics validate and reinforce these dichotomies with the 
rhetorical power they derive from being scientific, high tech and futuristic.284 
 
In his writings, Penny clearly affirms his opinions about the superiority of the bottom-
up approach compared to the top-down one:  
 
What bearing do ideas of emergent order and techniques of Artificial Life have 
on interactive art practice, as ideas or tools? The most profound, as I see it, is 
that it offers an alternative to the current all too deterministic paradigm of 
interactivity as pre-set responses to user navigation through an ossified 
database. This paradigm is firmly within the Top-Down camp. Emergent 
interactive behaviour would not be derived from a set of pre-determined 
alternatives. Rather, behaviours might arise through a contingent and 
unconnected chain of triggers.285 
 
In these paragraphs, the artist reformulates the paradigm of embodied robotics and the 
importance of the concept of emergence. Furthermore, the artist openly regards the 
traditional approach in artificial intelligence as erroneous in its very nature, since, in his 
opinion, it is based on the dualist assumption that sees human beings as composed by 
two separate entities, namely the mind and the body. This criticism appears 
contradictory at first, since the artificial intelligence research is obviously based on 
materialistic assumptions, which automatically exclude the hypothesis that intelligence 
is the result of a spiritual substance. In philosophy of mind, materialism is notably 
opposed to dualism, which commonly assumes the coexistence of material and spiritual 
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substances, the latter being responsible for mind and emotional related activities. How 
can Penny affirm that artificial intelligence research falls into what he considers the 
dualist mistake? Penny believes that intelligent behaviours, in order to arise, need a 
holistic approach as prefigured from the bottom-up paradigm. According to his thesis, 
the top-down strategies, on the contrary, try to independently create intelligent 
behaviours, that is, without taking into account the body, be it organic or material, in 
which the mental activities and intelligent behaviours should emerge. Penny can 
therefore conclude that traditional artificial intelligence research and its peculiar top-
down approach, although based on materialist assumptions, truly reiterates the dualist 
mistake, simply replacing the mind-body dichotomy with another one constituted by the 
couple matter-information. In a personal interview, Penny eventually questioned the 
possibility of recreating intelligence in an artificial system, even through a system based 
on artificial life approaches: 
 
I fundamentally don’t believe in the possibility of intelligence in a 
computational platform, I am therefore very sceptical about hard a-life theories. 
In my opinion, the approaches and definition suggested by Maturana and 
Varela are much more pertinent than that of Tom Ray. The fact is that no a-life 
can reproduce its own hardware.286 
 
Simon Penny spent several years applying the new paradigms of embodied robotics and 
artificial life in his works, it is interesting to acknowledge that he nevertheless remained 
sceptical about the factual goals of ‘hard a-life’, that is to say, the position of 
researchers who hold the real synthesis of life to be possible. In his opinion, intelligence 
is situational and grounded in the biological reality of the intelligent organism and the 
environment in which it evolves and to which it relates. So far, we have only managed 
to create machines that imitate some very specific aspects of what we consider 
intelligent actions; because these machines are not independent and self-sufficient, in 
Penny’s opinion they cannot be considered truly intelligent. During the same interview, 
he stressed the importance of the opportunity for artists to experiment with technologies 
and ultimately express their poetical visions, rather than attempting to recreate life in 
artificial systems. 
 
                                                            





After the establishment of artificial life and bottom-up approaches, other artists, critics 
and theorists involved in computer generated art started to embrace the arguments 
against artificial intelligence. With the same verve, artist and biologist Thomas Ray 
supported the idea that human intelligence cannot be reproduced artificially, but that 
digital intelligence might evolve in a way unpredicted by humans. 
 
We can not expect digital organisms evolving in this way to perform useful 
work for us, such as guiding robots or interpreting human languages. In order to 
generate digital organisms that function as useful software, we must guide their 
evolution through artificial selection, just as humans breed dogs, cattle and 
rice.287 
 
Developed in 1992 by Thomas Ray, Tierra is a simulation of an ecosystem of artificial 
viruses. Although it was originally developed for the purpose of scientific research, the 
project has been presented and discussed in a large variety of events, exhibitions and 
publications on media art, to the point that it became an iconic work of artificial life and 
generative art. 
 
Many other artists expressed their debts to the new paradigm of artificial life. Artist 
Jane Prophet, for example, explored the use of new technologies in art and discussed 
topics related to artificial intelligence, artificial life and virtual reality. She expressed 
her preference for the bottom-up approach when describing one of her most ambitious 
works, TechnoSphere, developed in 1995:  
 
The notion of self-organising artificial life systems which we have used in 
TechnoSphere depend on a ‘bottom-up’ approach, with behaviour emerging as 
artificial creatures interact, rather than us imposing a ‘top down’ control on 
behaviour. This idea of ‘bottom up’ evolution has been applied to the whole 
project and carried through to the design process.288 
 
Artists Louis-Philippe Demers and Bill Vorn created spectacular and somehow uncanny 
installations with performing robots. They both acknowledge their debt to artificial life 
research: "The conceptual framework of our researches is based upon Artificial Life, 
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immersive environments connectionism, reactivity and artificial behaviors (implanted 
and emergent)."289 
 
In addition to the critical stance toward artificial intelligence moved by artists and 
critics who embraced the artificial life approach, other artists preferred to adopt the new 
paradigm to tackle ethical questions, coupled with the possibility of a greater interaction 
with the spectator. For example, artists Christa Sommerer and Laurent Mignonneau, 
Professors at the InterfaceCulture Lab, Institute for Media at the University of Art and 
Design in Linz are commonly associated with artificial life. They have been very active 
in promoting this approach within artistic research, through their work and their 
academic activities. Christa Sommerer and Laurent Mignonneau’s works present 
aesthetic qualities and are consciously conceived for artistic venues and exhibition 
spaces; the artists take great care in the formal qualities of their interactive installations. 
Many of their works consists of an artificial universe or ecosystem that is graphically 
represented through a screen, sometimes powered with a tactile device allowing the 
spectator to interact with the life-like digital creatures evolving in the universe created 
by the artists. They described their artistic research as investigating the implications of 
technology for society. 
 
By using science, namely the principles of artificial life as a source for creation, 
GENMA is also an attempt to address the question of what it means to 
manipulate and what impact it will have on us in the future.290  
 
This statement appears in the catalogue of the Ars Electronica exhibition in 1996, where 
the work GENMA was presented. On the one hand, Sommerer and Mignonneau rely on 
the possibilities of creating seemingly living artificial organisms, thus strongly 
associating their research with artificial life, on the other they affirm their intention to 
ground their artistic activity in a larger discourse that encompasses ethical questions. 
The possibility of interaction between the public and the artificial creatures is justified 
by the intention to further develop a sense of responsibility in the public toward a new 
form of life. In conclusion, their work was less about paralleling scientific research in 
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the development of artificial life forms, but rather to raise and discuss philosophical 
questions involving the responsibility of the spectator toward artificial living organisms. 
 
The artist thus takes on a new role, no longer creating autonomous and elevated 
artworks but radically giving up control over the art itself. The public is 
responsible for what it sees and the worlds it creates.291 
 
Sommerer and Mignonneau are very careful not to defend bold statements about the 
advances in scientific research; they rather concede that their intention is to generate 
debate through their work. Their position manifests an awareness of the critical 
reception of computing technologies within the artistic field. During an interview in 
Linz in 2011, Christa Sommerer recalled that their early works, presented at the Ars 
Electronica festival, were harshly criticized by members of the audience precisely 
because of the association between computing machines and modern technologies, and 
the defence industry: 
 
I remember in the beginning of the nineties, many people attacked us, not only 
us, but many others, because we used computers for creating artworks. They 
said that computers are just the extension of the military industry. This 
argument of working with technology as being just a slave of the military 
industry, I have heard it since I touched a computer.292 
 
During the interview, Christa Sommerer additionally states that they were neither 
interested in the bottom-up versus top-down debate, nor in the serious possibility of 
generating a truly living artificial being. Artificial life algorithms, coupled with the 
possibility of interactive media interface and an artistic approach were a means for the 
artists to eventually stimulate a debate about life and responsibilities. This is the reason 
why, in some of their works, the audience is called to participate in the creation and 
survival of artificial life forms. 
 
The concerns expressed by Sommerer and Mignonneau regarding the impact of modern 
technologies on society reflect a growing tendency in artistic production associated with 
media art, and a likely explanation as to the preference for artificial life over artificial 
intelligence. Oliver Grau comes to similar conclusions, when he affirms that "AI failed 
to deliver the goods of its own predictions, and now, since the end of the 1980s, the 
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developing area of artificial life has been full of promise."293 The argument proposed by 
the media art historian seems to suggest that the reasons behind the failure of artificial 
intelligence are to be found in the methodology of the research, which unable to achieve 
its own goals is losing credibility as a result. Consequently, artificial life appears more 
interesting both for researchers and artists. In this respect, Mitchell Whitelaw has 
analysed the artistic production associated with artificial life and published an extensive 
book describing a variety of approaches. He is among the researchers in the media art 
field who clearly takes a critical position regarding traditional artificial intelligence 
research. In Metacreation, published in 2006, the author demonstrates a profound 
knowledge not only of the artistic field but also of scientific research and also concludes 
that artificial life research succeeded where artificial intelligence failed. 
 
A useful way to briefly provide a sense of a-life's approach and its particular 
innovations is to examine the way it distinguishes itself from artificial 
intelligence (AI). It does so frequently, and tends to present itself as succeeding 
in its aims where AI has failed.294 
 
If Whitelaw appears to criticise artificial intelligence and embrace artificial life, thus 
supporting the epistemological argument proposed by the researchers within the later 
field, other art historians have rather considered artificial intelligence research from an 
ethical perspective. Art historian and curator Anne Collins Goodyear, in an article 
published in 2008, associates the loss of faith in machines with the aftermath of the 
Vietnam War, thus identifying already in the seventies oppositional tendencies to 
modern technologies within artistic production: 
 
With the escalation of the Vietnam War, it became increasingly clear to artists 
and critics, as explained above, that industrially driven technology was integral 
to the military campaign waged by the United States against North Vietnam. In 
such an atmosphere, the destructive associations of technology rapidly replaced 
the positive connotations that predominated only a few years earlier.295 
 
While analysing the reception of the exhibition "Art and Technology" at the Los 
Angeles County Museum of Art in 1971, the art historian signals that many critics and 
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artists started to manifest dissent concerning the relationship between art and 
technology. 
 
But the association of technology with the defence industry is only a part of the 
discourse developed by new media artists and critics in regard to the impact of 
technologies. When it comes to the growing presence of computers in everyday life, 
some artists have raised issues in relation to the emerging digital culture. Mary 
Flanagan, an artist who has frequently dealt with artificial reality, published several 
articles addressing the subject in a critical way. In her essays, she advocates for more 
awareness and open discussion around virtual reality and virtually constructed agents. 
She urges for the adoption of a moral and critical position towards computing machines 
and digital technologies in order to question the implications of artificial reality and 
artificial agents on the lives of individuals and society as a whole. Her critique also 
considers the question of gender specifically in relation to the formation of social 
relationships established in an uncontrolled context such as the internet and virtual 
reality.296 
 
Similarly, Katherine Hayles, a writer and cultural theorist deeply interested in the 
impact of technologies on society in general and the constitution of individual identities 
in particular, recognises the unwelcome association of technology with dominance and 
over-power. 
 
If my nightmare is a culture inhabited by posthumans who regard their bodies 
as fashion accessories rather than the ground of being, my dream is a version of 
the posthuman that embraces the possibilities of information technologies 
without being seduced by fantasies of unlimited power and disembodied 
immortality.297 
 
Katherine Hayles, alongside Donna Haraway and her famous Cyborg Manifest,298 
belongs to a group of critical theorists that have considered the emergence of a post-
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human society as a way of overcoming gender diversity. While Hayles and Haraway not 
only examine the dangers of cybernetic research and the development of a post-human 
society but also the positive outcomes, other critical theorists don't share the same 
optimism. Art historian and philosopher Barbara Becker, in an essay published in 2000, 
analyses the developments of digital technologies to take into account theories of trans-
humanism and post-humanism associated with the most radical artificial intelligence 
researchers, such as Ray Kurzweil and Hans Moravec. In her opinion, many research 
projects in this field are based on a misconception of our human existence and its 
peculiar material reality: "There are strange visionaries who dream about a posthuman 
evolution. Thinkers like Moravec, More, and others hope to combine human minds with 
technical artefacts to eliminate the fragility and mortality of the human body."299 Becker 
concludes that these visions of the humanity have a negative impact on society because 
they tend to strengthen selfish and reclusive behaviours. 
 
The dissonance and noise of the material world, which cannot be reduced to a 
discursive construction, and the thrilling strangeness of the other are both 
successively obliterated in favor of a solipsistic turning to an inner world, 
accompanied by the illusion of control. In different forms, we find this in 
visions of technological self-design, bodiless self-construction, and virtual self-
creation.300 
 
Artists and historians such as Anne Collins Goodyear, Mary Flanagan, Katherine 
Hayles and Barbara Becker represent a strong critical position toward modern 
technologies, artificial intelligence and computing machines within the artistic field. 
Their arguments warn against the alienating dangers intrinsically to the implementation 
of computing machines within our society, as well as its association with capitalism and 
technological warfare. However, other art critics point out that the association of 
modern technology with military funding and capitalism should not be carried over to 
artistic production. Among the most notable media art theorists, Geert Lovink 
emphasised the independence of artists, working with computers and new medias, from 
information technology industries and military research. 
 
It is only outsiders who can accuse the electronic arts of compliance with the 
'capitalist system'. The sad reality is that artists aren't all that different from 
ordinary computer users, unless they are part of the celebrity high-end circuit. 
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For the majority of artists access to technology is limited to consumer 
electronics. Often there is no money for more state of the art machines and 
software. Industries already have their own networks who do the demo design. 
This is the true tragedy of new media arts. Those who turn new media inside 
out and develop an aesthetic agenda have no place in today's production 
processes.301 
 
What is interesting to note in this paragraph, is that Lovink recognises how among 
uninformed critics, the association of artistic production involved with new technologies 
and computers to the 'capitalist system' has become a fact. In Lovink's opinion, artists 
that use new media in their work are unjustly criticised by curators and critics who are 
not involved in this specific artistic production. According to him, it is only a handful of 
artists that can benefit from collaboration and significant support from the industries 
producing these medias. According to the critical theorist, the choice to work with a 
specific medium and the content of the work produced by the majority of media artists 
cannot therefore be dictated by commercial imperatives. 
 
The association between the research in artificial intelligence, private corporations and 
the defence industry has been recognised and discussed by Andrew Pickering in a recent 
essay on cybernetics, in which he is a respected authority. In his comprehensive history 
of cybernetics, he admits that the research has involved and subsequently been 
compromised by military funding. Nevertheless, the historian feels compelled to add 
that: 
 
In our world, any form of knowledge and practice that looks remotely useful is 
liable to be taken up by the military and capital for their own ends, but by the 
end of this book it should be abundantly clear that military and industrial 
applications come nowhere close to exhausting the range of cybernetics.302  
 
The author suggests that the association of cybernetic research with the defence industry 
should not be exaggerated. By way of contrast, he provides several examples of 
cybernetic research that has developed independently and on many occasions even in 
amateurish fashion. Nevertheless, the considerations by Geert Lovink and Andrew 
Pickering, and their responses to the link between cybernetics and the defence industry 
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and capitalism, are evidence that today this association is deeply implemented in 
collective representations of these fields of research. 
3.5 Epistemological and Ethical Arguments 
The arguments brought against modern technologies and more specifically artificial 
intelligence can be distinguished between epistemological arguments questioning the 
scientific goals and their approaches, and ethical arguments addressing the 
consequences and the impact of the research on the society. Parallel to the voices raised 
within the scientific community and the humanities, artists involved in media art have 
been discussing the same questions in critical terms. If ethical concerns have been 
raised by artists regarding the involvement of digital technologies in our society, it 
seems that the epistemological discourse, on the other hand, has been particularly 
influential within the cluster of artists that were more deeply involved with computer 
and generative art. The emergence of artificial life and embodied robotics in the eighties 
seem to have encouraged new approaches in the use of computers in art. Furthermore, 
the arguments advanced against artificial intelligence by these disciplines recurs in the 
writings of some of the most significant artists and critics of media art involved in 
generative approaches after the eighties, such as Simon Penny and Mitchell Whitelaw, 
who have been prolific in discussing bottom-up approaches in the arts. 
 
The debate about the use of computing machines in art was favoured by publications 
and institutions dedicated to arts and technologies. International events and journals 
focusing on media art such as the Ars Electronica Festival and the Leonardo journal 
functioned as important platforms for the discussion and confrontation of ideas between 
artists, critics and researchers. An analysis of the Leonardo journal, from the first issue 
published in 1968 to 2004, provides a telling insight into the interest in topics related to 
artificial intelligence and artificial life. Close analysis of articles dealing with these 
topics down through the years reveals a consistency of articles on artificial intelligence 
from 1969 to 1991, with a total of twenty-four articles during that period of time. A first 





of thirty-four articles on artificial life are published while only 10 are dedicated to 
artificial intelligence in the same period. If we consider the Leonardo journal as a 
barometer with which to gauge artistic production in the field of new media art, these 
numbers suggest a shift in interest from artificial intelligence to artificial life during the 
nineties. 
 
Another relevant indicator, the Ars Electronica Festival is an internationally recognized 
event dedicated to art and technology. Every year it hosts a series of exhibitions, 
conferences and awards. Since its first edition in 1979, it has provided an important 
platform for artist, critics and researchers to meet and share their work. Since 1987, 
each edition of the festival has focused on a specific topic related to technology, the arts 
and society. It is interesting to consider the presence of researchers and their 
participation in the symposiums organized within the Festival. Over the years, the most 
famous researchers associated with artificial intelligence, robotics and artificial life have 
been invited to participate in conferences and podium discussions. Among them are 
personalities such as Marvin Minsky, Hans Moravec, Pamela McCorduck, Rodney 
Brooks, Christopher Langton and Luc Steels, to name a few. The articles on artificial 
intelligence and artificial life in Leonardo and the participation of researchers at the Ars 
Electronica festival suggest that the scientific debate opposing artificial intelligence and 
artificial art has fuelled the artistic activity and has significantly shaped the evolution of 
artistic production within computer and generative art. 
 
Having considered the positions of the artists that discussed the opposition between 
bottom-up and top-down approaches, it seems that the majority of artists involved in 
computer-based generative art after the eighties were all very favourable to embracing 
the new bottom-up approach, while I hardly found any artist willing to advocate for the 
top-down approach. Moreover, the researchers in the artificial life field, where the 
bottom-up approach was established, were largely mentioned and discussed among the 
artists, while the texts of theorists of the classical top-down approach were practically 
ignored in the essays of artists, critics and historians. Why did the bottom-up approach, 
put forward by embodied robotic and artificial life, have greater success and impact on 





artists and the evolution of the topics in the Ars Electronica festival and the Leonardo 
journal. The ideas and works of the new scientific fields were possibly more inspiring 
and convincing for a new generation of artists. Furthermore, the artists were eager to 
participate in a new genre that manifestly aroused interest in the media art field. The 
necessity to present newer work related to the most ‘trendy’ disciplines is quite 
understandably an imperative in a field that seeks to connect art and technology. 
Another reason could be linked to the exaggeratedly optimistic and confident attitude of 
some researchers and institutions in the artificial intelligence field itself, where the 
announcement of upcoming innovations and spectacular achievements - that would 
never be fulfilled - was a regular feature. These promises may have undermined the 
credibility of artificial intelligence in the eyes of artists. Conversely, artificial life 
research and embodied robotics did not engage in audacious predictions, precisely 
because it was founded in an approach that would expect the properties to emerge from 
the system itself. The researchers in these new fields, therefore, were not necessarily 
obliged to predict exactly which property they were expecting and in which timeframe: 
rather they focused on the concept of emergence and on the evolutionary possibilities 
offered by the system. In my opinion, it is for this reason that the concept of emergence 
had such a significant impact on artistic production, a concept that allowed for much 
more freedom and outcomes in a creative context. It is also very rare to find references 
to seminal texts by known researchers associated with traditional artificial intelligence 
research, even in the writings of artists engaging with it, while the texts of Christopher 
Langton and Rodney Brooks, representative of the new paradigm, are very often 
mentioned in the writings of artists engaging with computer generated art of the 
nineties. 
 
On the other hand, epistemological concerns and the fascination for new fields of 
research were probably not the only reasons that artists were encouraged to dissociate 
themselves with artificial intelligence research. Questions of aesthetic, formal qualities 
and the reception of the works were also involved. In his extensive research about 
modern sculpture, Jack Burnham considered the impact and significance of 
technological progress in art. He believed that new tendencies in sculpture producing 





comprehensive survey of contemporary sculpture, published in 1968, he already 
anticipated the importance that computer programming and new technologies would 
have on artistic production, predicting the emergence of an aesthetic of artificial 
intelligence in art. The author further envisaged two future approaches to technology: 
"Sculpture can choose one of two courses: it can be fashioned as a reaction against 
technology or as an extension of technical methodology."303 
 
Jack Burnham was right in predicting the development of artistic research associated 
with computers and artificial intelligence. He also correctly predicted the necessity and 
the emergence of an aesthetic discourse associated with this field. Indeed, questions 
regarding the formal qualities of the works and their reception were also debated 
between the artists, curators and critics involved with computer technologies. 
Computational linguistics Professor and composer Remko Scha, for example, regarded 
the works of art produced with new media and computer programming as being the 
successors of Dadaist traditions. He affirms that computer-based art further develops 
dada-like strategies exploiting automatic creation, in order to represent the diversity and 
unpredictability of nature and reality, following the Kantian idea that nature is superior 
to artifice. But not all the critics and historians appreciated the works created with 
computers. In a provocative article that appeared in Leonardo in 1989, artist Brian 
Reffin Smith manifested his dissatisfaction with a large body of computer art. He 
sustained that "in general, computer art is the most conservative, dull, un-innovative 
artform of the 1980s."304 This harsh criticism doesn't come from a theorist uninformed 
about the artistic production involved with new technologies. Brian Reffin Smith has 
been deeply involved with computer art and often defended this kind of artistic 
production, affirming its artistic validity. Nonetheless, the author concedes that many 
works produced in this field are mediocre and aesthetically uninteresting. In affirming 
the dull and un-innovative character of the majority of artworks created with computers, 
de facto he invites artists engaged in this production to show more creativity and 
audacity. The considerations put forward by Brian Reffin Smith are representative of a 
larger critical reception of works associated with new technologies. If an artist such as 
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Brian Reffin Smith, who has a profound knowledge of this kind of artistic production, 
expresses his dissatisfaction with a large part of it on a formal, artistic level, we might 
understand why this specific production has found it difficult to succeed in the larger 
community of visual arts. Artists have always been sensible concerning the reception of 
their works. As an example, Kenneth Feingold, as already mentioned, clearly expressed 
his dissatisfaction with his former research by taking into account the reaction of the 
public. 
 
Another important factor certainly played a role in facilitating the shift from top-down 
to bottom-up strategies: the association of artificial intelligence with capitalism and the 
defence industry put forward by many philosophers and researchers. In this respect, 
Geert Lovink makes an important point, when he advocates for media art and affirms 
that it is mainly misunderstood and wrongly associated with capitalism. "The corporate 
world is not interested in the new media artworks because in the end they are too 
abstract and seriously lack sex appeal. Do not make this mistake. New media art is not 
merely a servant to corporate interests."305 What Geert Lovink suggests, is that new 
media art is often disregarded by the majority of art critics not only because it lacks 
aesthetic qualities, compared to traditional media, but also because of the wrongly 
assumed idea that it is compromised by the information technology industry. The 
statement is interesting because, while rejecting the association of media art with the 
corporate world, it also stresses how this association persists in the cultural field. Under 
such conditions, it might be understandable that artists working with computers and 
generative approaches felt compelled to justify their work as being artistic, thus 
dissociating it from artificial intelligence research that was inevitably linked to the 
defence industry and to capitalism. The attacks by critical theorists and researchers 
against artificial intelligence contributed to the undermining of the theoretical 
background associated with the top-down paradigm, thereby encouraging the shift of 
interest towards artificial life and bottom-up strategies. 
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From the analysis of the positions of the artists working with computer and generative 
approaches, we can conclude that attacks on artificial intelligence have had an impact 
on their artistic practices. Artificial intelligence has been accused of being founded on 
an erroneous basis and of being incapable of achieving its epistemological goals. As a 
consequence, many artists praised the merits of artificial life research in opposition to 
artificial intelligence. More particularly, some artists raised ethical questions regarding 
the massive implementation of computer technologies, artificial intelligence and 
artificial reality. They argued that it should be the role of artists to question the moral 
consequences of the implementation of such technologies in our society. Finally, some 
artists and critics expressed dissatisfaction concerning the formal qualities of the works 
and their reception, in particular those works involving computer technologies. It is 
probably not a coincidence that, while artificial life research surfaced as an alternative 
to the traditional artificial intelligence research in the eighties, many artists working in 
the fields of computer and generative art were keen to embrace the newest trend. It is 
also relevant to note that they not only embraced the new approach but they also 
actively engaged in the theoretical discussion, further polarising the opposition between 
the traditional top-down and the new bottom-up paradigm. 
 
The question concerning the implementation of modern technologies within our society 
has raised a significant debate among philosophers, researchers and artists. Ethical and 
epistemological arguments against artificial intelligence research have been discussed 
not only within the scientific field, but also in the arts. In conclusion, we can affirm that 
the artistic production in this field has been particularly shaped by the debate opposing 
the traditional top-down approach and subsequently embracing the bottom-up approach. 
In addition, the association of the computing machine with capitalism and the defence 
industry has also been echoed in the community responsible for the dissemination of 
artistic productions associated with computer and generative art. Indeed, faith in the 
computing machine and its associated research, artificial intelligence, did not last long. 
If in the pioneering years computers were considered as an opportunity for 
epistemological research, in the following years some artists began to move in an 










4.1 Computer Art at the documenta X Exhibition 
The implementation of the computing machine in society was not without controversy, 
as discussed in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, its use in the artistic field seemed to 
progress and raise interest within a larger artistic community, as indicated by the 
development of festivals and journals dedicated to digital and media art such as Ars 
Electronica and Leonardo. What about the traditional field of art and its circuit? In 
1997, the documenta exhibition in Kassel finally hosted a showroom dedicated to 
computer art, focusing in particular on works exploiting the Internet. 
 
Expectations were high regarding the last documenta of the millennium, directed by the 
French historian and curator Catherine David. Before the opening, rumours circulated 
that the important international exhibition in Kassel would be a technological one. 
Catherine David dismissed these rumours and stated that the exhibition would focus 
foremost on ideas and content, rather than media.306 On the other hand, documenta X 
featured for the first time a website, which besides providing general information on the 
event, would also host works of computer art conceived to be experienced online. Swiss 
curator Simon Lamunière was commissioned to design and curate the website, in 
collaboration with Catherine David, as well as the showroom dedicated to these works 
in the documenta-Halle during the exhibition. Joan Heemskerk and Dirk Paesmans, also 
known as Jodi, were among the artists invited to participate in the website and 
exhibition. 
 
The creation of a website and presentation of works of computer art, more particularly 
net art, at documenta X is an important moment in the history of media art. During these 
years, media art emerged as a distinct field within contemporary art, constituting a 
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cluster of artists, critics and curators providing a specific theoretical framework and a 
vocabulary for it. It was a chance for artists working with computers to present their 
work in an internationally significant venue such as documenta, and therefore an 
opportunity to gain visibility and recognition among the more traditional and 
prestigious contemporary art world. For this reason, expectations were high not only for 
the public but particularly for the emerging media art scene. The event went through 
some turbulence and the presentation of works of media art at documenta was not 
performed without difficulties and conflicts. The analysis of the presence of media art at 
documenta X, in particular focusing on the participation of Jodi, provides important 
insight into the evolution of computer-generated art, on the one hand, and the dialogue 
between digital art and traditional art on the other. It also provides some different 
perspectives with regard to the integration of media art works in traditional art museums 
and institutions, offering alternative answers to questions that are currently being 
discussed by critics and curators engaged in media art.307 
 
How did computer and media art enter the door of an important international event such 
as documenta, in 1997? Which choices were made in the selection of the artists and in 
the presentation of their works? To what extend were they integrated in the main 
exhibition and in the general concept of the event? What were the reactions of the 
professional press to these works and their presentation? Conclusively, what has been 
the significance of this event concerning the career of the artists? I have approached 
these questions by analysing, more specifically, the case of the artist duo Jodi. 
4.2 Which Criteria for Media Art? 
A proposal document in the documenta archives in Kassel, shows that the creation of a 
website for the event was already considered in the early stage of the planning for the 
exhibition. The website was originally imagined as a simple information tool for the 
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event and director Catherine David initially considered turning to local company - 
Media Highway & Cross Culture, specialised in information technologies - to create the 
website.308 It is only with the commission of the event to the Swiss artist and curator 
Simon Lamunière that the website took its definitive form, integrating on the same 
platform useful information for  visitors, together with the artist’s work created for the 
web. At that time, Simon Lamunière was in charge of Version, a biennial exhibition 
focusing on computer and digital art at the Centre pour l'Image Contemporaine in 
Geneva, directed by André Iten.309 Catherine David visited the second edition of the 
biennial, Version 2.2, in 1996 and, according to the Swiss curator, it is during that event 
that she discovered another approach to computer art, a more creative one compared to 
other approaches which tended to be determined by a fascination for computer 
technologies.310 
 
The curatorial approach of Simon Lamunière at the Centre pour l'Image Contemporaine 
must have convinced Catherine David, because the Swiss curator was eventually 
commissioned to develop and design the website on which he actively began working in 
August 1996. With the direction of Lamunière, the website became not merely an 
information tool for documenta, as was initially intended, but also a space to present 
works of art created for that medium. The use of computers to create works to be 
experienced and shared through the Internet, constituted a growing community of artists 
that would be grouped under the term internet art, net art or net.art, during the second 
half of the nineties. The choice to assign the curatorial care of the documenta X website 
to Lamunière was a decisive one. The Swiss curator imagined a website that would 
merge both the practical visitor information and the artistic works within the same 
platform, dividing the sections dedicated to the works into four thematic groups, where 
other documents and links were also available. The four groups were entitled: Surfaces 
& Territories, Cities & Networks, Groups & Interpretation and In & Out.  
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The first group, Surfaces & Territories, included the work A Description of the Equator 
and Some Other Lands (1997), by Philip Pocock, Florian Wenz, Udo Noll and Felix 
Stephan Huber, a collaborative and interactive online script for a hypothetical movie, or 
‘hypermovie’.311 The first group also included the works Without addresses (1997) by 
Joachim Blank & Karl Heinz Jeron, an interactive generative map created by the 
registrations of the visitors to the web, and Location Sculpture System (1989-97) by Eva 
Wohlgemuth and Andreas Baumann, an online documentation of their series of works 
System, consisting of interventions in the territory evoking mental associations. Holger 
Friese’s unendlich, fast... (1995) a poetic work displaying a very large, blue window to 
be scrolled from side to side and up and down was also presented in the first group. In a 
remote area of the blue window, a group of ACSII characters recalled a constellation 
lost in a blue sky. Simon Lamunière explained that the characters consisted of the 
encoded version of the mathematical symbol of the infinite.312 Lastly, the first group 
included the work jodi.org (1994-1997) by Joan Heemskerk and Dirk Paesmans. 
According to the description provided in the documenta X: short guide, the work 
consisted of an active link to the website of the artists which, at that time, consisted of 
approximately 350 pages that were constantly updated.313 
 
The second group, Cities & Networks, presented the work Up to 625 (1997) by Matt 
Mullican, a corpus of hundreds of images which the user could navigate as a hypertext, 
and the work Visitors Guide to London (1994-5) by Heath Bunting, an interactive visit 
to London reproduced through a collection of low resolution black and white images. 
The second group also included an online reference to the work Metro-Net (1997), an 
installation created by Martin Kippenberger and displayed in the Karls-Aue park during 
documenta. 
 
The third group, Groups & Interpretation, comprised the work On Translation: The 
Internet Project (1997) by Antoni Muntadas, an online version of his work investigating 
the process of translation, exploiting the possibility to send a sentence worldwide and 
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follow the modification of its meaning through the successive conversion into different 
languages. The group also presented a reference to Beware! (1995-97), a selection of 
movies focusing on the role of the spectator conceived by Johan Grimonprez and 
Herman Asselberghs. 
 
Finally, the fourth group, In & Out, presented the works l.o.s.t. (1997) by Hervé 
Graumann, a sequence of navigable texts highlighted by a beam of light, an online 
reference to the work suspension (1997) by Jordan Crandall & Marek Walczak, and an 
online reference to the work Makrolab (1997) by Marko Peljhan. 
 
The selection of artists for the website was made by Simon Lamunière, who was 
convinced that computer art is not about technology, but about art. For Lamunière, the 
value of a computer artwork lay in the creative use of technology rather than simply 
using computers as a processing machine. In the booklet of the CD-ROM, produced for 
documenta as a software documentation of the website, Simon Lamunière wrote: "I 
have no intention of talking about the Net or cyberculture in general; much closer to 
home, on the other hand, are the concrete works of art."314 He also decided to invite 
artists that belonged to the emerging community of internet art, such as Heath Bunting 
and Jodi, together with artists coming from the more traditional contemporary art field, 
who were invited to create a specific work for the website without having necessarily 
had much experience with that technology, such as Matt Mullican. By doing so, he 
ensured that the website project would present a selection of the important actors from 
the new internet art scene, but it would also allow him to venture into a more creative 
curatorial experiment with artists that he considered capable of providing interesting 
topics and approaches. 
 
However, these choices only partially explain the selection of the artists for the website 
project, in particular concerning the artists familiar with this specific medium. The 
artists using computers and the Internet represented a growing community and 
substantial literature on their work was lacking: consequently, it was a difficult decision 
to choose among them. What were, from a curatorial point of view, Simon Lamunière’s 
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criteria for selecting the artists? The determination to create a combination of artists 
from the traditional contemporary art field together with the computer art field leaves 
the question unresolved, and so does the decision to invite artists privileging a creative 
use of technology, a criterion that could be interpreted in very dissimilar ways. A first 
project submitted in the early 1997 to Catherine David by Lamunière, mentions that the 
website will be thematically centred on the concept of geographies: "Geographies is a 
working title synthesising different aspects ranging from the computer screen and its 
limits, to the world and perception."315 What is interesting, apart from the concept of 
geography, is the concept of limit mentioned in the first project by the Swiss curator. 
During a personal interview, Lamunière confirmed to me that the concept of limit was 
important in both his artistic and in his curatorial work. "I have been constantly 
interested in limits. I always affirm that I am a ‘fire exit curator’: I was born on the 
crossroad of limits."316 The importance of the concept of limit is more explicitly stated 
in the texts presenting the artists selected for the website project in the short guide. 
Lamunière wrote all the texts for the works that he was responsible for. It appears clear 
that in many texts, the artist’s works are described in terms of their inclination to play 
with the limit of the machine. Regarding the work of Holger Friese, Lamunière writes 
that: "On one hand he attempts to push the machine and its computing power to the 
limits, and on the other to bring out its inherent formal contingencies."317 On Hervé 
Graumann, he writes that he "situates his work on that abstract, blurry boundary 
between author and machine."318 The work of Antoni Muntadas is described as using 
"deconstructive strategies to reveal the symbolic and political meanings behind agencies 
and structures like the media (...)" and, more specifically, his work for the website 
project "continues to explore what is at stake in transcription, interpretation, and 
translation, from language to code, from science to technology, from subjectivity to 
objectivity."319 Concerning Heath Bunting, Lamunière affirms that "when he uses 
networks or some other leading-edge technology, it is less to work on their behalf than 
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to turn them to other ends by perverting them in some way."320 Finally, of Jodi, the 
curator states that: "The question of how to take over the machine, along with interest in 
viruses and the disturbances and dysfunctions they cause in computer systems, have 
been constant elements in Jodi’s work."321 
 
To push the machine to the limits, to question the blurry boundaries between the user 
and the machine, to deconstruct and reveal the functioning of a medium, to take over the 
machine and pervert it: these are the elements that have been highlighted as the creative 
aspects of the works selected for the documenta’s website project. We can deduce that 
these characteristics were quite probably the fundamental elements behind the curatorial 
choices in the selection of the works. These choices matched the expressed interest of 
Lamunière for the concept of limit, together with his frequently asserted position that he 
is interested in art and not in technology per se.  
 
The curating of the website, in addition, was undertaken with the supervision and 
collaboration of documenta’s artistic director. Catherine David made it clear that she 
was rather interested in visions, more than aesthetic questions. As a consequence, 
documenta X was quickly perceived as a political event, while the artistic director was 
ineluctably described as "a French curator well-steeped in postmodern critical 
theory."322 David did not attempt to dismiss these assumptions. During a long interview 
for Art Press, she affirmed that: "In this documenta, we have favoured critical artists 
who operate on another level, namely artists who engaged in a constant questioning of 
the anthropological foundations of culture."323 This sentence summarises quite clearly 
the general curatorial approach of Catherine David for documenta, an approach that is 
inevitably mirrored with the one adopted for the artistic contributions to the website. 
During the press conference presenting the website project, she affirmed that:  
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New technologies are nothing other than new means to an end. Alone they are 
of no significance; it always depends upon how they are applied. I am against 
naive faith in progress, glorification of the possibilities of technological 
developments. Much of what today's artists produce with New Media is very 
boring. But I am just as opposed to the denunciation of technology.324 
 
For David, consequently, works of new media art are not interesting per se, a typical 
position, although her description of the majority of media art works as being ‘very 
boring’ is certainly noteworthy. Furthermore, David considered that new technologies 
are only a means to an end, tools that don’t differ from more traditional ones for an 
artist to operate his or her critical questioning of the ‘anthropological foundations of 
culture’. David’s vision does indeed correspond to Simon Lamunière’s curatorial vision 
for the website. Both curators shared the conviction that works of media art that were 
worthy of being presented not only dealt with formal exercises about the nature of the 
medium, but rather offered a critical perspective on it.  
4.3 Jodi, a Bomb in the Source Code 
While Simon Lamunière and Catherine David were collaborating on the development of 
the website project for documenta X, between 1996 and 1997, Jodi was gaining 
considerable attention within the emerging media art scene. Through the website 
irrational.org and the Nettime mailing list, artists such as Heath Bunting, Alexei 
Shulgin and Vuk Ćosić started to exchange works and ideas on the creative and critical 
use of the internet. Jodi is an art collective composed of Dirk Paesmans (*1965, 
Brussels) and Joan Heemskerk (*1968, Kaatsheuvel). Today, Jodi are considered among 
the most successful and influential artists associated with net art, but their work is often 
presented in more general publications on media art and computer art. 
 
In 1993, Dirk Paesmans and Joan Heemskerk were hosted at the San Jose State 
University for an artist in residence program, where they had the opportunity to 
experiment with computer languages and web programming. They eventually created a 
website, which they have continued to develop ever since: wwwwwwwww.jodi.org.325 
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Instead of creating a virtual platform to display reproductions of physical works, Jodi 
conceived a website that functioned as a work in its own, a work that they kept 
transforming and evolving throughout the years. The website consists of a collection of 
pages that became distinctive of Jodi’s aesthetic, exploiting colourful characters, 
graphical glitches and overlapping images in chaotic compositions that often recall the 
frozen screens of virus infected computers. The artists frequently play with the 
possibilities offered by HTML and the interactive opportunities allowed by the Internet, 
the content of their website being often fed by other websites’ content and inputs 
provided by visitors. Among the first online work created by Jodi is a black page filled 
with an apparently illogical sequence of bright green ASCII characters, mostly dots and 
slashes. The sequence of characters completely fills the screen from side to side and 
from top to bottom. To understand the work, one had to go beyond the surface of the 
screen and display the source code of the page, a feature that is provided by the browser 
in the menu, or by clicking the appropriate combination of keys on the keyboard. The 
source code of the web page is the written instruction of the page, following a specific 
syntax that organises the final output and functionality of the page. The exploration of 
the source code of any given webpage would provide an informed user of the 
organization of the page and the instruction that operates it. To any other visitor, the 
source code would appear as a sequence of instructions in a markup language, usually 
HTML. Not in the case of this specific work by Jodi: in opening the source code, the 
work fully reveals itself to the visitor. In fact, the artist has written the source code - 
rather, they have drawn it with ASCII characters - without any concern for the result 
that it would generate. They did not intend to use the code as a functional tool to 
instruct the website. Instead, they used the space of the source code as a blank page to 
reproduce the schematics of the nuclear bomb and the nuclear chain reaction, using 
characters such as numbers, punctuation marks, lines, and parenthesis in the tradition of 
ASCII art. The resulting webpage with the long sequences of green characters is simply 
the source code as rendered by the browser. 
 
This early work reveals Jodi’s intention to invert the usual functioning and experience 
of the Internet and computing machine, by hiding the work where it is not expected. It 
                                                                                                                                                                              






also shows how the artists subvert the technology to their own ends: instead of 
complying with the language of the machine, they use it as a creative space. 
Furthermore, they invite the user to go beyond their habitual experience of the Internet 
and, to look behind the surface. It is quite suggestive that the image discovered in the 
source code represents the plans of a nuclear bomb, possibly an allusion to the military 
research that underlies the development of information technologies. As is well known, 
the origin of the Internet, before the invention of the World Wide Web protocol and its 
development for a wider public at CERN, was tightly connected to the U.S. Department 
of Defense. On the other hand, the work by Jodi could be considered a work of 
generative art: the artists have used a procedural system – composed of a computer, 
programming languages and the software that operates it – to create a work that in its 
final output is unpredictable and dependent on the contingency of the system itself, 
apart from the source. These aspects of their work satisfy the generally accepted 
definition of generative art.326 It is not a surprise that the generative properties of many 
works created by Jodi have been pointed out, for example by Florian Cramer,327 
although their pioneering position as internet artists has been preferred in the discussion 
of their work. What has not been pointed out, to my knowledge, is that the generative 
character of their work does contribute to the general purpose and discourse of the 
artists, aiming at deconstructing the aesthetic of the computer and information 
technologies, on the one hand, and at emphasising the growing dependency on these 
technologies on the other. 
 
Without hesitation, the two artists affirmed: "from the very beginning on, it has been the 
most important task for JODI to do everything wrong on the Internet that can be done 
wrong. That’s the core of all our work."328 The first website created by the artists, with 
its glitches, errors and chaotic display of texts and images that have now become their 
distinctive aesthetic, is indeed the result of a compulsion to do ‘everything wrong’, to 
play with and deconstruct the syntactical elements of the machine and its code in order 
                                                            
326 See, for example, the commonly accepted definition by Galanter: Philip Galanter, "What is Generative 
Art? Complexity theory as a context for art theory" in Proceedings of Generative Art Conference 
GA2003 (Milan: Generative Design Lab, Milan Polytechnic, 2003). 
327 Florian Cramer, "DISCORDIA CONCORS: www.jodi.org", in Install.exe - Jodi: [plug in] Kunst und 
neue Medien, Basel, 18. September bis 27. Oktober 2002 (Basel: Merian, 2002). 
328 Dirk Paesmans, in:  Tilman Baumgärtel, Net.art 2.0: neue Materialien zur Netzkunst (Nürnberg: Verl. 





to fight against it. The artists carried on the same approach coherently in their 
subsequent works, applying similar strategies to web browsers (OSS/, 1998; 
404.jodi.org, 1998; Wrong Browser, 2001), computer games (untitled game, 1996-
2001; sod.jodi.org, 1999; maxpaynecheatsonly, 2006) and social networks 
(folksomy.net, 2008; g33.con, 2009; thumbing.org, 2010). 
 
The reasons behind this determination to subvert the seemingly logical functioning of 
the computer are explicitly stated by the artists in an interview with Tilman 
Baumgaertel: "we do these things because we are angry. The people at the other 
computer terminal feel this rage." Questioned about the grounds of their anger, they 
reply: "Because of the prominence of technology. It is obvious that our work turns 
against High Tech. We also fight against the computer on a graphical level."329 From 
these paragraphs, it appears clear that the artists are not motivated by a fascination for 
the technologies that they decided to work with, but rather by anger and frustration 
concerning their overwhelming importance in our everyday life. It is interesting to note 
that their action against the technology is not only performed on a conceptual level but 
is sustained by the formal approach of the artists against the graphical norms of 
computers and the popular, commercial applications that dominate their use. 
 
The fight that the artists are undertaking against the machine has to be experienced in a 
particular context: their work needs to be experienced individually, with a personal 
computer. Although the artists have been invited to participate in solo and group 
exhibitions in many international institutions, they consider that their works are best 
experienced at home. In the first interview with Tilman Baumgaertel, they state: 
 
The Internet is the environment in which our work must be displayed. We are 
working with the connection speed of the Internet, or rather, with the 
connection slowness. That would get lost on a CD-ROM. (...) We have made 
about 150 changes since we started our website.330 
                                                            
329 "Wir machen diese Sachen, weil wir wütend sind. Die Leute am anderen Ende, am empfangenden 
Computer, spüren diese Wut. (...)Wegen der Bedeutung von Technologie, zum Beispiel. Es ist 
offensichtlich, dass sich unsere Arbeit gegen High Tech richtet. Und wir kämpfen auch auf 
graphischer Ebene gegen den Computer." Dirk Paesmans, in: Tilman Baumgärtel, Net.art: 
Materialien zur Netzkunst (Nürnberg: Verlag für Moderne Kunst, 1999), 108, my translation from the 
German. 
330 "Das Internet ist die Umgebung (environment), in der unsere Arbeit gezeigt werden muss. Wir 






To further support the argument that their work needs to be experienced individually, 
Jodi constantly update their website. Their main argument is that their work takes place 
in the computer, hence the personal relation of the user with the machine plays a 
significant role in their work. The computer is not, in the case of Jodi, a mere tool to 
display a work translated in digital ways, as for example a painting displayed in a 
dedicated fine art website, but it is the place where the work truly and exclusively 
exists. It is its ontological location: a work by Jodi doesn’t exist anywhere else. Not 
only does the work not exist outside the computer, but it also doesn’t exist exclusively 
in one single computer. The work taking place in the artist’s machine or in the viewer’s 
one is the same and it wouldn’t make any sense to speak of an original and a copy. But 
the main reason why Jodi’s website needs to be experienced at home, through one 
personal computer, is that it allows a more intimate, and probably unsettling experience. 
Jodi’s website plays with the anticipations and fears of the spectator as he comfortably 
surfs on the web on his personal computer. Fears of hacking, viruses and all sort of 
piracy regarding the internet had become a common concern by the end of the twentieth 
century, probably nurtured, in part, by the companies producing software to counter 
these dangers. Although in reality inoffensive, Jodi’s work destabilizes the viewer by 
exploiting the formal elements that characterise crashes and virus infections.  
 
The anxiety produced by the experience can only occur if the viewer uses his or her 
own personal computer, or at least it is more intense, as the artists state: "It’s a 
transgression into your personal space – it doesn’t work on public computers."331 While 
this is the reason why the artists considered that their website should be rather 
experienced through one’s own personal computer, at home, it has also determined the 
organisation of their website. Instead of creating a classical one, presenting their 
curriculum, works and exhibitions in an ordered fashion, Jodi’s website is a work of art 
in itself, constantly changing and evolving, without any practical information about the 
artists or the works. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Übertragungslangsamkeit. Das ginge verloren, wenn es auf einer CD-ROM wäre. (...) Wir haben 
ungefähr 150 Änderungen vorgenommen, seit wir unsere Site gemacht haben." Ibid., 107, my 
translation from the German. 
331 Dirk Paesmans, in:  Tilman Baumgärtel, Net.art 2.0: neue Materialien zur Netzkunst (Nürnberg: Verl. 




































4.4 Online and Offline: Problems of Presentation 
The analysis of Jodi’s works and ideas clearly show that the internet was the appropriate 
place to present the artists selected by Simon Lamunière for the media art section of 
documenta X. This is particularly true for the work of Jodi, but similar conclusions 
could be made for the other selected works. However, Simon Lamunière and Catherine 
David’s decision to present these artists in the physical spaces of the exhibition (from 
June 21 to September 28 1997) in addition to the website was understandable. Because 
the media art project was commissioned and developed during the last year of 
preparation for the exhibition, Simon Lamunière justified the choice of the documenta-
Halle, to host the showroom for the artists, because all of the other spaces were already 
occupied.332 In addition, the documenta-Halle was interesting for the curator because it 
hosted the auditorium dedicated to the 100 days - 100 guests conferences and 
discussions. Consequently, the media art works would be presented in close proximity 
to the symbolic heart of the documenta, given that the tenth edition was strongly 
focused on ideas and debates. The question of how to present works created with a 
computer and to be viewed on a computer, additionally exploiting the interactivity of 
the Internet, has certainly gone through many discussions and difficult decisions. 
Eventually, the works selected by Lamunière were presented with an elementary 
disposition of ten white aluminium tables and red office chairs. Each table was provided 
with a computer and a monitor, together with a file holder displaying the documentation 
of the artists. The room was conceived by Heimo Zobernig, who created a closed space, 
in which the walls were painted in ultramarine blue. Zobernig, who also imagined the 
auditorium for the 100 days - 100 guests conferences, described his idea behind the 
internet room in a project submitted to the curator: "This room is conceived to be 
autonomous from its functional use, having neutral aesthetic and sculptural qualities."333 
                                                            
332 Simon Lamunière, interview with the author in Geneva, 7 January 2013. 
333 "Dieser Raum ist so konzipiert, dass er unabhängig von seiner funktionalen Verwendung, selbständig 
ästhetisch/skulpturale Qualitäten hat" Heimo Zobernig, "Letter to Catherine David - Einrichtung für 
ein UTV-Fernsehstudio", 10.2.1997 (documenta Archive Kassel: D10, Mappe 336), my translation 





This paragraph confirms the intention to create a neutral space for the presentation of 
works of computer art. 
 
Once open to the public, the showroom conceived by Zobernig was quickly associated 
with an office space, not without criticism from some of the journalists that described it. 
Michael Gibbs from Art Monthly, affirmed that: "The presentation of the internet 
projects at the documenta-Halle, where they are relegated to a sterile, office-like space 
under the stairs, with standard grey computers sitting on an array of tables, could have 
been more imaginatively designed."334 Der Tagesspiegel of Berlin, described the space 
in analogous terms, while questioning its appropriateness: "The Internet room of the 
documenta appears as nothing else but a modern large office. (…) The display of 
‘immaterial’ net art confronts curators with entirely new problems. It is unlikely that in 
the future the presentation of net art will resemble the one at documenta."335 The 
choices behind the presentation of the works in the physical space reflected the will of 
the curators to integrate the works into the general discourse and visions of the 
documenta. For Catherine David, it was important that the works of computer art were 
part of the show. However, during the press conference presenting the website project, 
she made the following observation: "Of the concentric circles which constitute the 
cultural event documenta X, the website is so to speak the outermost ring."336 The 
outermost ring could be interpreted as the one closer to the public and the outside world, 
which is comprehensible, because the Internet is conceived as a portal between the 
documenta and the world. On the other hand, one could speculate that the ‘outermost 
ring’ is the furthermost ring from the core concerns of the curator, the reason why she 
delegated the curatorial project to Simon Lamunière and a possible explanation as to 
why the physical presentation of the works was conceived when ‘everything was 
already taken’.337 In an email to Simon Lamunière,338 Catherine David asked him to 
                                                            
334 Michael Gibbs, "On and Off Line at documenta X", Art Monthly, September 1997 (documenta 
Archive Kassel: d10, Mappe 40), 51. 
335 "So sieht der Internet-Raum der documenta nicht anders als ein modernes Grossraum-Büro. (...) Die 
Präsentation der 'immaterialen' Netzkunst stellt Ausstellungskuratoren von vollkommen neue 
Probleme. Dass die Präsentation von Netzkunst in Zukunft so aussehen wird wie auf der documenta, 
darf bezweifelt warden" Tilman Baumgärtel, "Das Reich ohne Sinne", Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin 
(02.08.1997) (documenta Archive Kassel: d10, Mappe 34), my translation from the German. 
336 Catherine David, "Statement", March 21 1997 (documenta Archive Kassel: d10, Mappe 275). 
337 Simon Lamunière, interview with the author in Geneva, 7 January 2013. 





manage all the correspondence with the artists involved in the media art project. Indeed, 
there is not one single exchange between Jodi, for example, and Catherine David in the 
archive of the documenta, beside a succinct contract. 
 
The decision to create a showroom similar to an office was in part dictated by finance 
and space availability, it was nonetheless a curatorial decision. Simon Lamunière 
clearly did not intend to create a metaphor of the Internet with a theatrical setting; he 
wasn’t interested in creating a place resembling a futuristic stage. In interpreting his 
curatorial choices, one could conclude that he took particular care not to create the 
impression of the media art showroom as an expression of an ingenuous fascination for 
modern technologies. During a personal interview, Lamunière described to me his 
vision of the showroom: "I told myself that we had to create a familiar environment to 
show all these works, because at that time there were only technological exhibitions, 
with Plexiglas furniture and all that. I wanted to create a very simple environment 
resembling either an office or a library."339 This description supports the hypothesis that 
the curator desired to avoid any association with a technophile ideology, for his media 
art exhibition. The simplicity of the Internet showroom corresponded to the general 
curatorial aesthetic of documenta which privileged content over form, discourse over 
aesthetic celebration. 
 
An additional concern that the curator had to face, however, was the online connection 
itself. The question was whether the work presented in the showroom should be actually 
connected to the Internet, during the opening hours of the exhibition. Some of the works 
selected could easily be presented off-line, with little modification to their original 
presentation in a web environment, but some would lose their distinctive character. This 
was particularly true for Jodi, whose work was not only created for the Internet, but also 
exploited web resources to generate its chaotic output. The generative aspect of the 
work by Jodi, which was the aesthetic characteristic of their work, required an Internet 
connection to function. The logical solution was then to supply an online connection 
and allow the work to function as intended. Furthermore, documenta was supported by 
                                                            
339 "Je me suis dit qu’il fallait créer une ambience familière pour montrer ça, parce que à l’époque il n’y 
avait que des expositions technoides, avec des sièges en coque plastique, etc. Je voulais créer un 
environnement extrèmement simple qui ressemblait soit au bureau soit à une bibliothèque" Simon 





sponsors IBM and SBK Software + Systeme, who provided financial and technical 
support for the event, motivated by the fact that the Internet project was an important 
and innovative feature of the tenth edition of documenta. The final decision reached by 
the curators, however, opposed the installation of an active online connection for the 
benefit of those works presented in the showroom. In the end, there was no connection 
and the works were shown off-line, with the content locally stored in the hard disk of 
the computers. This decision quite understandably generated vivid debate. 
 
The controversial decision to present the works off-line, was indeed made for curatorial 
reasons instead of technical ones. Simon Lamunière feared that the showroom would 
become an Internet cafe in which visitors would rather read their emails and surf the 
web, instead of consulting the works. He wanted the spectators to focus on the media art 
works, not on the Internet. By refusing to provide an Internet connection, while 
simulating it and having all the data stored in each hard drive, the curator ensured that 
the public would concentrate exclusively on the selected works. In addition, only one 
work was displayed in each computer station, a choice resembling curatorial standards 
of more traditional artworks, in which each individual work is attributed its own space 
of presentation. This curatorial strategy reflects Lamunière’s opinion that computer art 
should be discussed and exhibited under the same conditions of presentation used in the 
visual arts. This is, above all, the reason why he resolved not to provide an online 
connection in the showroom of the documenta-Halle, despite the fact that it was to be 
regarded as a contradictory one. In addition, Simon Lamunière had another concern, 
namely that the website would be attacked by hackers. Indeed, he confided that in the 
three months prior to the opening of the documenta, when the website was already 
online, it has been subject to several attacks.340 He confirmed that the attacks were not 
claimed, nor was it clear why they had been perpetrated. Nevertheless, it was a concern 
that played a role in his decision to keep the works offline in the hall. 
 
Despite the decision to exhibit the work offline, the presentation of the artists whose 
work appeared on the website went ahead in the documenta-Halle, and their presence 
                                                            





was also acknowledged in the official plan and list of the exhibition.341 To adapt to the 
situation of the showroom and the absence of online connection, Jodi displayed another 
work in the physical space of documenta, instead of the one presented online. In the 
documenta-Halle, they installed an adaptation of their recent work map.jodi.org (1997), 
a personal interpretation of an interactive map of the web, inspired by diagrams 
showing the most important institutions related to the internet, diagrams that were 
circulating on the Internet at that time. The artists changed the links to the institutions 
appearing in the original maps and replaced them with websites dedicated to alternative 
and creative uses of the Internet. However, because the showroom in the documenta-
Halle was not provided with access to the Internet, Jodi intentionally programmed the 
computer to crash when a user clicked on one of the links of the map.342 
 
While the room dedicated to works of net art in the hall of the documenta did not have 
internet access, the works presented online on the exhibition’s website were obviously 
available to everyone. The website, accessible three months prior to the opening and 
throughout the whole period of the exhibition, was conceived by the curator as a 
platform to provide practical information, display the works of computer art and offer a 
forum to discuss the event. The website was structured in a rather functional way, with 
pictograms composed by the curator, allowing a fairly intuitive navigation. As a 
pioneering example of a website presenting these specific works of art, it would have 
been advisable to keep the website online after the exhibition in Kassel had ended, 
thereby providing an online documentation of the works. Nevertheless, the website was 
closed at the end of the event. The decision was taken by Lamunière himself, who 
decided that the website, as an experiment of computer and internet art during 
documenta X, should be limited to that period of time. Above all, the curator feared that 
the website, if it was kept active after the show and beyond his care, would be modified 
with the time, with new information replacing old, as is the norm with the majority of 
websites. It was therefore a logical decision for Simon Lamunière and Catherine David 
to close the site. In their view, although it might appear to be a contradiction, the 
decision to close the website was intended as a means to better preserve it. After the 
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exhibition, the content of the website was transferred and stored in a CD-ROM, 
produced by documenta in several editions available for purchase. 
 
This decision, again, was not met with favourable criticism, in particular by some of the 
artists and critical theorists involved in the media art field. Vuk Ćosić, a Slovenian 
computer artist collaborating with the cluster of theorists and artists subscribed to the 
mailing list Nettime and who founded the Ljudmila digital media art lab in Ljubljana, 
copied the whole documenta website after its official closing and made it available 
online on his own website.343 The artist provocatively considered the copy of the 
website as a work of his own, sometimes referring to it as a ready-made of the new 
Internet era.344 This provocative action contributed to the international recognition of 
Vuk Ćosić, who would represent Slovenia at the Venice Biennale, in 2001. He also 
intended to preserve the site of the documenta, the works created for it and at the same 
time to elicit debate on the problematic position of artists engaging with ephemeral 
media such as computers and the Internet. Simon Lamunière and Bernd Leifeld, the 
managing director of documenta X, discussed the fact in a series of email exchanges.345 
The managing director questioned if the act by the Slovenian artist was an act of piracy 
and whether the Institution should prosecute the artist. In his reply, Lamunière 
suggested that they avoid engaging in any legal action, although he declared that he did 
consider the act to be one of piracy. The dialogue between prominent personalities in 
the media art world and traditional institutions of art was evidently not without friction 
even in the nineties. 
                                                            
343  See, for example, the article reporting the event by Tapio Mäkelä, "Tales from Deep Europe", in 
SIKSI magazine, n.4, Winter 1997. 
344  Vuk Ćosić, interview with the author in Ljubljana, 25 November 2012. 






Figure 25   View of the media art showroom in the documenta-Halle in 1997.  










Figure 26   View of the media art showroom in the documenta-Halle in 1997.  










4.5 Reception of Media Art  
documenta X was visited by 629,000 people, surpassing the number of visitors of all the 
previous editions, although this increase should be seen within the context of an upward 
trend, which characterised all future editions of the festival. The total budget for the 
event was of 21.73 million DM, while the website project directed by Simon Lamunière 
had an estimated budget of 200,000 DM.346 The final documenta X report does not list 
the costs of the website project separately, but an intermediary budget submitted by 
Lamunière at the end of the show, in September 1997, indicates that the costs did not 
surpass the previous estimate.347 The number of visitors, and the administration of the 
budget were testament to a successful event, although the success of an exhibition 
cannot be measured in numbers alone. What was the reception of the event on a more 
qualitative level? How were the works of computer art presented in the showroom of 
the documenta-Halle - in particular the work by Jodi - critically received by press from 
the art world and in general? Analysis of the articles written during the documenta X 
exhibition provides some answers to these questions. 
 
As a first observation, it can be said that the articles published in some of the important 
newspapers in Europe, reveal a mixed reception of documenta X. In France in 
particular, the work of Catherine David was met with harsh criticism; however, critics 
in Germany, Italy and the United States also questioned her work. The most recurrent 
objection to David’s curatorial approach was that she gave too much emphasis to 
concept and content at the expense of form and aesthetic. documenta X was sometimes 
criticised as being too pretentious, sometimes too obscure, while others even considered 
it boring or lacking artistic interest. 
 
                                                            
346 The information concerning the number of visitors and the total budget are indicated in the official 
website of the documenta Archive: 
http://www.kassel.de/miniwebs/documentaarchiv_e/08205/index.html. 
347 The documents concerning the website project, the estimated budget and intermediary report are in the 





But a more interesting observation is that documenta X was, from the very start, 
associated with new technologies and media art. This is probably a consequence of the 
artistic director’s curatorial position stressing that artworks should not be separated 
according to technique but rather according to conceptual and thematic qualities, which 
also played a significant role in the selection of the works. The important involvement 
of photography, video and computer art - whose presence at documenta X was 
perceived as disproportionate compared to more traditional techniques - fitted an 
approach more oriented towards questions related to documenting and investigating 
contemporary society, which was valued by the curator. 
 
Ken Johnson’s article covering documenta X, for Art in America, was entitled "A post-
Retinal documenta."348 Benita Munitz, from Cape Times, gave her review the playful 
title "It’s virtually art at show"349 while Il Giornale dell'Arte, in the title of its review, 
states that documenta X is "da cliccare più che da vedere,"350 that is to say: the 
exhibition offers more to click than to see. Another Italian newspaper, La Repubblica, 
offered a comparison of the documenta exhibition with the Venice Biennale taking 
place in the same year, an exercise undertaken by many art critics, particularly in Italy. 
The title of the article was again an allusion to the alleged technological penchant of the 
exhibition in Kassel: "Chi ha paura della tecnologia?" (Who is afraid of technology?). 
Interviewed by Paolo Vagheggi, the artist Fabrizio Plessi affirmed that if the Venice 
Biennale was too traditional, the documenta had fell in the opposite traps of complying 
too much with new technologies: 
 
The problem of Kassel is to have opened a path in opposition to the Venetian 
one. I believe that the two poles should cohabit. Art involved with technologies 
shouldn’t be a substitutive one. (…) Catherine David shifted too much to the 
opposite end of the spectrum, because technologies should instead be elevated 
to an appropriate level of cultural dignity, otherwise they will persist as mere 
experiments.351 
                                                            
348 Ken Johnson, "A Post-Retinal documenta", in Art in America, October 1997 (documenta Archive 
Kassel: d10, Mappe41), 81. 
349 Benita Munitz, "It’s virtually art at show", in Cape Times, 24 July 1997 (documenta Archive Kassel: 
d10, Mappe40). 
350 Mary Rozell Hopkins, "documenta X: da cliccare più che da vedere", in Il Giornale dell'Arte, n.156, 
June 1997 (documenta Archive Kassel: d10, Mappe 44). 
351 "Il problema di Kassel è di avere individuato una strada che è in contrapposizione a quella veneziana. 
Ritengo invece che i due poli debbano convivere. Quella delle tecnologie non è un'arte sostitutiva. (...) 
Catherine David si è spostata troppo sul fronte opposto anche perché le tecnologie devono essere 






The general impression that the 1997 edition of the documenta was burdened by new 
technologies is acknowledged by Robert Storr, as well. In an interview with Catherine 
David for Artforum, the American critic questioned the French curator about the rumour 
preceding the opening of the event:  
 
Robert Storr: The word is out that documenta will lean very heavily toward 
video, toward technological arts of one kind or another. Is that true? Catherine 
David: No, it’s not true at all. (...) I think we did the opposite of a technological 
show, and I hope that we worked carefully enough that the question of 
technology versus art won’t be relevant. That’s a very old debate, and we’ve 
been neither naively pro-technology nor have we been treating new media as 
the contemporary incarnation of Satan. I think that new media are simply 
tools.352 
 
Even if Catherine David affirmed in the printed statements, in the website and during 
the interviews that she was not interested in new technologies and media art per se and 
dismissed the idea that her exhibition was a technological one, the image of a 
documenta leaning towards new technologies in art and discarding older ones is evident 
in the writings of journalists that attended the event. The reactions were mixed, but in 
the case of the critics who wrote a rather negative review of the event, the importance 
given to new media was just one of the arguments posited in discrediting the curatorial 
work. 
 
The technological inclination of the documenta X exhibition might have been 
exaggerated by journalists and dismissed by Catherine David, nonetheless the media art 
room curated by Simon Lamunière was indeed an exercise in the presentation of media 
art work to a wider public. It is therefore interesting to consider, apart from the general 
criticism, how this specific venue and the work presented were received, and in 
particular the work by Jodi. Several local newspapers dedicated an article to the website 
project, mainly after its presentation during the press conference. Very often, these 
articles simply report the information about the project without providing any elaborate 
criticism. This is possibly due to the lack of a theoretical framework, which would have 
allowed for an analysis of the computer art works presented. Some authoritative 
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positions in the general press, venture into a deeper analysis of the project. The reaction 
is not always positive: Caro Maurer und Marion Leske, in an article entitled 
"Irritationen im Internet" which appeared in Die Welt prior to the opening of the 
exhibition, wrote "Here is the Internet at its best: even online art lives more from 
explanations and less from perceptions." The authors suggested that the "cyber artists 
irritate more than they inform" and finally concluded that "perhaps it is better that we 
continue our live tour on our own and we let the reality in Kassel itself surprise us."353 
Even more radical were the reviews of some important newspaper correspondents 
following visits to the exhibition and the website works presented in the documenta-
Halle. Waldemar Januszczak from The Sunday Time calls it a "Poor Show", (the title of 
the article), while he addresses the works of computer art with the following statement: 
"There are Web sites on which an international assortment of artistic complainants click 
their way through endless lists of laments upon the way our cultural lives have 
developed."354 Der Spiegel specifically addressed the presentation of the works in the 
documenta-Halle reporting that: "In order to prevent visitors from surfing around at 
will, the internet connection stops at the wall." The conclusion of the influential German 
weekly news magazine was rather sceptical: "With all the theorizing and good-
intentioned artistic activism, on the Website the results are ultimately too messy. 
Quivering video clips and flashing English texts are sorely missing a formal layout."355 
These examples show that, for the most part, the works of computer art selected for the 
website and showroom were criticized by journalists from non-specialised media. 
 
While the supposed technological inclination of the documenta X received a rather 
unenthusiastic reaction by the general press, the media showroom was fairly positively 
received by the periodicals specialized in contemporary art. Art in America dedicated a 
                                                            
353 "Da ist das Internet ganz auf der Höhe der Zeit: Auch die Online-Kunst lebt mehr von der Erklärung 
als von der Anschauung (…)Cyberkünstler halten mehr Irritation als Information parat (…) so weit 
unser mehrstündiger Ausflug in die virtuellen Künste. Vielleicht doch besser, wir reisen live und 
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Marion Leske, "Irritationen im Internet", in Die Welt, 4.4.1997 (documenta Archive Kassel: d10, 
Mappe 34), my translation from the German. 
354 Waldemar Januszczak, "A poor show", in The Sunday Times, 29 Jun 1997 (documenta Archive 
Kassel: D10, Mappe 40), 11. 
355 "Damit Besucher nicht etwa beliebig und kunstferne umhersurfen, reicht das Internet halt nur bis zum 
Wandstecker (…)Bei allem Theoretisieren und gutgemeintem Künstler-Aktionismus: Auf der Website 
geht es am Ende gar zu unübersichtlich zu. Zitternde Videoclips und vorbeiflitzende englische Texte 
lassen formale Gestaltung schmerzlich vermissen." "Ausser Sichtweite", in Der Spiegel, 31.7.1997, 





section to the media art presence at the documenta, with an article by Christopher 
Phillips, sustaining that: "this first-ever documenta presence on the Internet marked an 
unexpectedly bold artistic advance into the digital frontier."356 Wolf-Günter Thiel, 
writing for the international edition of Flash Art, integrated the website project room, 
together with the Hybrid Working Space dedicate to media art as well, in the list of 
places that "are valid and worth visiting."357 Andreas Broeckmann, affirms that "the 
tenth documenta has the ambition to be sensitive about social problems and to break the 
narrow boarders of art." After describing the website project, he concluded that "the 
chances are not bad for this."358 
 
For what concerns the artist duo Jodi, in particular, their work often appeared as an 
image supplementing the article in the general press, but it was rarely described and 
analysed in the body of the article itself. The description of the work by Jodi was often 
limited to the photo legend. Some journalists simply described it as "Eine Internet-
Seite" (an Internet site)359 while others further described it as an "ironische –website" 
(an ironic website).360 Torben Müller, writing for the Neue Presse from Hannover, 
provided a more elaborated legend for the work of Jodi: "Chaos as artwork: the 'jodi'-
project on the documenta website shocks Apple-users with fallacious virus attacks."361  
 
On the rare occasions that the work by the artists was actually discussed in the article, it 
was generally positively received. For Die Welt, the artists "play with the absurdity of 
all the available data and ironize – albeit somehow weakly – the users wandering in the 
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labyrinth."362 For the Neue Presse, Jodi "creates a completely new and unusual PC-
environment."363 Finally, for the Frankfurte Allgemeine Zeitung, Christoph Blase wrote 
that: 
 
Joan Heemskerk and Dirk Paesmans engage the visitors of 'jodi.org' with visual 
effects throwing a new picture on the screen with every click, giving the 
impression that one has slipped into several wrong programs and at the same 
time that the computer has crashed. In this way, the question of the aesthetics of 
the user interface is approached with a subtle irony.364  
 
Quite surprisingly, if on the one hand works of computer art in general and the alleged 
technological inclination of the exhibition were condemned by the non-specialised 
press, on the other the few articles describing Jodi’s work rather praised its ludicrous 
charm.  
 
The press specialised in contemporary art was even more explicit in its positive 
response to the work of Jodi. For Texte zur Kunst, Gerrit Gohlke wrote:  
 
In this irresolution, in which art is placed next to simple information, the 
projects that flirt with the aesthetics of sabotage are those that best assert 
themselves. Joan Heemskerk and Dirk Paesman have staged an effective game 
with the horrors of the use of computers, bringing by means of frustrated 
expectations, as well as through many 'Without Addresses' the reading process 
itself to consciousness.365  
 
Andreas Broeckmann clearly considered the duo to be two of the most interesting 
protagonists in computer art on the web:   
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For many years, Jodi’s website has been considered among the most 
interesting, curious and best ones. (…) For the documenta, Jodi also work, 
among other things, on their virus-site.366 
 
Michael Gibbs, writing for the Art Monthly, described their work in the following 
terms:  
 
Jodi's extraordinary and subversive delvings into the heart of electronic syntax, 
featuring cascading graphics that play havoc with the idea of 'user interface'.367  
 
Writing for Art in America, Ken Johnson, although critical of most of the computer art 
works at the documenta, regarded the work created by Jodi as one of the few interesting 
one: 
 
On the other hand, there was an amusing Internet piece by a programming team 
called Jodi (Barcelona) which gave you an absurd collage of generic menus, 
windows and icons that multiplied ridiculously as time passed – a clever play 
on the new vernacular environment of virtual life, but hardly mind-altering.368 
 
What is interesting to retain, particularly from the articles that dedicated a few lines of 
comment to Jodi's work, is that it is precisely their subversive approach to computer 
technology that is usually stressed as interesting and innovative. This is exactly the 
aspect that the curator of the website project, Simon Lamunière, as we have previously 
observed, considered important in his selection of the works. It is probable that the 
reaction of the press was in part influenced by the curatorial positions divulged during 
the press release and in the short guide presenting the works. However, it also confirms 
that works of computer art were ready to be accepted within a cultural show as long 
they presented an ironic and playful critique of modern technologies and machines. 
 
If Jodi’s contribution to the documenta X received favourable reviews both from the 
general press as well as from the specialised one, the reaction of the artists themselves 
concerning the presentation of their work has been a different one. The website created 
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by Simon Lamunière hosted a forum in which artists, critics and the public were invited 
to post comments on the event. Joan Heemskerk and Dirk Paesmans posted the 
following single comment:  
 
The net.room simulates an office; with office-tables, office-chairs, office-desk 
furniture, all organised 'just like at the office'. This office-setting was 'specially 
created for the presentation of 9 artist's net.projects in documenta X. It's an 
unnecessary confusing symbolical construct, built without the consultation of 
the artists. Net.projects don't need such metaphors when presented in real-space 
exhibits, as tv-monitors don't need a home-decor around them for viewing 
video. The office-cliché also sucks because it gives a false group-label to artists 
whose only thing in common is their use of the net, and categorises them, in 
opposition to the rest of the exhibition, by technique.369  
 
The artists are obviously unhappy with the presentation of their work, from their 
comment it appears clear that they considered the presentation at documenta and its 
setting to be inappropriate. They also complained about having not been consulted by 
the curator. In their opinion, the works didn’t need a metaphorical setting to be 
appreciated, a position that should have matched the one of the curator who stressed 
how important for him it was to focus the attention on the works. Yet, in Jodi’s opinion, 
the office setting was not the proper one. As the two artists asserted several times, they 
were convinced that their work would be better experienced on one’s own personal 
computer. Nevertheless, for a presentation of their work in an exhibition space another 
solution was necessary. What would have been the suitable solution for the artists? 
 
During an interview with Tilman Baumgaertel, reproduced on the mailing list Nettime, 
Dirk Paesmans is questioned about alternative ways of presenting their work in a 
physical place. The artist emphasised the importance of collaboration with the artists 
involved, instead of mandating the conception of the setting to another artist such as 
Heimo Zobernig, as was the case in Kassel. In his words:  
 
I personally think that if you have a space and decide to show net works, you 
can also present it to people who are not used to computers. And you could also 
give the artists the opportunity to add things to their installation. I think it is 
very important for net artists to deal with the presentation, or they will be re-
presented by other people; for example, designers who are asked to design to 
exhibition space. That's the worst. One should avoid that at all costs. All the 
different works disappear in the set up by the one guy who deals with the real 
                                                            






space. The real space is of course much more powerful than all these networks. 
When you are viewing the work you are in the real space. If you only do your 
work on the net, you become a fragment of the local situation and you can 
easily become manipulated in any direction.370 
 
Jodi’s concern about the presentation of their work in the documenta-Halle was 
perceived as even more disappointing because it was the first important occurrence of a 
presentation of works of Internet art in an international context. Concerning the office 
metaphor, as a setting to display their work, they affirmed that: "it is vulgar, it's too 
easy. It doesn't work." Additionally, they feared that "it will be repeated over and over 
again."371 The apprehension that the website project - both the online website and the 
media art showroom in the documenta-Halle - would become a paradigm for the 
presentation of works of computer art created on the web was also expressed by other 
media artists. Alexei Shulgin, Russian artist and curator, founder of the WWW-Art-Lab 
in Moscow, criticised not only the setting of the documenta showroom, but the 
curatorial selection of the works, as well. 
 
Since there is practically no critical context for net.art, we have really a big 
mess in this kind of approach and selection. Look at the documenta site 
[www.documenta.de]. It has a very different quality and trend and base works 
promoted as art works, it’s because of this mess, of the impossibility to 
contextualise net.art.372 
 
The participation of media art at the 1997 edition of documenta was awaited with both 
expectation and apprehension. In the end, after the initial fears of a technological show 
and some negative reviews of the curatorial approach, the general press - but more 
specifically the press specialised in visual art - welcomed the artists participating in the 
website project, in particular Jodi, with an overall positive reception. It is from the 
artist's corner, more particularly the artists engaged in the emerging Internet art cluster, 
that disapproval of curatorial choices concerning the selection and presentation of the 
works was strongest. 
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4.6 The Significance of documenta for Jodi  
Although Joan Heemskerk and Dirk Paesmans criticised the presentation of their work 
in Kassel, disagreeing with the design choices of the room and its situation ‘under the 
stairs’ and ‘behind a cafeteria’, along with the decision to create a specific section for 
computer and internet art, their work did not go unnoticed. Reproductions of their work 
were published both in the general and dedicated press who seem to have appreciated 
and correctly interpreted their defiant use of media technologies. Jodi’s website was 
characterised as ironic, amusing, playful and even subversive. How significant was 
Jodi’s participation in documenta for their future career? 
 
The first important recognition for the artists arrived one year after their participation in 
the exhibition in Kassel. In 1998, the artist duo was awarded the first prize of the 
Videokunstpreis at the ZKM in Karlsruhe, a prize founded in 1992 and open to a variety 
of media techniques since 1997. The Jury supported the decision with the following 
statement:  
 
JODI are among the first to do 'field research' in the realm of digital data. Not 
unlike the pioneers of early video art, who examined the 'inherent possibilities 
of the medium', JODI work with the materiality of pictures and text fragments 
of the user's desk top which they recombine and collage through their work. 
Consequential, analytic, and with a dash of irony, they demonstrate the 
'cussedness of the computer'.373  
 
The Hessische/Niedersächsische Allgemeine newspaper, relating the event, linked their 
winning of the award to their previous participation at documenta: "The multimedia 
artist Joan Heemsker and Dirk Paesmans participated in the internet artistic project of 
last year’s documenta X. For the CD-ROM they have been awarded the main prize of 
30’000 marks."374 The following year, in 1999, Peter Weibel curated net_condition, an 
exhibition questioning the Internet and presenting artists working with this new media. 
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The exhibition, in which Jodi participated, was held in Karlsruhe, Graz, Barcelona and 
Tokyo.  
 
The Internet became a popular topic at the end of the millennium and several 
exhibitions and publications were created to present a selection of artists, in which Jodi 
were often involved. The November 2000 edition of the magazine DU was entirely 
dedicated to media art and the Internet. The title of the edition was suggestive: "Net.Art. 
Rebellen im Internet."375 Jodi were invited to contribute to the edition with images from 
their website that would run all through the content of the edition, providing the visual 
background of many articles. ESC, a publication edited by the Media Arts Lab des 
Künstlerhauses Bethanien, offered a first chronology of the history of net.art, while 
boldly affirming its death in 1999. The majority of works that were presented at 
documenta X, including the work by Jodi, were mentioned in the chronology of the 
publication.  
 
In 2002, the artistic duo was invited to create a solo show at Plug-in, an exhibition space 
in Basel dedicated exclusively to digital and media art directed by Annette Schindler. 
The exhibition was completed with a first monograph publication of their work, edited 
by Annette Schindler and Tilman Baumgaertel. In the publication, Jodi were presented 
as a new generation of media artists. In the catalogue, Josephine Bosman stressed that 
"with the development of cheap and easy to use technology, a new breed of media artist 
has emerged. Media artists of today do not necessarily respect the tools they work with 
and they do not always control them, either."376 On a same note, Florian Cramer 
situated the work of the artists in the tradition of software and generative art, although 
challenging and subverting the usual strategies and approaches of the genre; in his 
words: "Jodi no longer synthesize instruction codes, but for the first time use them 
intertextually, as found material."377 From these examples, we can deduce that the 
subversive and rebellious character of Jodi’s approach in the new media art field 
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established very quickly after the first international presentation of their work at 
documenta. 
 
It is difficult to appreciate the role played by the website project at documenta X in the 
career of the artists, but the response of the press, the prize at ZKM and the invitations 
to participate in many exhibitions and publications that multiplied in the following years 
suggest that documenta X has played a significant role for Jodi. On the other hand, if 
Jodi became an iconic duo in the new media art scene and are still considered among 
the few pioneers that shaped the emerging net.art movement, their success was often 
circumscribed to the new media art field. Analysis of their recent biography mentions 
some participation in important institutions such as the Centre Pompidou in Paris, 
Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam and New Modern Museum in New York. 
Nevertheless, these participations were usually smaller contributions to group shows or 
activities thematically centred on new technologies: the great majority of the exhibitions 
to which Jodi participated in the years after documenta X were hosted by institutions 
specifically dedicated to media art. The media showroom in Kassel provided a chance 
for media artists such as Jodi to enter the door of the traditional art circuit. Catherine 
David's curatorial approach was driven by the conviction that it made no sense to 
distinguish between a diversity of techniques in art, and thus between new media and 
traditional art. However, the separation of the field of media art from the traditional art 
world seemed to grow wider after documenta X. During the exhibition in Kassel, 
Michael Gibbs, writing for Art Monthly, raised a question that, in light of the current 
debate concerning the alleged digital divide, could appear prophetic: 
 
The internet projects presented as part of documenta X may be state-of-the-art 
at the moment, but will such works ever become art of the state. In other words, 
can they be co-opted into the traditional art system? Or will they have to be 
content with a virtual, ephemeral existence, viewed only by like-minded 
aficionados?378  
 
According to the majority of actors involved in the media art field today, and despite the 
intentions manifested by David and Lamunière, it seems that the evolution of media art 
has leaned towards the second, most pessimistic option envisaged by Gibbs. 
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4.7 Subversive Drives in Media Art 
The presentation of media art at documenta X, and more particularly the participation of 
Jodi, was an important moment in the history of computer art. It also provides some 
interesting new elements for the analysis of the relationship between media art and the 
traditional contemporary art world, to which the exhibition in Kassel belongs and is 
among the most important international venues.  
 
From the analysis of the curatorial criteria and the choices that were made in the 
selection of the artists for the website project, it emerges that a lot of emphasis was put 
on works that privileged an artistic approach over a technological one. Particular value 
was given to an approach that presented a critical and even subversive position towards 
the technologies used. From the analysis of the presentation of the works and their 
integration in the main exhibition curated by Catherine David, it appears that the artistic 
director considered the participation of media artists at documenta to be important, 
nevertheless she affirmed very clearly that works should not be divided by techniques 
and that the works of computer art created for the website should be integrated into the 
show. The presence of media work was furthermore supported by important sponsors 
that contributed financially and with technical backing to the realisation of the event. 
However, the website project and showroom was not directly curated by Catherine 
David, it was delegated to Simon Lamunière. Additionally, the showroom was 
conceived at the last moment and relegated to a place that the artists deemed 
inappropriate. No online connection was made available for works that needed it and 
the website was taken down at the end of the event. Furthermore, the invitation 
extended to media artists to engage with online works on the event’s website that year 
was never repeated in the following editions of the event. 
 
Analysis of the articles that appeared during the event shows that, although the 
exhibition in Kassel was sometimes criticised for being too inclined towards new 
technologies, the specific media art works of the website project, and in particular the 
work by Jodi, were positively received, even more so by the specialised press. The 





expressed their dissatisfaction concerning the presentation of their work, in particular 
the presentation in the physical spaces of the exhibition. Against the wishes of the 
artists, the decisions to display the works offline and to close the website after the show, 
suggest that there was a lack of dialogue or agreement between the artists involved and 
the curator. However, although it is difficult to directly associate the career of the artists 
to their participation at documenta X, it is evident that Jodi developed a very successful 
career in the following years, as has been illustrated in the preceding section. Jodi 
rapidly established themselves as pioneers and leading artists working with computers 
and the Internet. 
 
From the previous observations, we can conclude that the subversive drive that fuelled 
Jodi’s approach in the use of computer and internet, was not only the aspect that 
determined their selection to participate in an important event such as documenta, but 
also what determined their positive reception in the press and what later contributed to 
their successful career. Furthermore, the analysis of Jodi's participation in the 
documenta exhibition allows for more general considerations regarding the 
controversial relationship between new media art and the traditional field of established 
contemporary art institutions to be inferred. Although artistic experiments with new 
technologies were not an invention of the nineties, it is during these years that new 
media art was clearly recognised as a specific approach. Geert Lovink discerns the 
beginning of media art as early as the late eighties: "Despite its numerous predecessors 
and prehistories of telematic art, I see the late 1980s as a starting point when new media 
art hit the surface, specifically tied to the rise of desktop publishing, hypertext, and the 
production of CD-ROMs".379. New media art was not simply associated with the use of 
technologies but was identified as an artistic approach that offered a position, a 
comment on these technologies, in particular information technologies. As the 
documenta case confirms, artists that proposed a critical, subversive approach were 
privileged by curators and critics who identified their work as being representative of 
the emerging media art scene. This hypothesis is sustained by some of the leading 
critics and curators who, at the turn of the millennium, strongly determined the 
                                                            






association of new media with strategies such as hacktivism, tactical media and critical 
approaches.380 
 
documenta X marked an important moment in the history of computer and digital art, a 
moment in which artists overtly manifested a critical position toward information 
technologies and rather misused them in their work. This peculiar subversive drive that 
played a role in the success of media artists and opened to them the door to important 
and international venues, nevertheless, contributed at the same time to the formation of 
a specific field, characterised by dedicated institutions, prizes, festivals, critics and 
curators that strengthened their specificity with regard to the traditional art world. 
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The Myth of the Two Cultures 
In 1971, Herbert W. Franke published an essay on computer art that has been widely 
mentioned in publications concerning this kind of artistic production and considered 
among the first comprehensive analysis of the genre. In the conclusion, he argued that 
computer art plays a fundamental role in our society by facilitating the dialogue 
between the arts and the sciences: in his words, computer art "has clarified the 
interactions between art, technology and science unlike any other medium before".381 
Writing in 1971, Franke predicted that in the decades to come, computer art would 
merge with the traditional world of art and eventually become the most important 
artistic medium. Forty years later, in his essay presenting and discussing the history of 
computer art, Grant D. Taylor laments the fact that this form of production is mostly 
ignored and rejected by the traditional art field.382 According to Taylor, the reasons for 
this situation can be attributed to the persistent association of computer art with the cult 
of machines and new technologies, a fascination disdained by the humanities. However, 
in his narrative encompassing fifty years of artistic production, Taylor does not provide 
the arguments to contradict the association between computer-generated art and the 
techno-utopia ideology. Quite the opposite: he reaffirms Herbert Franke's credo that 
computer, digital and media arts are truly capable of bridging the gap between the 
humanities and the sciences - in reference to the famous separation between the two 
cultures discussed by Charles Percy Snow383 - thus inviting traditional art historians, 
critics and curators to finally appreciate this important contribution to mankind. The 
compelling metaphor of 'bridging the two cultures', as a way to value the significance of 
this artistic production, has been a persuasive and recurring image employed by the 
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most influential media art critics and historians, as I have observed in the analysis of the 
varied narratives offered to approach computer-generated art in the first chapter. 
 
I believe that the use of the metaphor of 'bridging the two cultures' to address computer 
generated, digital and media art is inappropriate and misleading. According to my 
findings, the driving force behind this production, the purpose of the artists and their 
contribution to art and the society, have very little to do with the ambition of bringing 
the humanities and the sciences closer to one another. I am also convinced that this 
metaphor prevents this specific production from being correctly appreciated by the 
larger majority of art historians and curators. Furthermore, I argue that computer art has 
never been completely separated from the so-called traditional art world - which allows 
for the co-existence of dedicated fields - and that this perceived separation has to be 
understood in different terms than the one provided by the majority of critics who 
examined the supposed digital divide. 
 
Before developing my arguments further, let us first consider an illustrative example 
within the field of media art: the presence of Anonymous at the Transmediale festival in 
Berlin in 2012. During the panel "Anonymous Codes: Disruption, Virality and the Lulz" 
(chaired by journalist Krystian Woznicki and featuring presentations by Gabriella 
Coleman, Jacob Appelbaum and Dana Buchzik) a member of the Anonymous 
movement appeared as a special guest via a live broadcast interview. The projected 
appearance of the spokesperson on the large screen behind the panel, hidden behind the 
iconic Guy Fawkes mask and addressing the audience with a disguised voice, was in 
itself quite impressive, but even more so were the arguments put forward to describe 
and justify the movement. While arguing that Anonymous aims at strengthening 
freedom and democracy, in particular by fighting against the censorship of the internet, 
the spokesperson affirmed that the movement does not follow a political agenda nor 
does it comply with a specific ideology. What is more, he claimed that everyone is part 
of Anonymous and that everyone is entitled to initiate action within the community, 
because the movement is not centralized. I had the chance to put a question to the 
spokesperson about the criteria concerning the selection of the actions proposed by the 





agenda upon which the members could discuss and agree as a hindrance to acting 
democratically in the long term. The answer wasn't unexpected: because of its very 
nature as a diaspora of unidentified individuals acting independently, Anonymous could 
not possibly function other than as a decentralized and apolitical movement. The sole 
unifying vision of the movement, conceded by the spokesperson, was the fight for the 
freedom of the internet worldwide. This response is coherent to the analysis of the 
movement made by anthropologist Gabriella Colemann.384 According to her 
investigation, the movement was primarily motivated to carry out their actions simply 
"for the lulz", which in internet slangs stands for 'having fun'.385 It is only with the 
collaboration with WikiLeaks, that a section of the movement became more engaged in 
political actions.386 Nevertheless, Colemann acknowledges that the movement had a 
disruptive force and played a significant role in the Occupy movement. But if 
Anonymous’s apolitical vision is not entirely convincing, what were the reasons behind 
the Transmediale Festival’s decision to host a panel dedicated to the movement, other 
than the obvious purpose of discussing recent media buzz? The published outlet of the 
symposium presents the topic in the following terms: "mixing up with contemporary 
social media culture, being anonymous means to produce a new aesthetics - new 
linguistic codes - where poetic images, disruptive strategies (such as trolling and 
DDoSing) intertwine with multiple possibilities for lulz and pleasure".387 The 
Transmediale Festival’s interest in the activities of Anonymous hence relies mostly on 
its capability to propose 'new aesthetics' and entertainment, rather than on its political 
discourse, let alone the opportunity to bridge the two cultures. 
 
The interest in hacking and cyberactivism is reflected in other important international 
media art festivals in recent years. Julian Assange, for example, was invited to present a 
Special Keynote at the 19th International Symposium on Electronic Art held in Sydney 
in 2013. During the talk, Assange discussed the activities of WikiLeaks and invited 
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artists engaging with digital media to have an impact on society. In 2010, the Ars 
Electronica Festival in Linz focused on the topic of sustainability, naming its edition 
with the suggestive title "Repair". The festival presented symposiums with international 
guests invited to expose their visions on how the modern technologies could be hacked 
and exploited to create tools that can help to fight excessive waste production and 
pollution. It offered an exhibition of innovative do-it-yourself projects along with 
another presenting artists, such as Chris Jordan and Cornelia Hesse-Honegger, who take 
a critical stance on the impact of modern technologies on the environment. Quite 
significantly, the Golden Nica for the digital community category was attributed to the 
German hacker group Chaos Computer Club, a group that subscribes to the hacker ethic 
as described by Steven Levy, encouraging freedom of information and mistrust of the 
authorities.388 After many years of engaging with topics displaying an art and science 
flavour, from artificial intelligence to life science, with its 2010 edition, the Ars 
Electronica festival affirmed the intent to change the perspective of its content and 
engage with more socially engaged topics offering a more critical perspective on 
science and technology. The Italian magazine Neural, another significant voice within 
the media art community established in 1993, covering exclusively media art and 
electronic music, is divided in three sections: Hacktivism, E-Music and New Media Art. 
It is quite remarkable, that the very first section of the publication is dedicated to 
hacktivism: this choice gives a strong identity to the magazine and clearly shows the 
intent to include this practice among the spectrum of subjects associated with digital 
creativity. In this case, the strategies of hacking and cyberactivism are not simply 
discussed as one among the possible topics for the understanding of the contemporary 
artistic production, they are regarded as an integral and indispensable part of the media 
art discussion itself. These examples suggest that the field of media art today favours 
disruptive strategies and technology criticism, rather than following the aspiration of 
bridging the humanities and the sciences.  
 
Hacking and cyberactivism became prominent within the artistic production during the 
nineties (with artists like etoy, RTMark and the Yes Men), when the term new media art 
started to be adopted as an umbrella term to bring together artistic productions 
                                                            






associated with the use of digital and information technologies, as proposed by Geert 
Lovink, who identifies "the late 1980s as a starting point when new media art hit the 
surface".389 The computer art showroom presented at documenta X in 1997 reflects this 
particular turning point. Analysis of the selection process of the artists that participated 
in this event, clearly demonstrate that the confrontational approach of the artist versus 
the machine was an important aspect for the curator of the exhibition: the artists 
selected to participate in this exhibition were mainly chosen because of their rebellious 
and provocative attitude not only toward the computing machine, but also concerning 
the implementation of information technologies within the society. They were not 
selected because they displayed a profound understanding of computer languages and 
digital tools, nor because of their ambition to parallel the scientific research. The artists 
selected to represent computer art in the last documenta of the century, offered on the 
contrary a rather pessimistic view of machines and information technologies, as 
exemplified by the work of Jodi. 
 
The analysis of the documenta case incites the hypothesis that the confrontational 
attitude to machines and technologies, which would constitute a distinctive feature of 
media art production after the nineties, was encouraged by the actors of the traditional 
institutions of art. Margot Lovejoy, in her historical survey of digital art, mentions the 
dilemma of artists working with new technologies, confronted by the critical stance of 
many cultural critics that "are averse to even recognizing their works" because "they so 
deeply distrust technology and the losses it will bring in the future that they often do not 
want to look at an art that uses it as a means of representation".390 Both Lovejoy and 
Taylor pointed out that the humanities, including fine art historians and curators, always 
considered modern technologies, and in particularly computers, with a sceptical eye. 
Furthermore, the investigation of the positions of artists participating in the debate 
against the top-down methodology of the traditional artificial intelligence research, 
during the eighties and nineties, confirms that the discourse developed within the 
humanities supporting a critical stance against modern technologies and computers was 
mirrored in artistic production. As already advanced in the conclusion of the third 
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chapter, artificial intelligence has been strongly criticized by researchers, philosophers 
and artists alike, while the computing machine has often been regarded as a product of 
military research, on the one hand, and as an instrument of capitalism and its modern 
exploitation of labour, on the other. But it is not only the association with capitalism 
and military research that affected the artistic development within this production: the 
emergence of new scientific fields of research such as artificial life and embodied 
robotics, with a strong emphasis on the bottom-up approach, certainly contributed to 
discrediting artificial intelligence research as obsolete and uninteresting: the criticism 
moved by the partisans of the bottom-up approach against traditional artificial 
intelligence reiterated the idea that the latter was founded on an archaic vision of the 
cognitive properties of humans. With the passing of time, artificial intelligence and its 
emblematic instrument, the computer, have been observed with growing suspicion. 
Eventually, these unapologetic visions of the computing machine opened the way for 
the subversive approaches within digital and media art. 
 
Cyberactivist strategies in art are not a singular occurrence restricted to the emergence 
of media art during the nineties: many recent works engage in similar practices. For 
example, Google Will Eat Itself (2005), the collaborative work by Paolo Cirio, 
Alessandro Ludovico and Ubermorgen, is an explicitly disruptive project that aims at 
eventually overthrowing Google Inc. by exploiting the financial mechanisms that 
generate its income, based on selling targeted advertisement spaces. The project consists 
of the acquisition of parts of the company's shares with the money generated by 
exploiting the AdSense program offered by Google, who pays percentages of its income 
to individuals accepting to host targeted ads on their websites. Italian artists Eva and 
Franco Mattes, working collectively under these pseudonyms, question the habits and 
the motivations of the individuals participating in peculiar digital communities, by 
infiltrating and corrupting the codes of the subcultures belonging to specific social 
networks and video-games. Their works No Fun (2010), Reenactments (2007-10) and 
Freedome (2010) involve the participation of the artists within the virtual communities. 
The performative work of Eva and Franco Mattes highlights the cynicism and the 
immorality pervading these virtual social playgrounds, suggesting that the social 





further isolate the individuals. !Mediengruppe Bitnik, who are arguably among the most 
prominent artistic collective representing new media art in Switzerland, have turned 
hacking into their distinctive approach. Their works consist of interventions that 
question the violation of privacy allowed by modern technologies. Activities such as 
hijacking the surveillance cameras of the Zurich police force (Militärstrasse 105, 2009) 
and of a tube station in London (Surveillance Chess, 2012) brought the artistic 
collective to the public attention. In 2013, !Mediengruppe Bitnik succeeded in sending a 
package to Julian Assange, confined in the Ecuadorian embassy in London, using a 
hidden camera and built-in GPS to track its tortuous trip to its destination. Although the 
work intended to test the possibility of contacting a controversial and protected person 
such as Assange - and at the same time determine the existence of a surveillance system 
within the postal service - the work implicitly asserted the affiliation of the artistic 
group with the leader of WikiLeaks and the hacker ideology associated with the 
organisation. During his online talk at the ISEA Festival in Sydney, Julian Assange 
returned the favour by mentioning the work of the Swiss artists as an example of 
meaningful digital art. 
 
The GLI.TC/H festival founded in Chicago in 2010 by artists Nick Briz, Evan Meaney, 
Rosa Menkman and Jon Satrom proposes a cluster of works that, more particularly, 
further develop the disorderly aesthetic that characterized the early works of the Net Art 
movement, such as the one by Jodi and Mark Napier, for example. These younger artists 
exploit glitches and errors to produce performances, software, videos and musical works 
that rely on the malfunctioning of computing machines. For instance, they create videos 
depicting the chaotic multiplication of icons and folders on a window desk, or musical 
and visual compositions generated by corrupted files. Instead of manifesting the will to 
develop sophisticated programs that employ the computational capabilities of the 
machines, they rather build upon and emphasize the dysfunctional occurrences of 
computers and software to create works that are formally surprising and fascinating. 
Although these younger artists do manifest a peculiar fetish for a disorderly aesthetic, 
which is undeniably captivating on a formal level, they nonetheless exalt the 
vulnerability and uselessness of the machine, instead of its utility for society. Artist and 





development of glitch art as a genre and made it very clear that the artistic intent behind 
her work was indeed subversive in nature: 
 
To some artists, myself included, it has become a personal matter to break the 
assured informatic flows of media. (...) Through these tactics, glitch artists 
reveal the machine’s techné and enable critical sensory experience to take place 
around materials, ideologies and (aesthetic) structures. Their destructive or 
disfiguring processes have no technological name, definition or explanation 
(yet).391 
 
The words of Rosa Menkman, representing the youngest generation within a larger 
history of computer-based generative art, summarise quite well the convoluted stance 
regarding the machine that characterizes this type of artistic production: if on the one 
hand the glitch artists still manifest a fascination for the machine and its peculiar formal 
qualities, on the other they have clearly assimilated the subversive drive that 
characterized artistic production at the end of the nineties. The purpose of her work, as 
she affirms, is to disrupt the flows of media, challenging the idea that information 
technologies are reliable tools and therefore questioning their utility for our society. 
 
However, the inclination of artists to engage with machines with a disruptive approach 
is not only a consequence of the establishment of the new media art field. The analysis 
of the work of Harold Cohen and Edward Ihnatowicz, joined with the considerations of 
their respective positions through their writings, contradict the idea that they were 
simply mimicking the scientific research in their works. Both artists developed their 
own language and solutions, exploiting the computer to pursue their artistic goals. 
Harold Cohen did not question the machine and its impact on society; nevertheless, his 
purpose was not to bring the arts and the sciences closer, it was first and foremost an 
enquiry into the act of drawing, an enquiry driven by the conviction that the general 
understanding of art-making should be challenged. Edward Ihnatowicz, on the other 
hand, was persuaded that art and technology should move toward the same goal, as 
expressed in his writings. In this sense, the metaphor of bridging the two cultures could 
be justified to describe his work. However, he strongly disagreed with the methodology 
of artificial intelligence, the most prominent model of exploiting computers for 
epistemological goals during his time. One decade before the publication of the theories 
                                                            





of embodied robotics, he anticipated the same ideas concerning the possibilities of 
machines to evolve in an open environment. What is more, the Senster, his most 
spectacular achievement, should be regarded as the result of his personal obsessions for 
building a life-like creature in the tradition of automata. To consider Ihnatowicz as an 
artist fascinated with the scientific research of his time would be incorrect. It is true that 
Cohen and Ihnatowicz were sincerely attempting to examine emerging behaviours such 
as intelligence and creativity, by developing a personal and profound understanding of 
the technologies they used in their artistic production. Nevertheless, these artists clearly 
stated their distance from the scientific research of their time and repeatedly affirmed 
their artistic identity and autonomy. The fascination for the computing machine 
expressed by the two pioneers has to be therefore reconsidered under the light of the 
critique that they addressed to the artificial intelligence research. Critics and historians 
that have discussed their works have, in my opinion, overstated the association of the 
artists to this scientific discipline during and after their lifetime. 
 
If computer-based generative art is often considered as a very restricted group of works 
that exemplify the marriage of art and science, artists working within this field seem to 
resist this kind of classification and rather have developed a confrontational approach to 
the machine, which was, ultimately, the source of the creative process of their work. In 
conclusion, I argue that the metaphor of bridging the arts and the science is a misleading 
approach in understanding this form of artistic production in particular and media art in 
general. I also affirm that, if on the one hand the subversive drives were particularly 
expected and encouraged by curators and critics of the 'traditional' art world during the 
nineties, artists that used computers have developed a personal and disruptive approach 
even before that time. The will to challenge the usual functioning of the machine 
characterized the production of artists engaged in experimenting with computers. These 
artists constantly affirmed their independence from scientific research. If media art 
critics and historians continue to insist that the interest of computer-generated art relies 
on the opportunities it offers to bring the arts and the sciences closer together, this kind 
of artistic production will never be fully understood and appreciated, neither from the 
actors of the media art field, nor from the ones of the traditional art world. A change of 





for their respective and creatively subversive approach, rather than for their supposed 
role of bringing the sciences and the humanities closer to one another. What is more, the 
change of perspective regarding this type of artistic production allows us to better 
understand and finally overcome the so-called digital divide. 
Another Take on the Digital Divide 
The digital divide is a prevailing and ongoing debate among the new media art 
specialists. Grant Taylor, while considering recent examples of digital and media art as 
an evolution of computer art, affirms that this production is still separated from the 
traditional art world. Catherine Mason, in her analysis of the early years of British 
computer art, concludes that this field "has tended to be overlooked by mainstream 
art".392 Concerning digital and media art in general, she also adds that "there is still 
some way to go before these are thoroughly integrated within museum culture".393 
Edward Shanken and Domenico Quaranta sustain that this production, generally 
discussed under the term 'media art', is excluded from the traditional circuit of art, 
providing several arguments to explain the divide, already discussed in the first chapter. 
I am arguing that the perceived digital divide is badly formulated and further increases 
the misunderstanding of an important part of the current artistic production. Firstly, it is 
important to clarify some of the terms and concepts involved in the debate about the 
digital divide. Computer art, digital art and new media art, or simply media art, are 
being used interchangeably and inconsistently. In the first chapter, I have discussed the 
different narratives that linked computer-generated art to one group of production. 
Computer art is related to the artistic production involving the use of a general-purpose 
programmable machine. Digital art involves the use of digital media, and is often used 
as a synonym for computer art. The most recent term of media art, today widely used, 
encompasses a larger spectrum of works exploiting media ranging from computers to 
bio-technologies, including obsolete devices and tools. Although I have focused on 
computer-generated art in my research, I consider it as an exemplary case to discuss the 
                                                            
392 Catherine Mason, A Computer in the Art Room: The Origins of British Computer Arts 1950-80 
(Hindrigham, Norfolk: JJG, 2008), 239. 





so-called digital divide that concerns the supposed separation of the media art field from 
the traditional art field. This perceived divide is not to be confused with the separation 
of the two cultures, the humanities and the sciences, as expressed by Charles Percy 
Snow. The digital divide concerns the alleged separation between the traditional circuit 
of contemporary art and the field of new media art. I do not question the existence of 
the media art field: it is undeniable, that there are institutions, exhibitions, festivals and 
journals dedicated to present, promote and discuss artistic productions that focus on the 
use of digital media and modern technologies. I do not question that there are critics, 
curators and artists that work and evolve within this field. But to acknowledge the 
existence of one particular field does not necessarily imply that the field is separated 
from another. Contemporary art, on an international level, is composed of a large 
number of actors and overlapping fields. Photography, installation and video art, for 
example, are being discussed and promoted by dedicated institutions, journals and 
curators. Although they constitute specific fields, they are nevertheless all part of the 
contemporary art field. The same is true for media art. However, what the media art 
critics who discuss the digital divide affirm is that media art suffers from a particular 
reclusion, compared to other artistic productions, from the traditional and international 
fine art institutions. They deplore the lack of opportunities for media artists to 
participate and succeed in the traditional circuit of institutions, museums, biennales and 
commercial galleries that constitute the contemporary art world. It is precisely against 
this opinion and the arguments provided to support it, that I argue. 
 
The discussion concerning the so-called digital divide is certainly complicated by the 
difficulty of clearly circumscribing the artistic production associated with media art. 
The coexistence of terms such as computer and digital art, as well as the recurring 
addition of the adjective 'new' - as in 'new media art' - further complicates the issue, 
because of the rapid evolution of new technologies. If the terms were used to only 
identify the artistic production with regard to the devices used by the artists, as I have 
previously described, the problem would be easily solved. However, prominent media 
art critics and historians such as Christiane Paul, Geert Lovink, Anke Hoffmann and 
Yvonne Volkart almost unanimously propose to identify media art with the works of 





technologies on our society, rather than with respect to the media used in their practice. 
This is what I would call the thematic definition of media art, as opposed to the 
description based on the nature of the media used. 
 
At first glance, the thematic definition offers the advantage of dissociating media art 
from modern technologies and, at the same time, including a wider range of works 
within this artistic production. In truth, the thematic definition allows works of media 
art to be arbitrarily included and excluded depending on the necessity of the critic or 
historian to justify his or her arguments. For example, media art critics that discuss the 
digital divide, support this thesis by excluding works of computer and digital art that are 
presented in the traditional circuit because, as they affirm, these works do not discuss 
the technologies employed by the artist, as requested by the thematic definition of 
media art. Claire Bishop affirmed that there are very few digital and new media 
artworks in the traditional art field, while Domenico Quaranta relates the history of 
media art and its flirt with contemporary art as a short lived adventure. If we consider 
recent important international exhibitions, it appears that works using computer and 
digital media are nevertheless included. The 13th documenta edition in 2012 presented a 
large retrospective of the works of Erkki Kurenniemi, an iconic figure of electronic 
music, experimental movies and robotics, while the 55th edition of the Venice Biennial 
in 2013 recreated a video-drome work by Stan Van Der Beek. If those might be 
regarded as historical tributes to pioneering artists engaging with computers, electronics 
and new media, they contradict or at least weaken the assumption that media art is cut 
off from the traditional circuit. Many contemporary artists that use computers and 
digital media in their practices, such as Cory Arcangel and Wade Guyton, are in fact 
often exhibited in important international institutions and exhibitions. It is therefore not 
the case that new media and digital art is not presented in the contemporary art circuit. 
What is nonetheless the case, is that artists who do work with new media and digital 
technologies and do exhibit within the traditional art circuit are systematically regarded 
as not being genuine media artists from the majority of critics who support the existence 
of the digital divide. According to Grant Taylor, many young contemporary artists, 





references to computers."394 Analogously, Claire Bishop affirms that many artists such 
as Cory Arcangel, Cao Fei and Miltos Manetas, who manifestly use digital media, do 
not bring these media into a critical and deeper perspective. 
 
While many artists use digital technology, how many really confront the 
question of what it means to think, see, and filter affect through the digital? 
How many thematize this, or reflect deeply on how we experience, and are 
altered by, the digitization of our existence?395  
 
Bishop answers her own question by affirming that she can think of only a handful of 
artists undertaking these tasks, such as Frances Stark, Thomas Hirschhorn and Ryan 
Trecartin. Conversely, media art historians today still describe Harold Cohen as an artist 
who has not been correctly recognised by the traditional field. However, during his 
pioneering years, he exhibited in important institutions such as the Tate Modern in 
London, the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art and the Stedelijk Museum in 
Amsterdam. 
 
It is clear from these examples, that the thematic argument allows for the exclusion of 
works of media art that are successful in the traditional art world because they would 
otherwise contradict the thesis that computer art is ignored by the traditional circuit. 
This points us to the fact that the concept of media art is employed not to define a 
specific group of artists or works, but primarily in order to claim, instead of defending, 
a specific field of practice. In this sense, I consider the thematic definition to be 
problematic. What is more, the thematic definition is another case of fallacy concerning 
medium specificity in art, as discussed by Rosalind Krauss in her essay A Voyage in the 
North Sea.396 The American art historian refers to the work of Marcel Broodthaers (in 
particular his complex and evolving project Musée d'Art Moderne, Départment des 
Aigles) to controvert the idea that works of art should be analysed and judged according 
to their conformity to the specificity of the medium employed, as defended by 
modernist critic Clement Greenberg. Although media art critics that support the 
thematic definition do not offer, strictly speaking, a Greenbergian definition of media 
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specificity - that is to say, they do not affirm that the peculiar device used by the artist 
has to be employed in its physical specificity - they still fall prey to the fallacy, in my 
opinion, of attempting to impose a prescriptive definition of what media art should be, 
in this case based on the discourse offered by the artist. In the best case, the thematic 
definition can be accepted as an attempt to provide a qualitative criterion for the 
judgment of media art, upon which one might agree or disagree. In this case, works of 
media art that offer a reflection on modern technologies and their consequences on our 
society could be appreciated according to the significance of the discourse proposed by 
the artist. However, the thematic definition is not acceptable when determining the 
inclusion or exclusion of media art works within this kind of artistic production because 
it does not provide any reliable and objective criteria. It is an illusion that one could 
define the necessary content of media artworks. Similarly, it would be improbable to 
have content-based prescriptions for a painting, a work of photography or a drawing 
before accepting these artworks as such. The great majority of younger artists with 
whom I had the opportunity to discuss this issue, clearly considers themselves first and 
foremost as artists and are quite reluctant to subscribe to a specific field of art, be it 
computer art, digital art or media art. But the same is true for key figures: as already 
discussed, Harold Cohen explicitly refused to be considered a computer artist in his 
paper "Off The Shelf".397 Christa Sommerer expressed a similar stance: although 
conceding to profit from the existence of an 'art and science' interest, she felt compelled 
to claim her artistic position and to express distance from any scientific goals or 
approaches, rooting her production in a larger artistic legacy, encompassing, for 
example, performance art.398 Dirk Paesmans and Joan Heemskerk, of Jodi, strongly 
criticised the presentation of their work during the tenth documenta and in particular the 
constitution of an isolated showroom for media art. They also affirmed that they "never 
choose to be net.artists or not" but simply started, as artists, "to make things on the 
computer".399 What is more, the discourses developed by these artists are very diverse, 
as demonstrated by the analysis of their work, and cannot be reduced under the 
restricting perspective of thematising the technologies in our society. 
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It appears to me that, when critics and historians attempt to define media art through the 
content of the works, they are in fact securing their artistic field by prescribing the 
necessary knowledge required to participate in it. In this sense media art could be 
considered a combat term. The reflection offered by Mitchell G. Ash on the word 
Pseudowissenschaft might be helpful here. Mitchell G. Ash considers the word 
Pseudowissenschaft as a combat term, which does not provide a clear characterization 
of the disciplines to which it refers, but is rather used to position the person employing 
the term within a debate "whose content is determined more by the interests of the 
actors involved than by durable and definable standards."400 Analogously, the thematic 
definition of media art offers less the opportunity to better define media art, and rather 
secures the position of the actor discussing media art as an expert of the field. In this 
case, of course, the combat term does not have a negative connotation, such as 
'Pseudowissenschaft', but a positive one. The mechanism is similar nonetheless. 
 
The understanding of the thematic definition of media art as a case of medium 
specificity fallacy allows for better understanding of the question concerning the 
supposed digital divide. The most frequently recurring arguments offered to explain the 
divide, as analysed in the first chapter, invoke the lack of a commercial market within 
the art world and the lack of competences among critics and curators. I will not discuss 
the argument concerning the lack of market, since it goes beyond the content of my 
research. My experience in the traditional circuit of art as a curator, and having worked 
for an international commercial gallery in Geneva over the course of two years, has 
provided me with many convincing examples of the vast potential to commercialize a 
work of art regardless of its medium and form. After all, Yves Klein managed to sell for 
gold several "Zone de Sensibilité Picturale Immatérielle" in the early sixties! 
Furthermore, in his analysis of Internet art, Julian Stallabrass mentions examples of 
artists selling their works in a variety of ways. Although he concedes that the marketing 
of online works comes with many challenges associated with authorship and ownership, 
he asserts that "for online activists, perhaps the most pernicious aspect of showing 
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Internet art in the gallery is that it becomes unambiguously art."401 On the other hand, 
the argument invoking the lack of knowledge from the traditional art critics and 
curators, regarding digital art, is emblematic of the ambivalence of the discourse 
provided by media art critics and curators. On the one hand, they deplore a supposed 
separation of fields, yet on the other, they insist that actors from the so-called traditional 
art field lack the instruments to understand digital art. It seems to me that this argument 
is precisely related to the medium specificity fallacy and the securing of the media art 
field by the actors involved with it. By defining media art works in regard to their 
supposed thematic-wise specificity and by affirming that knowledge in the field is 
required to approach such works, the actors working in the media art field not only 
establish the existence of their field and secure their positions, but they also exclude 
critics and curators of the traditional art field from discussing and participating in this 
form of artistic production. Digital and media artworks are undeniably present in the 
traditional circuit of fine arts, although I can concede that one might argue about their 
lower number in relation to the number of works using more traditional media, such as 
painting. However, the smaller proportion of computer artworks with respect to 
paintings and sculptures within the traditional circuit of art museums and galleries could 
be simply explained as a reduced number of artists working with this media, which 
leads to a lower number of convincing and exhibition worthy works. Media art critics 
insist that digital artworks presented in the traditional circuit differ from authentic 
media artworks, relying on the thematic definition. However, the differences based on 
the thematic definition between works of digital art presented in the traditional circuit 
and those which are allegedly excluded from it, as suggested by the supporter of the 
digital divide, are not convincing. The analysis of the criteria of selection and of the 
reception of the works of the tenth documenta demonstrates that the critical stance 
regarding modern technologies rather favoured the inclusion of computer-based works 
within a traditional institution.  
 
As an alternative to the widespread idea that the mainstream art field excludes new 
media artworks and artists, I propose to consider that the perceived exclusion is in fact 
the result of the establishment of the media art field itself. As a separated field, media 
                                                            






art stands out and flourishes with its circuit of international festivals and dedicated 
institutions, it offers an important platform to artists, curators and critics (who focus on 
media and digital technologies) who, in turn, strengthen the field and its identity. 
Because it is a dedicated platform, it is more accessible for the concerned actors, than 
the wider circuit of traditional galleries and museums, which encompasses all 
contemporary artistic production. Certainly, a successful career within the new media 
art field doesn't automatically translate to a successful career in the contemporary art 
world. This is, I concede, a possible difficulty resulting in the existence of a dedicated 
field such as media art. Nonetheless, many artists have been able to present their works 
both in the specialised media art institutions and in the traditional ones as well. Julius 
von Bismarck, winner in 2008 of the prestigious Golden Nica award at the Ars 
Electronica Festival with his Image Fulgurator, later worked with other contemporary 
artists and institutions. For example, he collaborated with Santiago Sierra in the 
performative work NO projected above the Pope during the World Youth Day in 
Madrid in 2011 and he presented his works in traditional institutions such as the Palais 
de Tokyo and the Venice Biennial. Previously discussed artists like Jodi and 
!Mediengruppe Bitnik provide similar examples. Hence, digital and media art 
specialists need to abandon the illusion of medium specificity and forget the thematic 
definition of media art. In addition, freeing the work of digital and media art from their 
constrained role of 'bridging the two cultures', as I have already stated, will not only 
allow for a better appreciation of the qualities of these works, but will also constitute a 
valuable step towards the facilitation of a dialogue between the specialised field of 
media art and the traditional circuit of contemporary art. 
 
The investigation of the origins of the subversive drives in computer-generated art has 
changed my initial assumptions concerning this type of artistic production. It now 
appears clear to me that these driving forces are a necessity of the artists engaging with 
machines to affirm their artistic work independently from the association with modern 
technologies and scientific research. My analysis also allowed me to approach the much 
debated questions of the digital divide. On several occasions, I had the opportunity to 
discuss the future of media art with artists, critics and curators involved in and outside 





conviction that media and digital art is either doomed to disappear or else to eventually 
merge with the contemporary art world. These predictions bear a similar flavour to the 
ones that announced the end of painting some decades ago. They also strengthen the 
illusion of a digital divide. The abundance and the variety of this kind of artistic 
production today contradict such predictions, just as the vivacity of contemporary 
painting confirms, if needed, that this traditional medium is far from being depleted. 
The future of computer-based generative art, like that of media art in general, lies not in 
the merging with the traditional circuit of art, for these works and their artists have 
always been part of contemporary artistic production. The parallel existence of 
dedicated institutions for media art does not contradict this assertion. These institutions 
fulfil an important function by supporting artistic productions related to new media and 
modern technologies, as long as they allow works to be presented and discussed 
regardless of their supposed medium specificity. Critics and curators engaging with 
computer, digital and media art should learn to appreciate these types of productions for 
their artistic qualities, rather than focusing only on modern technologies as a topic and 
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